

AN
E S S A Y

CONCERNING

Human Understanding;

WITH

Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding.

BY JOHN LOCKE, ESQ.

COLLATED WITH DESMAIZEAUX'S EDITION.

To which is prefixed,

THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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E. S. A. Y.



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OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK II.—CHAPTER XXII.

OF MIXED MODES.

§ 1. *Mixed Modes, what.*

HAVING treated of *simple modes* in the foregoing chapters, and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to show what they are, and how we come by them, we are now, in the next place, to consider those we call *mixed modes*; such are the complex *ideas* we mark by the names *obligation*, *drunkenness*, a *lie*, &c. which, consisting of several combinations of *simple ideas*, of different kinds, I have called *mixed modes*, to distinguish them from the more *simple modes*, which consist only of *simple ideas* of the same kind. These *mixed modes*, being also such combinations of *simple ideas*, as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent *ideas* put together by the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex *ideas* of substances.

§ 2. *Made by the Mind.*

THAT the mind, in respect of its *simple ideas*, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the existence and operations of things, such as sensation or reflection offers them, without being able to make any one *idea*, experience shows us; but, if we attentively consider these *ideas* I call *mixed modes*, we are now speaking of, we shall find their original quite different. The mind often exercises an active power in making these several

combinations; for, it being once furnished with simple *ideas*, it can put them together in several compositions, and so make variety of complex *ideas*, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is that these *ideas* are called *notions*, as if they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things; and, to such *ideas*, it sufficed that the mind puts the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding, without considering whether they had any real being; though I do not deny but several of them might be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple *ideas* so combined, as they are put together in the understanding. For, the man who first framed the *idea of hypocrisy* might have either taken it at first from the observation of one who made show of good qualities which he had not, or else have framed that *idea* in his mind, without having any such pattern to fashion it by; for it is evident, that in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex *ideas*, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of men before they existed any where else; and that many names that stood for such complex *ideas* were in use, and so those *ideas* framed, before the combination they stood for ever existed.

§ 3. *Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.*

INDEED, now that languages are made and abound with words standing for such combinations, an usual way of getting those complex *ideas*, is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For, consisting of a company of simple *ideas* combined, they may, by words standing for those simple *ideas*, be represented to the mind of one who understands those words, though that complex combination of simple *ideas* were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the *idea of sacrilege* or *murder*, by enumerating to him the simple *ideas* which these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.

4 §. *The Name ties the parts of Mixed Modes into one Idea.*

EVERY *mixed mode* consisting of many distinct simple *ideas*, it seems reasonable to inquire *whence it has its unity*, and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one *idea*, since that combination does not always exist together in nature. To which I answer, It is plain it has its unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple *ideas* together, and considering them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this union, or that which is looked on generally to complete it, is one name given to that combination. For it is by their names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any number of simple *ideas* to make one complex one, but such collections as there be names for. Thus, though the killing of an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one complex *idea* as the killing a man's father, yet, there being no name standing precisely for the one, as there is the name of *parricide* to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex *idea*, nor a distinct species of actions, from that of killing a young man, or any other man.

§ 5. *The Cause of making Mixed Modes.*

If we should inquire a little farther, to see *what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled modes*, and neglect others, which, in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined, and make distinct *ideas*, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of language, which being to mark or communicate men's thoughts to one another with all the despatch that may be, they usually make such collections of *ideas* into complex modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of living and conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that tie them together; they rather choosing to enumerate (when they have need) such *ideas*

as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex *ideas* with names to them, which they shall seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

§ 6. *Why Words in one Language have none answering in another.*

THIS shows us *how it comes to pass that there are in every language many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another.* For the several fashions, customs, and manners of one nation, making several combinations of *ideas* similar and necessary in one, which another people have never had any occasion to make, or perhaps so much as taken notice of; names comes of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation, and so they become so many distinct complex *ideas* in their minds. Thus *ἰσχυρισμός* amongst the Greeks, and *proscriptio* amongst the Romans, were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered, because they stood for complex *ideas*, which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no such custom, there was no notion of any such actions; no use of such combinations of *ideas* as were united, and, as it were, tied together by those terms; and therefore in other countries there were no names for them.

§ 7. *Why Languages change.*

HENCE also we may see the reasons *why languages constantly change*, take up new, and lay by old terms; because change of customs and opinions bringing with it new combinations of *ideas*, which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long descriptions, are annexed to them, and so they become new species of complex modes. What a number of different *ideas* are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the *ideas* that either *reprieve* or *appeal* stand for; and, instead of either

of those names, use a periphrasis, to make any understand their meaning.

§ 8. *Mixed Modes, where they exist.*

THOUGH I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when I come to treat of words and their use, yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of *mixed modes*, which, being fleeting and transient combinations of simple *ideas*, which have but a short existence any where but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any existence, than whilst they are thought on, *have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence, as in their names*; which are therefore, in these sort of *ideas*, very apt to be taken for the *ideas* themselves. For if we should inquire where the *idea* of a *triumph* or *apotheosis* exists, it is evident they could neither of them exist altogether any where in the things themselves, being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never exist all together; and as to the minds of men, where the *ideas* of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain existence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

§ 9. *How we get the Ideas of Mixed Modes.*

THERE are therefore *three ways whereby we get the complex ideas of mixed modes*. 1. By experience and observation of things themselves. Thus, by seeing two men wrestle or fence, we get the *idea* of wrestling or fencing. 2. By *invention*, or voluntary putting together of several simple *ideas* in our own minds; so he that first invented printing or etching had an *idea* of it in his mind before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by *explaining the names* of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot see; and, by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting before our imaginations all those *ideas* which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For, having, by *sensation* or *reflection*, stored our minds with simple *ideas*, and, by use, got the names that stand for them, we can, by those names, represent to another any com-

plex *idea* we would have him conceive; so that it has in it no simple *ideas* but what he knows, and has with us the same name for. For all our complex *ideas* are ultimately resolveable into simple *ideas*, of which they are compounded and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex *ideas*. Thus the *mixed mode*, which the word *lie* stands for, is made of these simple *ideas*:
 1. Articulate sounds. 2. Certain *ideas* in the mind of the speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those *ideas*. 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the *ideas* they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the analysis of that complex *idea* we call a *lie*. What I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple *ideas*; and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my reader to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple *idea* that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex *ideas* whatsoever, which, however compounded and decomposed, may at last be resolved into simple *ideas*, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear that the mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of *ideas*, if we consider what an inexhaustible stock of simple modes number and figure alone affords us. How far then *mixed modes*, which admit of various combinations of different simple *ideas*, and their infinite modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that, before we have done, we shall see that nobody need be afraid he shall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple *ideas* received from sensation or reflection, and their several combinations.

§ 10. *Motion, Thinking, and Power have been most modified.*

It is worth our observing, *which of all our simple ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed modes made out of them, with names given to them; and those have been*

these three : Thinking and motion (which are the two *ideas* which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence these actions are conceived to flow. These simple *ideas*, I say, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been most modified, and out of whose modification have been made most complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great business of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder that the several modes of thinking and motion should be taken notice of, the *ideas* of them observed, and laid up in the memory, and have names assigned to them, without which laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorder repressed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without such complex *ideas*, with names to them; and therefore men have settled names, and supposed settled *ideas*, in their minds, of modes of actions distinguished by their causes, means, objects, ends, instruments, time, place, and other circumstances; and also of their powers fitted for those actions, *v. g.* boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, *παρρησία*, which power or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is that *idea* we name *habit*; when it is forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it *disposition*. Thus *testiness* is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

To conclude, let us examine any *mode of action*, *v. g.* *consideration* and *assent*, which are actions of the mind; *running* and *speaking*, which are actions of the body; *revenge* and *murder*, which are actions of both together; and we shall find them but so many *collections of simple ideas*, which together make up the complex ones signified by those names.

§ II. *Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the Effect.*

POWER being the source from whence all action proceeds, the substances wherein these powers are, when

they exert this power into act, are called *causes*; and the substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple *ideas* which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that power, are called *effects*. The *efficacy* whereby the new substance or *idea* is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that power, *action*; but in the subject wherein any simple *idea* is changed or produced, it is called *passion*; which efficacy, however various, and the effects almost infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of action, besides these, produces any effects, I confess myself to have no notion nor *idea* of, and so it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the *ideas* of colours to a blind man; and therefore *many words, which seem to express some action*, signify nothing of the action or *modus operandi* at all, but barely *the effect*, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no *idea* of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And, when a country man says the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems to import some *action*, yet truly it signifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any *idea* of the action whereby it is done.

§ 12. *Mixed Modes made also of other Ideas.*

I THINK I shall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths of men; yet other simple *ideas*, and their several combinations, are *not* excluded; much less, I think, will it be *necessary* for me to *enumerate all the mixed modes* which have been settled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the

greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design, is, to show what sort of *ideas* those are which I call *mixed modes*, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compositions made up of simple *ideas* got from sensation and reflection, which, I suppose, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII.

OF OUR COMPLEX *IDEAS* OF SUBSTANCES.§ 1. *Ideas of Substances, how made.*

THE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple *ideas*, conveyed in by the *senses*, as they are found in exterior things, or by *reflection* on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple *ideas* go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick despatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterwards to talk of, and consider as one simple *idea*, which indeed is a complication of many *ideas* together: Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple *ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some *substratum* wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call *substance*.

§ 2. *Our Idea of Substance in general.*

So that if any one will examine himself concerning his *notion of pure substance in general*, he will find he has no other *idea* of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple *ideas* in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, What is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres? he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded, What is it that solidity and extension inhere in? he would not be

in a much better case than the *Indian* before mentioned, who, saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on? To which his answer was, A great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, Something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct *ideas*, we talk like children; who being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily gave this satisfactory answer, That it is *something*: which, in truth, signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is what they have no distinct *idea* of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The *idea*, then, we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substantia*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, *standing under, or upholding*.

§ 3. *Of the sorts of Substances.*

AN obscure and relative *idea* of substance in general being thus made, we come to have the *ideas of particular sorts of substances*, by collecting such combinations of simple *ideas*, as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come to have the *ideas* of a man, horse, gold, water, &c. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear *idea*, farther than of certain simple *ideas* co-existing together, I appeal to every one's own experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex *idea* of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other *idea* of those substances than what is framed by a col-

lection of those simple *ideas* which are to be found in them: only we must take notice, that our complex *ideas* of substances, besides all those simple *ideas* they are made up of, have always the confused *idea* of *something* to which they belong, and in which they subsist. And therefore, when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a *thing* having such or such qualities; as body is a *thing* that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; spirit, a *thing* capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say, are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking, intimate that the substance is supposed always *something* besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable *ideas*, though we know not what it is.

§ 4. *No clear Idea of Substance in general.*

HENCE, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as *horse*, *stone*, &c. though the *idea* we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple *ideas* of sensible qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common subject; which support we denote by the name *Substance*, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct *idea* of that thing we suppose a support.

§ 5. *As clear an Idea of Spirit as Body.*

THE same happens concerning the operations of the mind, *viz.* thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call *spirit*: whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *idea* or notion of matter, but *something* wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses, do subsist; by supposing a substance, wherein *thinking*, *knowing*, *doubting*, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of *spirit*, as we have of *body*: the one being supposed

to be (without knowing what it is) the *substratum* to those simple *ideas* we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *substratum* to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that the *idea* of corporeal *substance* in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of spiritual *substance* or *spirit*: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the *substance* of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct *idea* of the *substance* of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct *idea* of the *substance* of a spirit.

§ 6. *Of the sorts of Substances.*

WHATEVER, therefore, be the secret abstract nature of *substance* in general, all the *ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances*, are nothing but several combinations of simple *ideas*, co-existing in such, though unknown, cause of their union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. It is by such combinations of simple *ideas*, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of *substances* to ourselves; such are the *ideas* we have of their several species in our minds; and such only do we, by their specific names, signify to others, *v. g. man, horse, sun, water, iron*: upon hearing which words, every one who understands the language, frames in his mind a combination of those several simple *ideas* which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it were, adherent to, that unknown common substratum, which inheres not in any thing else. Though, in the mean time, it be manifest, and every one upon inquiry into his own thoughts will find, that he has no other *idea* of any *substance*, *v. g. let it be gold, horse, iron, man, vitriol, bread*, but what he has barely of those sensible qualities which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a *substratum*, as gives, as it were, a support to those qualities or simple *ideas* which he has

observed to exist united together. Thus, the *idea* of the *sun*, what is it but an aggregate of those several simple *ideas*, bright, hot, roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some other? as he who thinks and discourses of the *sun*, has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities, *ideas*, or properties, which are in that thing which he calls the *sun*.

§ 7. *Power, a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.*

FOR he has the perfectest *idea* of any of the particular sorts of *substances*, who has gathered and put together most of those simple *ideas* which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active powers and passive capacities; which, though not simple *ideas*, yet in this respect, for brevity sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus, the power of drawing iron is one of the *ideas* of the complex one of that substance we call a *loadstone*; and a power to be so drawn, is a part of the complex one we call *iron*: which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects. Because every *substance*, being as apt, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible qualities in other subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple *ideas* which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible qualities introduced into other subjects, discover to us those powers, which do thereby mediately affect our senses, as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately: v. g. we immediately, by our senses, perceive in *fire* its heat and colour: which are, if rightly considered, nothing but powers in it to produce those *ideas* in us: We also, by our senses, perceive the colour and brittleness of *charcoal*, whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of wood. By the former fire immediately, by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire, and so make them a part of the complex *ideas* of it. For all those powers that we take cognizance of, terminating only in the al-

teration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible *ideas*; therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple *ideas*, which make the complex ones of the sorts of *substances*; though these powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex *ideas*. And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these *potentialities amongst the simple ideas*, which we recollect in our minds, when we think of *particular substances*. For the powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances.

§ 8. *And why.*

NOR are we to wonder, that *powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances*; since their secondary qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex *idea* of the several sorts of them. For our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk, texture, and figure of the minute parts of bodies, on which their real constitutions and differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities, as the characteristical notes and marks, whereby to frame *ideas* of them in our minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary qualities, as has been shown, are nothing but bare powers. For the colour and taste of *opium* are, as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues, mere powers depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies.

§ 9. *Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Substances.*

THE *ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances*, are of these three sorts: First, The *ideas* of the primary qualities of things, which are discovered by our senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not; such are the bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion of the parts of bodies, which are really in

them, whether we take notice of them or no. *Secondly*, The sensible secondary qualities, which, depending on these, are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several *ideas* in us by our senses; which *ideas* are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its cause. *Thirdly*, The aptness we consider in any substance to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities, as that the substance so altered should produce in us different *ideas* from what it did before; these are called active and passive powers: All which powers, as far as we have any notice or notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple *ideas*. For whatever alteration a *loadstone* has the power to make in the minute particles of iron, we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron, did not its sensible motion discover it: and I doubt not, but there are a thousand changes, that bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects.

§ 10. *Powers make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.*

POWERS therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances. He that will examine his complex *idea* of gold, will find several of its *ideas* that make it up, to be only powers: as the power of being melted, but of not spending itself in the fire; of being dissolved in *aq. regia*; are *ideas* as necessary to make up our complex *idea* of gold, as its colour and weight: which, if duly considered, are also nothing but different powers. For to speak truly, yellowness is not actually in gold, but is a power in gold to produce that *idea* in us by our eyes, when placed in a due light: And the heat, which we cannot leave out of our *idea* of the sun, is no more really in the sun, than the white colour it introduces into wax. These are both equally powers in the sun, operating, by the motion and figure of its insensible parts, so on a man, as to make him have the *idea* of heat: and so on wax, as to make it capable to produce in a man the *idea* of white.

§ 11. *The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts.*

HAD we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies, and the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different *ideas* in us; and that which is now the yellow colour of gold would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size and figure. This microscopes plainly discover to us: For what to our naked eye produces a certain colour, is, by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a coloured object to our usual sight, produces different *ideas* from what it did before. Thus sand or pounded glass, which is opaque, and white to the naked eye, is pellucid in a microscope; and a hair seen this way, loses its former colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling colours, such as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and other pellucid bodies. Blood, to the naked eye, appears all red; but by a good microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shows only some few globules of red, swimming in a pellucid liquor: and how these red globules would appear, if glasses could be found that yet could magnify them 1000, or 10,000 times more, is uncertain.

§ 12. *Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.*

THE infinite wise Contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to the conveniencies of life, and the business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our uses, and several ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life. We have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power, and goodness of their Author. Such a knowledge as this, which is suited to our present condition, we want not faculties

to attain. I should have of them: To any finite being and weak aptures to lead the knowledge enough with living: These our senses all the appearance have quite another would be in being, in the He that could bear a removal than that we be satisfied, mansion, the and the bodily If our sense than it is, he And we should to sleep or m Nay, if that in any man is now by the of times less would, then would come tion of the many of them stitutions. B world from same to him would be diff the rest of m of sight, or ha appearances such a quick

tain. But it appears not that God intended we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate knowledge of them: That perhaps is not in the comprehension of finite being. We are furnished with faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the creature to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator, and to the knowledge of our duty; and we are fitted well even with abilities to provide for the conveniencies of life: These are our business in this world. But were our senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward scheme of things would present quite another face to us; and, I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our being, or at least well-suited, in this part of the universe which we inhabit. What considers how little our constitution is able to remove into parts of this air, not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reason to be satisfied, that in this globe of earth allotted for our habitation, the all-wise Architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are to affect them, one to another. If our sense of hearing were but 1000 times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract us? We should, in the quietest retirement, be less able to sleep or meditate, than in the middle of a sea-fight. If that most instructive of our senses, seeing, were in man 1000 or 100,000 times more acute than it now is by the best microscope, things several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now, would then be visible to his naked eyes, and so he would come nearer the discovery of the texture and motion of the minute parts of corporeal things; and in the use of them, probably get *ideas* of their internal constitutions. But then he would be in a quite different situation from other people: Nothing would appear the same to him and others; the visible *ideas* of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sense, or have any communication about colours, their differences being so wholly different. And perhaps a quickness and tenderness of sight could not en-

dure bright sunshine, or so much as open day-light; nor take in but a very small part of any object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if, by the help of such microscopical eyes (if I may so call them), a man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange; if he could not see things he was to avoid, at a convenient distance, nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion depends, would no doubt discover something very admirable: But if eyes so framed could not view, at once, the hand and the characters of the hour-plate, and thereby, at a distance, see what o'clock it was, their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness; which, whilst it discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him lose its use.

§ 13. *Conjecture about Spirits.*

AND here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine, viz. that since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine, that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk, figure, and conformation of parts; whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception, as to suit them to their present design, and the circumstances of the object they would consider. For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge, who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes, that one sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision which the assistance of glasses (casually at first lit on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his eyes to all

sorts of objects, as to see, when he pleased, the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood, and other juices of animals, as distinctly as he does, at other times, the shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us, in our present state, unalterable organs, so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies, whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them, would perhaps be of no advantage. God has, no doubt, made them so, as is best for us in our present condition. He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us, and we have to do with: And though we cannot, by the faculties we have, attain to a perfect knowledge of things, yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above mentioned, which are our great concernment. I beg my reader's pardon, for laying before him so wild a fancy, concerning the ways of perception in beings above us: But how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the knowledge of angels, but after this manner, some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves. And though we cannot but allow, that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have; yet our thoughts can go no farther than our own: so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the *ideas* received from our own sensation and reflection. The supposition, at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies, needs not startle us; since some of the most ancient and most learned Fathers of the Church seemed to believe that they had bodies: And this is certain, that their state and way of existence is unknown to us.

§ 14. *Complex Ideas of Substances.*

BUT to return to the matter in hand; the *ideas* we have of substances, and the ways we come by them: I say, our *specific ideas of substances* are nothing else but a *collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing*. These *ideas of substances*, though they are commonly called simple apprehensions, and the

names of them simple terms; yet in effect are complex and compounded. Thus, the *idea* which an Englishman signifies by the name *swan*, is white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise; and perhaps, to a man who has long observed those kind of birds, some other properties, which all terminate in sensible simple *ideas*, all united in one common subject.

§ 15. *Idea of Spiritual Substances as clear as of Bodily Substances.*

BESIDES the complex *ideas* we have of material sensible substances, of which I have last spoken, by the simple *ideas* we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion, &c. co-existing in some substance; we are able to frame the complex *idea* of an immaterial spirit. And thus, by putting together the *ideas* of thinking, perceiving, liberty and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances, as we have of material. For, putting together the *ideas* of thinking and willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion, joined to substance, of which we have no distinct *idea*, we have the *idea* of an immaterial spirit; and, by putting together the *ideas* of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with substance, of which likewise we have no positive *idea*, we have the *idea* of matter. The one is as clear and distinct an *idea* as the other: The *idea* of thinking, and moving a body, being as clear and distinct *ideas* as the *ideas* of extension, solidity, and being moved. For our *idea* of substance is equally obscure, or none at all in both; it is but a supposed I know not what, to support those *ideas* we call accidents. It is for want of reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things. Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst

I know, by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter, nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being.

§ 16. *No Idea of abstract Substance.*

By the complex *idea* of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the *idea* of the substance of body, as if we knew nothing at all: Nor, after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter, and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will it perhaps, upon examination, be found that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body, than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

§ 17. *The cohesion of solid Parts and Impulse, the primary Ideas of Body.*

THE primary ideas we have peculiar to body, as contradistinguished to spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulse. These, I think, are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body; for figure is but the consequence of finite extension.

§ 18. *Thinking and Motivity the primary Ideas of Spirit.*

THE ideas we have belonging and peculiar to spirit, are thinking and will, or a power of putting body into motion by thought, and, which is consequent to it, liberty. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body which it meets with at rest; so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The ideas of existence, duration, and mobility, are common to them both.

§ 19. *Spirits capable of motion.*

THERE is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make mobility belong to spirit: For, having no other idea of motion but change of distance with other

beings that are considered as at rest, and, finding that spirits, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where they are, and that spirits do operate at several times in several places, I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits (for of the infinite spirit I speak not here). For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body or being, as body itself; and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance between two spirits; and so conceive their motion, their approach, or removal, one from another.

§ 20.

EVERY one finds in himself, that his soul can think, will, and operate on his body in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a body, or in a place an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody can imagine that his soul can think, or move a body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his body, it constantly changes place all the whole journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in motion; or, if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear *idea* enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will: For to consider it as going out of the body, or leaving it, and yet to have no *idea* of its motion, seems to me impossible.

§ 21.

If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none; for spirits are not *in loco*, but *ubi*; I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many, in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reason

to show, that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God, not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite Spirit.

§ 22. *Idea of Soul and Body compared.*

LET us *compare* then our complex *idea* of an immaterial spirit with our complex *idea* of body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other, and in which most. Our *idea* of body, as I think, is an extended solid substance, capable of communicating motion by impulse: And our *idea* of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. These, I think, are our complex *ideas of soul and body, as contra-distinguished*; and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know, that people, whose thoughts are immersed in matter, and have so subjected their minds to their senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thinking thing, which perhaps is true: But I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

§ 23. *Cohesion of solid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceived as thinking in a Soul.*

If any one say, he knows not what it is thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks, I answer, Neither knows he how he is extended; how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere together, to make extension. For though the pressure of particles of air may account for the *cohesion of several parts of matter*, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air; yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And, if the pressure of the ether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite, and hold fast together the parts of a

particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis*. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by showing, that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of the ether itself: And by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the ether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the ether itself; which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of all other bodies.

§ 24.

BUT in truth, *the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter.* For, though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another, in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never, in the least, hinder the separation by a motion, in a line parallel to those surfaces. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space, deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body, were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the ether be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation (as has been shown), therefore, in every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion, than of two polished surfaces, which will always, not-

withstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that perhaps, how clear an *idea* soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is *as easy* for him to have a clear idea, *how the soul thinks, as how body is extended.* For since body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the *extension* of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

§ 25.

I ALLOW it is usual for most people to wonder, how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning *thinking* and *voluntary motion*? Do we not every moment experiment it in ourselves; and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there I think we are at a loss, both in the one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold, or brass (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass), come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them: A considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfy his own, or another man's understanding.

§ 26.

THE little bodies that compose that fluid we call *water*, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one, who, by a microscope (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to 10,000, nay, to much above

100,000 times), pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion: And the particles of *water* are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another; and yet, let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another, would discover a great, and yet unknown secret: And yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could show wherein consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those bonds, or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as any thing belonging to our minds, and a *solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one*, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

§ 27.

For, to extend our thoughts a little farther, that pressure, which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies, is as unintelligible as the cohesion itself. For if matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivable hoops, what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close a pressure together; from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If matter be finite, it must have its extremes; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If, to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter, let him consider what light he thereby brings to the *cohesion* of body, and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other:

So far is our extension of body (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer, or more distinct, when we would inquire into the nature, cause, or manner of it, than the *idea* of thinking.

§ 28. *Communication of Motion, by Impulse, or by Thought, equally intelligible.*

ANOTHER *idea* we have of body, is the power of *communication of motion by impulse*; and of our souls, the power of *exciting motion by thought*. These *ideas*, the one of body, the other of our minds, every day's experience clearly furnishes us with; but if, here again, we inquire how this is done, we are *equally in the dark*. For in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the other, which is the ordinarieſt caſe, we can have no other conception, but of the paſſing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obſcure and inconceivable, as how our minds move or ſtop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. The increaſe of motion by impulse, which is obſerved or believed ſometimes to happen, is yet harder to be underſtood. We have, by daily experience, clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loſs in both. So that, however we conſider motion and its communication, either from body or ſpirit, *the idea which belongs to ſpirit is at leaſt as clear as that which belongs to body*. And if we conſider the active power of moving, or, as I may call it, *motivity*, it is much clearer in ſpirit than body; ſince two bodies, placed by one another at reſt, will never afford us the *idea* of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: Whereas the mind, every day, affords us *ideas* of an active power of moving of bodies; and therefore it is worth our conſideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of ſpirits, and paſſive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit, viz. God, is

only active; pure matter is only passive; those beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think we have as many, and as clear *ideas* belonging to spirit, as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally unknown to us; and the *idea* of thinking in spirit, as clear as of extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For when the mind would look beyond those original *ideas* we have from sensation or reflection, and penetrate into their causes and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

§ 29.

To conclude, sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience assures us of the existence of such beings; and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear *ideas*, both of the one and the other. But beyond these *ideas*, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire farther into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not, should by thought set body into motion, than how a substance we know not, should by impulse set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the *ideas* belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple *ideas* we receive from sensation and reflection, are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those *ideas*.

§ 30. *Idea of Body and Spirit compared.*

So that, in short, *the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body*, stands thus: The substance of spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties of body, *viz.* solid coherent parts and impulse, we have distinct clear *ideas* of; so likewise we know, and have distinct clear *ideas* of two primary qualities or properties of spirit, *viz.* thinking, and a power of action; *i. e.* a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions. We have also the *ideas* of several qualities inherent in bodies, and have the clear distinct *ideas* of them: which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts, and their motion. We have likewise the *ideas* of the several modes of thinking, *viz.* believing, doubting, intending, fearing, hoping; all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the *ideas* of willing, and moving the body consequent to it, and with the body itself too; for, as has been shown, spirit is capable of motion.

§ 31. *The Notion of Spirit involves no more Difficulty in it than that of Body.*

LASTLY, If this notion of immaterial spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it, not easy to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits, than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body; because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our notion of spirit more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divisibility, *in infinitum*, of any finite extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

§ 32. *We know nothing beyond simple Ideas.*

WHICH we are not at all to wonder at, since we, having but some few superficial *ideas* of things, discovered to us only by the senses from without, or by the mind, reflecting on what it experiments in itself within, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things, being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore, experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid parts, which is the extension and motion of bodies: *we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other.* For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist, separate and independent from solidity, than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist, separate and independent from thinking, they being both but simple *ideas*, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct *ideas* in us of thinking as of solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity, *i. e. immaterial*, to exist, as a solid thing without thinking, *i. e. matter*, to exist; especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter, than how matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple *ideas* we have from sensation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obscurity, perplexedness and difficulties; and can discover nothing farther but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex *ideas* be clearest, that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple *ideas* that make them up, are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection; and so is it of all our other *ideas* of substances, even of God himself.

§ 33. *Idea of God.*

FOR if we examine the *idea* we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find, that we come by

it the same way ; and that the complex *ideas* we have both of God and separate spirits, are made up of the simple *ideas* we receive from reflection ; v. g. having from what we experiment in ourselves got the *ideas* of existence and duration ; of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happiness ; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without ; when we would frame an *idea* the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our *idea* of infinity ; and so putting them together, make our complex *idea* of God. For that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its *ideas*, received from sensation and reflection, has been already shown.

§ 34.

If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an *idea* of knowing twice as many, which I can double again, as often as I can add to number ; and thus enlarge my *idea* of knowledge, by extending its comprehension to all things existing, or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly, i. e. all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known, that is in them, or can any way relate to them ; and thus frame the *idea* of infinite or boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite ; and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end, and so frame the *idea* of an eternal Being. The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any *ideas* of) to that Sovereign Being which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best *idea* of him our minds are capable of : All which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple *ideas* we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection : or by our senses, from exterior things, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

§ 35. Idea of God.

FOR it is infinity, which, joined to our *ideas* of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex *idea*, whereby we represent to ourselves the best we can, the Supreme Being. For though, in his own essence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own selves), God be simple and uncompounded; yet I think I may say, we have no other *idea* of him but a complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c. infinite and eternal; which are all distinct *ideas*, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shown, originally got from *sensation* and *reflection*, go to make up the *idea* or notion we have of God.

§ 36. No Ideas in our complex one of Spirits but those got from Sensation or Reflection.

THIS farther is to be observed, that there is no *idea* we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex *idea* of other spirits; because, being capable of no other simple *ideas*, belonging to any thing but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence; and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our *ideas*, as well of *spirits* as of other things, we are *restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection*, is evident from hence, that, in our *ideas* of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any *idea* of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another; though we must necessarily conclude, that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs and particular sounds;

which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no *idea* how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less how spirits, that have no bodies, can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.

§ 37. *Recapitulation.*

AND thus we have seen, *what kinds of ideas we have of substances of all kinds*, wherein they consist, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our *ideas* of the several sorts of substances, are nothing but collections of simple *ideas*, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct *idea* at all.

Secondly, That all the simple *ideas*, that thus united in one common *substratum*, make up our complex *ideas* of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from *sensation* or *reflection*. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple *ideas*. And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing we can perceive in ourselves by *reflection*, or discover by *sensation* in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple *ideas*, which we originally received from *sensation* or *reflection*; as is evident in the complex *ideas* we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the simple *ideas* that make up our complex *ideas* of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities, *v. g.* the greatest part of the *ideas* that make our complex *idea of gold*, are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility, and solubility, in aq.

regia, &c. all united together in an unknown *substratum*: all which *ideas* are nothing else but so many relations to other substances, and are not really in the gold, considered barely in itself, though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness differently to operate, and be operated on by several other substances.

CHAP. XXIV.

OF COLLECTIVE *IDEAS* OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. *One Idea.*

BESIDES these complex *ideas* of several single substances, as of man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath also *complex collective ideas* of substances, which I so call, because such *ideas* are made up of many particular substances considered together, as united into one *idea*, and which so joined are looked on as one; *v. g.* the *idea* of such a collection of men as make an army, though consisting of a great number of distinct substances, is as much one *idea* as the *idea* of a man; and the great collective *idea* of all bodies whatsoever, signified by the name world, is as much one *idea* as the *idea* of any the least particle of matter in it; it sufficing to the unity of any *idea*, that it be considered as one representation or picture, though made up of ever so many particulars.

§ 2. *Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.*

THESE collective *ideas* of substances the mind makes by its power of composition, and uniting severally, either simple or complex *ideas* into one, as it does by the same faculty make the complex *ideas* of particular substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple *ideas* united in one substance; and as the mind, by putting together the repeated *ideas* of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex *idea* of any number, as a score or a gross, &c. so, by putting together several particular substances, it makes collective *ideas* of substances, as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet; each of

which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one *idea*, in one view; and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one, as one ship or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one *idea*, than how a man should make one *idea*; it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the *idea* of a great number of men, and consider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct *ideas* that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all together as one.

§ 3. *All artificial Things are collective Ideas.*

AMONGST such kind of collective *ideas* are to be counted the most part of artificial things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances; and, in truth, if we consider all these collective *ideas* aright, as *army*, *constellation*, *universe*, as they are united into so many single *ideas*, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of them, united into one conception, and signified by one name. For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one *idea*; as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*.

CHAP. XXV.

OF RELATION.

§ 1. *Relation what.*

BESIDES the *ideas*, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise object: It can carry any *idea* as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one

thing that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: This is, as the words import, *relation* and *respect*; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call *relatives*; and the things so brought together, *related*. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that *idea*, but what really exists in Caius; v. g. when I consider him as man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex *idea* of the species man. So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name *husband*, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name *whiter*, I intimate some other thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any *idea*, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct; therefore any of our *ideas* may be the foundation of relation. As in the above mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination or relation of husband; and the colour white, the occasion why he is said whiter than freestone.

§ 2. *Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceived.*

THESE, and the like *relations*, expressed by relative terms that have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and son, bigger and less, cause and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at first sight perceives the relation. For father and son, husband and wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of

them, the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of. *Concubine* is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as *wife*; but, in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which seem to explain one another, and not be able to exist, but together. Hence it is that many of those names, which, duly considered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty sounds, must signify some *idea* which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in, the thing to which the denomination is given: or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it includes a relation.

§ 3. *Some seemingly absolute Terms contain relations.*

ANOTHER sort of *relative terms* there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable relation. Such are the *seemingly positive* terms of *old*, *great*, *imperfect*, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

§ 4. *Relation different from the Things related.*

THIS farther may be observed, that the *ideas* of relation may be the same in men who have far different *ideas* of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. those who have far different *ideas* of a *man*, may yet agree in the notion of a *father*; which is a notion superinduced to the substance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby

he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what he will.

§ 5. *Change of Relation may be without any Change in the Subject.*

THE nature therefore of *relation* consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed or cease to be, the relation ceases, and the denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all; v. g. Caius, whom I considered to-day as a father, ceases to be so to-morrow only by the death of his son, without any alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the mind's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time: v. g. Caius, compared to several persons, may truly be said to be older and younger, stronger and weaker, &c.

§ 6. *Relation only betwixt two Things.*

WHATSOEVER doth or can exist, or be considered as one thing, is positive: And so not only simple *ideas* and substances, but modes also are positive beings, though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex *idea* of one thing; which *idea* is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of diverse parts, and under one name, it is a positive or absolute thing or *idea*. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be *relative*, yet the *idea* of the whole is a positive absolute *idea*. The same may be said of a family, a tune, &c.; for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things. There must always be in relation two *ideas*, or things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison.

§ 7. *All Things capable of Relation.*

CONCERNING relation in-general, these things may be considered:

First, That there is *no one thing*, whether simple *idea*, substance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, *which is not capable of almost an infinite number of* considerations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words: *v. g.* one single man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following *relations*, and many more, *viz.* father, brother, son, grandfather, grandson, father-in-law, son-in-law, husband, friend, enemy, subject, general, judge, patron, client, professor, European, Englishman, islander, servant, master, possessor, captain, superior, inferior, bigger, less, older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almost infinite number; he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, disagreement, or respect whatsoever. For, as I said, *relation* is a way of comparing or considering two things together, and giving one, or both of them some appellation from that comparison; and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

§ 8. *The Ideas of Relations clearer often than of the Subjects related.*

SECONDLY, This farther may be considered concerning *relation*, that though it be not contained in the real existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced; yet the *ideas* which relative words stand for, are often clearer and more distinct than those substances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man; or, if you will, *paternity* is a thing whereof it is easier to have a clear *idea* than of *humanity*: And I can much easier conceive what a friend is, than what God; because the knowledge of one action, or one simple *idea*, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of fundry *ideas* is necessary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them; so that, when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a

very clear *idea* of that relation. The *ideas* then of *relations* are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds, than those of *substances*; because it is commonly hard to know all the simple *ideas* which are really in any substance, but for the most part easy enough to know the simple *ideas* that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for; v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very easy to frame the *ideas* of brothers, without having yet the perfect *idea* of a man. For significant relative words, as well as others, standing only for *ideas*; and those being all either simple, or made up of single ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise *idea* the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear *idea* of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear *idea* of the relation of *dam* and *chick*, between the two cassowaries in St. James's Park, though perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect *idea* of those birds themselves.

§ 9. *Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.*

THIRDLY, Though there be a great number of considerations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of *relations*; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple *ideas*, either of sensation or reflection: which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of, and in some that seem to be the most remote from *sense* or *reflection*; which yet will appear to have their *ideas* from thence, and leave it past doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain simple *ideas*, and so originally derived from *sense* or *reflection*.

§ 10. *Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated are relative.*

FOURTHLY, That *relation*, being the considering of one thing with another, which is extrinsical to it, it is evi-

dent that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other *ideas* than are supposed really to exist in that thing, to which the word is applied, are *relative words*: v. g. a man *black, merry, thoughtful, thirsty, angry, extended*; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated: But *father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c.* are words, which, together with the thing they demoninate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing.

§ 11. *Conclusion.*

HAVING laid down these premises concerning *relation* in general, I shall now proceed to show, in some instances, how all the *ideas* we have of *relation* are made up, as the others are, only of simple *ideas*, and that they all, how refined and remote from sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple *ideas*. I shall begin with the most comprehensive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned; and that is, the relation of *cause* and *effect*: The *idea* whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, *sensation*, and *reflection*, I shall in the next place consider.

CHAP. XXVI.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.

§ 1. *Whence their Ideas got.*

IN the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist; and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation, we get our *ideas* of *cause* and *effect*. That which produces any simple or complex *idea*, we denote by the general name *cause*; and that which is produced, *effect*. Thus, finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a simple *idea* that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the ap-

plication of a certain degree of heat; we call the simple *idea* of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect. So also, finding that the substance wood, which is a certain collection of simple *ideas* so called, by the application of fire is turned into another substance called ashes; *i. e.* another complex *idea*, consisting of a collection of simple *ideas*, quite different from that complex *idea* which we call wood; we consider fire, in relation to ashes, as cause, and the ashes as effect. So that, whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple *idea*, or collection of simple *ideas*, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.

§ 2. *Creation, Generation, making Alteration.*

HAVING thus, from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another, got the notion of *cause* and *effect*, viz. that a *cause* is that which makes any other thing, either simple *idea*, substance or mode, begin to be; and an *effect* is that which had its beginning from some other thing: The mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts.

First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist, *in rerum natura*, which had before no being, and this we call *creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles, which did all of them before exist, but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles, which, considered altogether, make up such a collection of simple *ideas*, had not any *existence* before, as this man, this egg, rose or cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a substance, produced in the ordinary course of nature by an internal principle, but set on work by, and received from, some external agent or cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call *generation*: When the cause is extrinsical, and the effect produced by a sensible separation, or *juxta*-position of discernible parts,

we call it *making*; and such are all artificial things. When any simple *idea* is produced, which was not in that subject before, we call it *alteration*. Thus, a man is generated, a picture made, and either of them altered, when any new sensible quality or simple *idea* is produced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are *effects*; and those things, which operated to the existence, *causes*. In which, and all other cases, we may observe, that the notion of *cause* and *effect*, has its rise from *ideas*, received by sensation or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the *idea* of *cause* and *effect*, it suffices to consider any simple *idea*, or substance, as beginning to exist by the operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.

§ 3. *Relations of Time.*

TIME and *place* are also the foundations of very large relations, and all finite beings at least are concerned in them. But having already shown, in another place, how we get these *ideas*, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the denominations of things, received from time, are only relations. Thus, when any one says, that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty-nine, and reigned forty-five years, these words import only the relation of that duration to some other, and mean no more than this, that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and the duration of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun; and so are all words answering *how long*. Again, William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1070, which means this; that taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now, for one entire great length of time, it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes: And so do all words of time, answering to the question *when*, which show only the distance of any point of time, from the period of a longer duration from which we measure, and to which we thereby consider it as related.

§ 4.

THERE are yet, besides those, other words of time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive *ideas*, which yet will, when considered, be found to be relative, such as are *young*, *old*, &c. which include and intimate the relation any thing has to a certain length of duration, whereof we have the *idea* in our minds. Thus, having settled in our thoughts the *idea* of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years, when we say a man is *young*, we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to: And when we denominate him *old*, we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed. And so it is but comparing the particular age, or duration of this or that man, to the *idea* of that duration which we have in our minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals: which is plain, in the application of these names to other things; for a man is called young at twenty years, and very young at seven years old: But yet a horse we call old at twenty, and a dog at seven years: because, in each of these, we compare their age to different *ideas* of duration, which are settled in our minds, as belonging to these several sorts of animals, in the ordinary course of nature. But the sun and stars, though they have outlasted several generations of men, we call not old, because we do not know what period God hath set to that sort of beings. This term, belonging properly to those things which we can observe, in the ordinary course of things, by a natural decay, to come to an end in a certain period of time; and to have, in our minds as it were, a standard to which we can compare the several parts of their duration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or a diamond, things whose usual periods we know not.

§ 5. *Relations of Place and extension.*

THE relation also that things have to one another in their places and distances, is very obvious to observe; as above, below, a mile distant from Charing-cross in

England, and in London. But as in duration, so in extension and bulk, there are some *ideas* that are relative, which we signify by names that are thought positive; as *great* and *little* are truly *relations*. For here also having, by observation, settled in our minds the *ideas* of the bigness of several species of things, from those we have been most accustomed to, we make them as it were the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others. Thus we call a great apple, such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a little horse, such a one as comes not up to the size of that *idea* which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses: And that will be a great horse to a Welshman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; the two having, from the different breed of their countries, taken several sized *ideas* to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little.

§ 6. *Absolute Terms often stand for Relations.*

So likewise *weak* and *strong*, are but *relative denominations* of power, compared to some *ideas* we have, at that time, of greater or less power. Thus, when we say a weak man, we mean one that has not so much strength or power to move as usually men have, or usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his strength to the *idea* we have of the usual strength of men, or men of such a size. The like, when we say the creatures are all weak things; weak, there, is but a relative term, signifying the disproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures. And so abundance of words, in ordinary speech, stand only for relations (and perhaps the greatest part) which at first sight, seem to have no such signification: v. g. the ship has necessary stores. *Necessary* and *stores* are both relative words; one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended, and the other to future use. All which relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in, *ideas* derived from *sensation* and *reflection*. is too obvious to need any explanation.

CHAP. XXVII.

OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY,

§ 1. *Wherein Identity consists.*

ANOTHER occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when considering any thing as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with its self-existing at another time, and thereon form the *ideas* of *identity* and *diversity*. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And in this consists *identity*, when the *ideas* it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there itself alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no; it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place, or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse. That which has made the difficulty about this relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§ 2. *Identity of Substances.*

WE have the *ideas* but of three sorts of substances; 1. God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. *Bodies*. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore, concerning his identity there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists. Thirdly, The same will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: or else the notions and names of identity and diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinction of substances, or any thing else one from another. For example: Could two bodies be in the same place at the same time, then those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great or little; nay, all bodies must be one and the same. For, by the same reason that two particles of matter may be in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of identity and diversity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction that two or more should be one, identity and diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the understanding. All other things being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances, the identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be by the same way determined: only as to things whose existence is in succession; such as are the actions of finite beings, *v. g. motion* and *thought*, both which consist in a continued train of succession, concerning their diversity, there can be no question: Because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent beings can at different times

exist in distant places; and therefore no motion or thought, considered as at different times, can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence.

§ 3. Principium Individuationis.

FROM what has been said, it is easy to discover what is so much inquired after, the *principium individuationis*; and that, it is plain, is existence itself, which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind. This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple substances or modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied: *v. g.* Let us suppose an atom, *i. e.* a continued body, under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place; it is evident that, considered in any instant of its existence, it is in that instant the same with itself. For being at that instant what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued; for so long it will be the same, and no other. In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass, every one of those atoms will be the same, by the foregoing rule: And whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled. But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same mass, or the same body. In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity: An oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak: and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same horse; though, in both these cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter, though they be truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse. The reason whereof is,

that in these two cases of a mass of matter, and a living body, *identity* is not applied to the same thing.

§ 4. *Identity of Vegetables.*

WE must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this: that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and leaves, &c. of an oak; in which consists the vegetable life. That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants. For this organization being at any one instant in any one collection of *matter*, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and is that individual life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant, during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united.

§ 5. *Identity of Animals.*

THE case is not so much different in *brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For example, What is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts, to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased or diminished, by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we

should have something very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, that in an animal the fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines, the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

§ 6. *Identity of Man.*

THIS also shows wherein the identity of the same *man* consists, *viz.* in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the *identity* of man in any thing else, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued under one organization of life in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an *embryo*, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Cæsar Borgia, to be the same man. For if the *identity* of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter, why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be, from a very strange use of the word *man*, applied to an *idea*, out of which body and shape is excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their mis-carriages, be detrudd into the bodies of beasts, as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet, I think, nobody, could be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say, that hog were a man or Heliogabalus.

§ 2. *Identity suited to the Idea.*

IT is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends

all sorts of *identity*, or will determine it in every case : but to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what *idea* the word it is applied to stands for ; it being one thing to be the same *substance*, another the same *man*, and a third the same *person*, if *person*, *man*, and *substance* are three names standing for three different *ideas* ; for such as is the *idea* belonging to that name, such must be the *identity* : which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that confusion, which often occurs about this matter, with no small seeming difficulties, especially concerning *personal identity*, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.

§ 8. *Same Man.*

AN animal is a living organized body ; and consequently the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious observation puts it past doubt, that the *idea* in our minds, of which the sound *man* in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form : since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, though it had no more reason all its life than a *cat* or a *parrot*, would call him still a *man* ; or whoever should hear a *cat* or a *parrot* discourse, reason and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a *cat* or a *parrot* ; and say the one was a dull irrational *man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *parrot*. A relation we have in an author of great note, is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational *parrot*. His words * are :

“ I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice’s own
“ mouth, the account of a common, but much credited
“ story, that I had heard so often from many others, of
“ an old *parrot* he had in Brasil during his government
“ there, that spoke, and asked and answered common

* *Memoirs of what passed in Christendom, from 1672 to 1679.*
P. 57—392.

“ questions like a reasonable creature ; so that those of
 “ his train there generally concluded it to be witchery
 “ or possession ; and one of his chaplains, who lived
 “ long afterwards in Holland, would never from that
 “ time endure a *parrot*, but said they all had a devil in
 “ them. I had heard many particulars of this story,
 “ and assevered by people hard to be discredited, which
 “ made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of it.
 “ He said, with his usual plainness and dryness in talk,
 “ there was something true, but a great deal false, of
 “ what had been reported. I desired to know of him
 “ what there was of the first ? He told me short and
 “ coldly, that he had heard of such an old *parrot*
 “ when he came to Brasil ; and though he believ-
 “ ed nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet
 “ he had so much of curiosity as to send for it : That it
 “ was a very great and a very old one ; and when it
 “ came first into the room where the prince was, with
 “ a great many Dutchmen about him, it said present-
 “ ly, *What a company of white men are here !* They
 “ asked it, what he thought that man was, pointing
 “ to the prince ? It answered, *Some general or other.*
 “ When they brought it close to him, he asked it, * *D’ou*
 “ *venes vous ?* It answered, *De Marinnan.* The Prince,
 “ *A qui estes vous ?* The parrot, *A un Portugais.* Prince,
 “ *Que fais tu la ?* Parrot, *Je garde les poulles.* The
 “ prince laughed, and said, *Vous gardez les poulles ?*
 “ The parrot answered, *Ouy moy, & je sçay bien faire ;*
 “ and made the chuck four or five times that people
 “ use to make to chickens when they call them. I set
 “ down the words of this worthy dialogue in French,
 “ just as Prince Maurice said them to me. I asked
 “ him in what language the *parrot* spoke, and he said,
 “ in Brasilian ; I asked, whether he understood Brasi-
 “ lian ? He said no ; but he had taken care to have

* “ Whence come ye ? It answered, “ From Marinnan.” The
 prince, “ To whom do you belong ?” The parrot, “ To a Portuguese.”
 Prince, “ What do you there ? Parrot, “ I look after the chickens.”
 The prince laughed, and said, “ You look after the chickens !” The
 parrot answered, “ Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it.”

“two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke Brazilian, and the other a Brazilian that spoke Dutch; that he asked them separately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the *parrot* said. I could not but tell this odd story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one: for, I dare say, this prince at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious man: I leave it to naturalists to reason, and to other men to believe as they please upon it. However, it is not perhaps amiss to relieve or enliven a busy scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose or no.”

Same Man.

I HAVE taken care that the reader should have the story at large, in the author's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the testimonies he gives of himself, should take so much pains in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince in whom he acknowledges very great honesty and piety, a story which, if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this story, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a *parrot*; and I ask any one else, who thinks such a story fit to be told, whether if this *parrot*, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it, as this one did, whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of *rational animals*: but yet whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be men, and not *parrots*? For I presume it is not the *idea* of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the *idea* of a *man* in most people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and if that be the *idea* of a *man*, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as

well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same *man*.

§ 9. *Personal Identity.*

THIS being premised, to find wherein *personal identity* consists, we must consider what *person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it; it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: And by this every one is to himself that which he calls *self*; it not being considered in this case, whether the same *self* be continued in the same or divers substances. For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that that makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists *personal identity*, i. e. the sameness of a rational being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that *person*; it is the same *self* now it was then; and it is by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it; that that action was done.

§ 10. *Consciousness makes personal Identity.*

BUT it is farther inquired, whether it be the same identical substance? This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and as would be thought evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions, before our eyes in one view, but even the best

memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep, having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts: I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past *selves*, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, *i. e.* the same substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not *personal identity* at all: The question being, what makes the same *person*, and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person; which in this case matters not at all: Different substances by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose *identity* is preserved, in that change of substances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself, to himself, *personal identity* depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the *idea* of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same *personal self*. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is *self* to *itself* now, and so will be the same *self*, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come; and would be by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two *persons*, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same *person*, whatever substances contributed to their production.

§ 11. *Personal Identity in Change of Substances.*

THAT this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our

very bodies, all whose particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our *selves*; i. e. of our thinking conscious *self*. Thus the *limbs* of his body is to every one a part of *himself*: he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himself*, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus we see the *substance* whereof *personal self* consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of *personal identity*; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs, which but now were a part of it be cut off.

§ 12. *Whether in the Change of thinking Substances.*

BUT the question is, whether, if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or remaining the same, it can be different persons?

And to this I answer, first, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies; unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

§ 13.

BUT next, as to the first part of the question, whether if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same person? I answer, That cannot be resolved but by those who know what kind of substances they are that do think, and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant, were the same consciousness the same individual action, it could not; but it being but a present representation of a past action, why it may not be possible that that may be represented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore, how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the *same consciousness*, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent; why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it is never so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking substances, be best resolved into the goodness of God, who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal error of their's transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fleeting animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that if the same consciousness (which, as has

been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.

§ 14.

As to the second part of the question, whether the same immaterial substance remaining, there may be two distinct persons? which question seems to me to be built on this, whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the actions of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again; and so as it were beginning a new account from a new period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state? all those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind, since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body; and if they should not, it is plain experience would be against them. So that personal identity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in a state of silence, must needs make different persons. Suppose a *Christian Platonist* or *Pythagorean* should, upon God's having ended all his works of creation the seventh day, think his soul hath existed ever since; and should imagine it has revolved in several human bodies, as I once met with one, who was persuaded his had been the soul of *Socrates* (how reasonably I will not dispute; this I know, that in the post he filled, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very rational man, and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning): would any one say, that he being not conscious of any of *Socrates's* actions or thoughts, could be the same person with *Socrates*? let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which

thinks in him, and in the constant change of his body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in *Nestor* or *Thersites*, at the siege of *Troy* (for souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the supposition has no apparent absurdity in it), which it may have been, as well as it is now, the soul of any other man: but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions either of *Nestor* or *Thersites*, does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other man that ever existed? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men, he is no more one *self* with either of them, than if the soul or immaterial spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present body; though it were ever so true, that the same spirit that informed *Nestor's* or *Thersites's* body, were numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the same person with *Nestor*, than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part of *Nestor*, were now a part of this man; the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same person by being united to any body, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness united to any body, makes the same person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of *Nestor*, he then finds himself the same person with *Nestor*.

§ 15.

AND thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the soul the *man*, be enough to make the same *man*. For should the soul of a prince, carrying

with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions : but who would say it was the same man ? The body too goes to the making the man, and would I guess, to every body determine the man in this case ; wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man : but he would be the same cobbler to every one besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what *ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will inquire what makes the same *spirit*, *man*, or *person*, we must fix the *ideas* of *spirit*, *man*, or *person* in our minds ; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the *same*, and when not.

§ 16. *Consciousness makes the same Person.*

BUT though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man ; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to ages past, unites existences and actions very remote in time, into the same person, as well as it does the existence and actions of the immediately preceding moment : so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the *Thames* last winter, or as that I write now ; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the *Thames* overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same *self*, place that *self* in what substance you please, than that I who write this am the same *myself* now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or imma-

terial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same *self*, it matters not whether this present *self* be made up of the same or other substances; I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

§. 17. *Self depends on Consciousness.*

SELF is that conscious thinking thing (whatever substance made up of, whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for *itself*, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of *itself*, as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the *person*, the *same person*; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same *person*, and constitutes this inseparable *self*; so it is in reference to substances remote in time. That with which the *consciousness* of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same *person*, and is one *self* with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it *self*, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther: as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18. *Objects of Reward and Punishment.*

IN this *personal identity*, is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for *himself*, not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the same *self* which was concerned for the

whole body yesterday, as making a part of it *self*, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same body should still live, and immediately, from the separation of the little finger, have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of *itself*, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19.

THIS may show us wherein *personal identity* consists, not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of *consciousness*; wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same *consciousness*, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.

§ 20.

BUT yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps, I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, That we must here take notice what the word *I* is applied to: which, in this case, is the man only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person, *I* is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousnesses at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the *mad man* for the *sober man's* actions, nor the *sober man* for what the

mad man did, thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking *English*, when we say such an one is *not himself*, or is *besides himself*; in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that *self* was changed, the *self*-same person was no longer in that man.

§ 21. *Difference between Identity of Man and Person.*

BUT yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the same individual man, should be two persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual man.

First, It must be either the same individual, immaterial thinking substance; in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.

Secondly, Or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul.

Thirdly, Or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal.

Now take which of these suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal identity to consist in any thing but consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the first of them, it must be allowed possible, that a man born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the second and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the same man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making *human identity* to consist in the same thing wherein we place *personal identity*, there will be no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. But then they who place *human identity* in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a *man*, and consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few are

agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*) without involving us in great absurdities.

§ 22.

BUT is not a man drunk and sober the same person, why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person, as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge; because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep, is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.

§ 23. *Consciousness, alone makes Self.*

NOTHING but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person, the identity of substance will not do it. For whatever substance there is, however framed, without consciousness there is no person: and a carcass may be a person, as well as any sort of substance be so without consciousness.

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness acting by intervals two distinct bodies: I ask in the first case, whether the *day* and the *night-man* would not be two as distinct persons, as *Socrates* and *Plato*? And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as

much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to say, that this same, and this distinct consciousness, in the cases abovementioned, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances, bringing it with them to those bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the case; since it is evident the *personal identity* would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no. For granting, that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions: and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty years together. Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit, as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body. So that *self* is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.

§ 24.

INDEED it may conceive the substance, whereof it is now made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious being: but consciousness removed, that substance is no more it *self*, or makes no more a part of it, than any other substance; as is evident in the instance we have already given of a limb cut off, of whose heat, or cold, or other affections, having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a man's self, than any other matter of the universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness, whereby I am my *self* to my *self*: if there be any part of its existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness whereby I am now my *self*, it is in that part of its existence no more my *self*, than any other immaterial being. For whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I

cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being any where existing.

§ 25.

I AGREE, the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial substance.

But let men, according to their diverse hypotheses, resolve of that as they please. This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or misery, must grant, that there is something that is *himself* that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this *self* has existed in a continued duration more than one instant, and therefore it is possible may exist, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same *self*, by the same consciousness continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the *same self* which did such or such an action some years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of *self*, the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same *self*; but the same continued consciousness, in which several substances, may have been united, and again separated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same *self*. Thus any part of our bodies vitally united to that which is conscious in us, makes a part of our *selves*: but upon separation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that which a moment since was part of our *selves*, is no more so, than a part of another man's *self* is a part of me; and it is not impossible, but in a little time may become a real part of another person. And so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons; and the same person preserved under the change of various substances. Could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousness

of past actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all; the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does. Any substance vitally united to the present thinking being, is a part of that very *same self* which now is: any thing united to it by a consciousness of former actions, makes also a part of the *same self*, which is the same both then and now.

§ 26. *Person, a Forensic Term.*

PERSON, as I take it, is the name of this *self*. Wherever a man finds what he calls *himself*, there I think another may say is the *same person*. It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery. This personality extends it *self* beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it *self* past actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy. And therefore whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present *self* by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: and to receive pleasure or pain, *i. e.* reward or punishment, on the account of any such action, is all one as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For supposing a man punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that punishment, and being created miserable? And therefore conformable to this the Apostle tells us, that at the great day, when every one shall receive according to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open. The sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they *themselves*, in what bodies soever they appear, or what substances so-

ever that consciousness adheres to, are the *same* that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them.

§ 27.

I AM apt enough to think I have, in treating of this subject, made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet, I think, they are such as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as our *selves*. Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one such body, upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend; we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do (in the dark concerning these matters), the soul of a man, for an immaterial substance, independent from matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the nature of things be no absurdity at all to suppose, that the same soul may, at different times, be united to different bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one man: as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's body yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow, and in that union make up a vital part of *Melibæus* himself, as well as it did of his ram.

§ 28. *The Difficulty from ill use of Names.*

To conclude, whatever substance begins to exist, it must during its existence, necessarily be the same; whatever compositions of substances begin to exist during the union of those substances, the concrete must be the same: whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence, it is the same: and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes, the same rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter, rather rises from the names ill used, than from any obscurity in

things themselves. For whatever makes the specific *idea* to which the name is applied, if that *idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the same, and divers, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt about it.

§ 29. *Continued Existence makes Identity.*

FOR supposing a rational spirit be the *idea* of a *man*, it is easy to know what is the *same man*, viz. the *same spirit*, whether separate or in a body, will be the *same man*. Supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body, of a certain conformation of parts to make a *man*, whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting successive body, remains, it will be the *same man*. But if to any one the *idea* of a *man* be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be the *same man*. For whatever be the composition, whereof the complex *idea* is made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same existence continued, preserves it the same individual under the same denomination.

CHAP. XXVIII.

OF OTHER RELATIONS.

§ 1. *Proportional.*

BESIDES the before-mentioned occasions of time, place, and causality of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

FIRST, The first I shall name, is some one simple *idea*; which being capable of parts or degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple *idea*, v. g. *whiter, sweeter, bigger, equal, more, &c.* These relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple *idea*, in several subjects, may be called, if one will, *proportional*; and

that these are only conversant about those simple *ideas* received from sensation or reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§ 2. *Natural.*

SECONDLY, Another occasion of comparing things together, or considering one thing, so as to include in that consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong; *v. g. father and son, brothers, cousin-germans, &c.* which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in several degrees; *countrymen, i. e.* those who were born in the same country, or tract of ground; and these I call *natural relations*: wherein we may observe that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the several races of other animals as well as men: but yet it is seldom said, this bull is the grandfather of such a calf; or that two pigeons are cousin-germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct names these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind; there being occasion, both in laws, and other communications one with another, to mention and take notice of men under these relations: from whence also arise the obligations of several duties amongst men. Whereas in brutes, men having very little or no cause to mind these relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of languages; which being suited only to the convenience of communication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various respects might be found among them, nor the different abstract considerations might be framed about them. Where they had no philosophical notions, there they had no terms to express them: and it is no wonder men should

have framed no names for those things they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine why, as in some countries, they may not have so much as the name for a horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred one to another.

§ 3. *Instituted.*

THIRDLY, Sometimes the foundation of considering things, with reference to one another, is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do something. Thus a *general* is one that hath power to command an army: and an army under a general is a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A *citizen*, or a *burgher*, is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon men's wills, or agreement in society, I call *instituted* or *voluntary*; and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alterable, and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged, though neither of the substances, so related, be destroyed. Now, though these are all reciprocal, as well as the rest, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men usually take no notice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a *patron* and *client* are easily allowed to be relations, but a *constable* or *dictator* are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such; because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator, or constable, expressing a relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

§ 4. *Moral.*

FOURTHLY, There is another sort of relation which is the conformity, or disagreement, men's voluntary actions

have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called *Moral* relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deserves well to be examined, there being no part of knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determined *ideas*, and avoid, as much as may be, obscurity and confusion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumstances they are framed into distinct complex *ideas*, are, as has been shown, so many *mixed modes*, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once; when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many determined *ideas* of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined *ideas* of them, and to know what names belong to such and such combinations of *ideas*. We have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether such actions so made up are morally good or bad.

§ 5. *Moral Good and Evil.*

Good and evil, as hath been shown, B. II. Ch. 20. § 2. and Ch. 21. § 42. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the lawmaker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the lawmaker, is that we call reward and punishment.

§ 6. *Moral Rules.*

OF these moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seem to me to be *three sorts*, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to de-

termine his will, we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from, his rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself. For that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of itself without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all *law*, properly so called.

§ 7. *Laws.*

THE laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude, or obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of *opinion* or *reputation*, if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

§ 8. *Divine Law, the Measure of Sin and Duty.*

FIRST, The *divine* law, whereby I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves, I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are his creatures: He has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best; and he has a power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchstone of *moral rectitude*, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most considerable *moral good* or *evil* of their actions; that is, whether as *duties* or *sins* they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty.

§ 9. *Civil Law, the Measure of Crimes and Innocence.*

SECONDLY, The *civil* law, the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is

another rule to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be *criminal* or no. This law nobody overlooks; the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it, which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions of those who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from him who disobeys: which is the punishment of offences committed against this law.

§ 10. *Philosophical Law, the Measure of Virtue and Vice.*

THIRDLY, The law of opinion or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right or wrong; and as far as they really are so applied, they so far are coincident with the *divine law* above mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is visible, that these names *Virtue* and *Vice*, in the particular instances of their application, through the several nations and societies of men in the world, are constantly attributed only to such actions, as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that men every where should give the name of *Virtue* to those actions, which amongst them are judged praiseworthy; and call that *Vice*, which they account blameable: since otherwise they would condemn themselves, if they should think any thing *right*, to which they allowed not commendation, any thing *wrong*, which they let pass without blame. Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed *Virtue* and *Vice*, is this approbation or dislike, praise, or blame, which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies, tribes, and clubs of men in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of that place. For though men, uniting into politic societies, have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens any farther than the law of the country directs; yet they retain still

the power of thinking well or ill, approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst, and converse with: And by this approbation and dislike, they establish among themselves what they will call *Virtue* and *Vice*.

§ II.

THAT this is the common *measure of virtue and vice*, will appear to any one who considers, that though that passes for *vice* in one country, which is counted a *virtue*, or at least not *vice* in another, yet every where *virtue* and praise, *vice* and blame go together. *Virtue* is every where that which is thought praise-worthy; and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem, is called *Virtue* *. *Virtue* and praise are so united, that they

* Our author, in his preface to the fourth edition, taking notice how apt men have been to mistake him, added what here follows: Of this the ingenious author of the *Discourse concerning the Nature of Man*, has given me a late instance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expressions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think, that he would have closed his preface with an insinuation, as if in what I had said, *Book II: Chap. 28.* concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to make *virtue vices*, and *vice-virtue*, unless he had mistaken my meaning, which he could not have done, if he had but given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief design of that chapter, plainly enough set down in the fourth section, and those following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but showing the original and nature of moral *ideas*, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, whether those rules were true or false: and pursuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that denomination, which in the language of that place answers to *virtue* and *vice* in our's, which alters not the nature of things, though men do generally judge of, and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place, or sect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, *B. i. c. 3. § 18.* and in this present chapter, § 13, 14, 15, and 20, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call *virtue* and *vice*; and if he had observed, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as matter of fact, what others call *virtue* and *vice*, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For, I think, I am not much out in saying, that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation, is that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, according to which they are called *virtues* or *vices*: and whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowndes places in his *Old-English Dictionary*, I dare say it no where tells him (if I should

are called often by the same name. *Sunt sua premia laudi*, says *Virgil*; and so *Cicero*, *Nihil habet natura præstantius, quam honestatem, quam laudem, quam dignitatem*,

appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called and counted a *virtue* in one place, which being in disrepute, passes for and under the name of *vice* in another. The taking notice that men bestow the names of *virtue* and *vice* according to this rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards making *vice* *virtue*, and *virtue* *vice*. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in such points, and to take the alarm, even at expressions, which standing alone by themselves might sound ill, and be suspected.

It is to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing, as he does these words of mine, in § 11. of this chapter: *The exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute; whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, &c.* Phil. iv. 8. without taking notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: *Whereby in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved; so that even the exhortations of inspired teachers, &c.* By which words, and the rest of that section, it is plain that I brought that passage of *St. Paul*, not to prove that the general measure of what men call *virtue* and *vice*, throughout the world, was the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself; but to show, that though it were so, yet, for reasons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not or the most part much vary from the law of nature; which is that standing and unalterable rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and pravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them *virtues* or *vices*. Had *Mr. Lowde* considered this, he would have found it little to his purpose, to have quoted that passage in a sense I used it not; and would, I imagine, have spared the explication he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this second edition will give him satisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now so expressed, as to show him there was no cause of scruple.

Though I am forced to differ from him in those apprehensions he has expressed in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had said about *virtue* and *vice*, yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he says in his third chapter, p. 78. concerning *natural inscription* and *innate notions*. I shall not deny him the privilege he claims, p. 52. to state the question as he pleases, especially when he states it so as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have said. For, according to him, *innate notions being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances, in order to the soul's exerting them*; all that he says for *innate, imprinted, impressed notions* (for of *innate ideas* he says nothing at all) amounts at last only to this: That there are certain propositions, which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet by assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of: which is no more than what I have affirmed in my first book. For I suppose, by the *soul's exerting them*, he means its beginning to

quam decus ; which, he tells you, are all names for the same thing, *Tusc. l. 2.* This is the language of the Heathen philosophers, who well understood wherein their notions of *virtue* and *vice* consisted. And though perhaps, by the different temper, education, fashion, maxims, or interest of different sorts of men, it fell out that what was thought praise-worthy in one place, escaped not censure in another ; and so in different societies, *virtues* and *vices* were changed ; yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and discountenance the contrary ; it is no wonder, that esteem and discredit, virtue and vice, should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable rule of right or wrong, which the law of God hath established : there being nothing that so directly and visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws he has set them ; and nothing that breeds such mischiefs and confusion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men, without renouncing all

know then, or else the *soul's exerting of notions* will be to me a very unintelligible expression ; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this case, it misleading men's thought by an insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the *soul exerts them*, i. e. before they are known : whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind, but a capacity to know them, when the concurrence of these circumstances, which this ingenious author thinks necessary in order to the *soul's exerting them*, brings them into our knowledge.

P. 52. I find him express it thus : *These natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul, as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation.* Here he says they exert themselves, as p. 78. that the *soul exerts them*. When he has explained to himself or others, what he means by the *soul's exerting innate notions*, or their exerting themselves, and what that previous cultivation and circumstances, in order to their being exerted, are, he will, I suppose, find there is so little of controversy between him and me in the point, bating that he calls that *exerting of notions*, which I in a more vulgar style call *knowing*, that I have reason to think he brought in my name upon this occasion, only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me ; which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a title I have no right to.

sense and reason, and their own interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side that really deserved it not. Nay, even those men, whose practice was otherwise, failed not to give their approbation right; few being depraved to that degree, as not to condemn, at least in others, the faults they themselves were guilty of: whereby, even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute: *Whatsoever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, &c.* Phil. iv. 8.

§ 12. *Its Enforcements, Commendation, and Discredit.*

IF any one shall imagine that I have forgot my own notion of a law, when I make the law, whereby men judge of virtue and vice, to be nothing else but the consent of private men, who have not authority enough to make a law; especially wanting that which is so necessary and essential to a law, a power to enforce it: I think I may say, that he who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives on men, to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the nature or history of mankind: the greatest part whereof he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion: and so they do that which keeps them in reputation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magistrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God's laws, some, nay perhaps most men, seldom seriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many, whilst they break that law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for such breaches. And as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their censure and dislike, who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is

there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and unusual constitution, who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society. Solitude many men have sought, and been reconciled to : but nobody, that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with. This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance : And he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from his companions.

§ 13. *These three Laws be Rules of Moral Good and Evil.* THESE three then, *First*, The law of God ; *Secondly*, The law of politic societies ; *Thirdly*, The law of fashion, or private censure, are those to which men variously compare their actions : And it is by their conformity to one of these laws, that they take their measures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad.

§ 14. *Morality is the Relations of Actions to these Rules.* WHETHER the rule, to which, as to a touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodness, and accordingly to name them ; which is, as it were, the mark of the value we set upon them : whether, I say, we take that rule from the fashion of the country, or the will of a lawmaker, the mind is easily able to observe the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule ; and so hath a notion of *moral goodness* or *evil*, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule : and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of several simple *ideas*, the conformity thereto is but so ordering the action, that the simple *ideas* belonging to it may correspond to those which the law requires. And thus we see how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in these simple *ideas* we have receiv-

ed from sensation or reflection. For example, let us consider the complex *idea* we signify by the word murder; and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collection of simple *ideas* derived from reflection or sensation, viz. *First*, From reflection on the operations of our minds, we have the *ideas* of willing, considering, purposing before hand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. *Secondly*, From sensation we have the collection of those simple sensible *ideas* which are to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which simple *ideas* are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of simple *ideas* being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: If I have the will of a supreme invisible lawmaker for my rule; then, as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, sin or duty: And if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legislative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime. So that whencesoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the *ideas* of virtues or vices, they consist only, and are made up of collections of simple *ideas*, which we originally received from sense or reflection, and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law.

§ 15.

To conceive rightly of *moral actions*, we must take notice of them under this twofold consideration. *First*, As they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple *ideas*. Thus *drunkenness*, or *lying*, signify such or such a collection of simple *ideas*, which I call mixed modes: And in this sense they are as much *positive absolute ideas*, as the drinking of a horse, or speaking of a parrot. *Secondly*, Our actions are considered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect

they are *relative*, it being their conformity to, or disagreement with, some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad : and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain positive mode, or particular sort of action, by particular *ideas*, distinguished from all others, is called *duelling* : which, when considered, in relation to the law of God, will deserve the name sin ; to the law of fashion, in some countries, valour and virtue ; and to the municipal laws of some governments, a capital crime. In this case, when the positive mode has one name, and another name as it stands in relation to the law, the distinction may as easily be observed, as it is in substances, where one name, *v. g. man*, is used to signify the thing ; another, *v. g. father*, to signify the relation.

§ 16. *The Denominations of Actions often mislead us.*

BUT because very frequently the positive *idea* of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity ; therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of, and there is often no *distinction* made between the positive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term, those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds, and are forward to take names for things, are often misled in their judgment of actions. Thus, the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called *stealing* ; but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called stealing, as an ill action, disagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his sword from a madman, to prevent his doing mischief, though it be properly denominated *stealing*, as the name of such a *mixed mode* ; yet when compared to the law of God, and considered in its relation to that su-

preme rule, it is no sin or transgression, though the name *stealing* ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

§ 17. *Relations innumerable.*

AND thus much for the relation of human actions to a law, which therefore I call *moral relations*.

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of *relations*; it is not therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It suffices to our present purpose, to show by these, what the *ideas* are we have of this comprehensive consideration, called *relation*: Which is so *various*, and the occasions of it so *many* (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules, or under just heads. Those I have mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our *ideas* of relations and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been said, give me leave to observe;

§ 18. *All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.*

FIRST, That it is evident, that *all relation terminates in*, and is ultimately founded on those *simple ideas* we have got from *sensation or reflection*: so that all we have in our thoughts ourselves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would signify to others, when we use words standing for relations, is nothing but some *simple ideas*, or collections of *simple ideas*, compared one with another. This is so manifest in that sort called *proportional*, that nothing can be more: for when a man says, honey is sweeter than wax, it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this *simple idea*, sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; though where they are compounded or decomposed, the *simple ideas* they are made up of are perhaps seldom taken notice of. *V. g.* when the word father is mentioned: *first*, There is meant that particular species, or collective *idea*, signified by the word man. *Secondly*, Those *simple ideas* signified by the word generation: and, *thirdly*, The effects of it, and all the *simple ideas* signified by the word child. So the word friend being taken for a man, who

loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all these following *ideas* to the making of it up; *first*, All the simple *ideas* comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. *Secondly*, The *idea* of love. *Thirdly*, The *idea* of readiness or disposition. *Fourthly*, The *idea* of action, which is any kind of thought or motion. *Fifthly*, The *idea* of good, which signifies any thing that may advance his happiness, and terminates at last, if examined, in particular simple *ideas*; of which the word *good* in general signifies any one, but if removed from all simple *ideas* quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminate at last, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of simple *ideas*: the immediate signification of relative words, being very often other supposed known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in simple *ideas*.

§ 19. *We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a Notion of the Relation as of its Foundation.*

SECONDLY, That in relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of those simple *ideas* wherein it is founded. Agreement or disagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear *ideas*, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the distinguishing simple *ideas*, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear *idea* of sweetness, light or extension, I have too, of equal, or more or less of each of these: if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. *Sempronia*, I know what it is for another man to be born of the same woman, *Sempronia*; and so have as clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that *Sempronia* dug *Titus* out of the parsley-bed (as they use to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the same manner, she dug *Caius* out of the parsley-bed, I had as clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill of a midwife: the notion that the same woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births (though I were ignorant or mistaken in the man-

ner of it) being that on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumstance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the *ideas* of particular relations are capable of being as clear and distinct in the minds of those who will duly consider them, as those of mixed modes, and more determinate than those of substances; yet the names belonging to relation, are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification as those of substances or mixed modes, and much more than those of simple *ideas*; because relative words being the marks of this comparison which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an *idea* only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different comparisons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same names.

§ 20. *The Notion of the Relation is the same, whether the Rule any Action is compared to, be true or false.*

THIRDLY, That in these I call *moral relations*, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure any thing by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard, though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard; which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the relation. Though measuring by a wrong rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule; but I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED
IDEAS.

§ 1. *Ideas some clear and distinct, others obscure and confused.*

HAVING shown the original of our *ideas*, and taken a view of their several sorts; considered the difference between the simple and the complex, and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, substances, and relations; all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things: it will perhaps be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of *ideas*. I must, nevertheless, crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are *clear*, and others *obscure*; some *distinct* and others *confused*.

§ 2. *Clear and obscure, explained by Sight.*

THE perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight, we shall best understand what is meant by *clear* and *obscure* in our *ideas*, by reflecting on what we call *clear* and *obscure* in the objects of sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible objects, we give the name of *obscure* to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it, and which, in a better light would be discernible. In like manner our *simple ideas* are *clear*, when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well-ordered sensation or perception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occasion to consider them, they are *clear ideas*. So far as they either want any thing of that original exactness, or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by time, so far are they *obscure*.

Complex ideas, as they are made up of simple ones, so they are *clear*, when the *ideas* that go to their composition are clear; and the number and order of those *simple ideas*, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain.

§ 3. *Causes of Obscurity.*

THE *causes* of *obscurity* in *simple ideas*, seem to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received. For to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter: if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well when well imprinted; or else supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression: in any of these cases, the print left by the seal will be *obscure*. This, I suppose, needs no application to make it plainer.

§ 4. *Distinct and confused, what.*

As a *clear idea* is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-disposed organ, so a *distinct idea* is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other; and a *confused idea* is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.

§ 5. *Objection.*

IF no *idea* be *confused*, but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it should be different; it will be hard, may any one say, to find any where a *confused idea*. For let any *idea* be as it will, it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other *ideas*, which cannot be other, *i. e.* different, without being perceived to be so. No *idea* therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself: for from all other it is evidently different.

§ 6. *Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.*
To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the *confusion ideas* are at any time chargeable with, we must consider that things ranked under distinct names, are supposed different enough to be distinguished, that so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked and discoursed of apart upon any occasion: and there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things. Now, every *idea* a man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other *ideas* but itself; that which makes it *confused*, is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another name, as that which it is expressed by: the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct, and makes some of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names, being left out: and so the distinction which was intended to be kept up by those different names is quite lost.

§ 7. *Defaults which make Confusion.*

THE *defaults which* usually occasion this *confusion*, I think, are chiefly these following:

First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.

FIRST, When any complex *idea* (for it is complex *ideas* that are most liable to confusion) is made up of *too small a number of simple ideas*, and such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus he that has an *idea* made up of barely the simple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confused *idea* of a leopard; it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and several other sorts of beasts that are spotted. So that such an *idea*, though it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not distinguishable from those designed by the names lynx or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms, contributes to make the *ideas* we would express by them confused and undetermined, I leave others to consider. This is evident, that confused *ideas* are such as render the use of words uncertain, and

take away the benefit of distinct names. When the *ideas*, for which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused,

§ 8. Secondly, or its simple ones jumbled disorderly together.

SECONDLY, Another default which makes our *ideas* confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any *idea* are in number enough; yet they are so *jumbled together*, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confusion, than a sort of pictures usually shown as surprising pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no symmetry nor order appears, is in itself no more a confused thing than the picture of a cloudy sky; wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found, yet nobody thinks it a confused picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confused, since the want of symmetry does not? As it is plain it does not, for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confused, I answer, That which makes it be thought confused, is, the applying it to some name, to which it does no more discernibly belong, than to some other: *v. g.* When it is said to be the picture of a man, or *Cæsar*, then any one with reason counts it confused: because it is not discernible in that state, to belong more to the name man, or *Cæsar*, than to the name baboon, or *Pompey*; which are supposed to stand for different *ideas* from those signified by man, or *Cæsar*. But when a cylindrical mirror, placed right, hath reduced those irregular lines on the table into their due order and proportion, then the confusion ceases, and the eye presently sees that it is a man, or *Cæsar*, i. e. that it belongs to those names; and that it is sufficiently distinguishable from a baboon, or *Pompey*, i. e.

from the *ideas* signified by those names. Just thus it is with our *ideas*, which are as it were the pictures of things. No one of these mental draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused (for they are plainly discernible as they are) till it be ranked under some ordinary name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other name of an allowed different signification.

§ 9. *Thirdly, or are mutable and undetermined.*

THIRDLY, A third defect that frequently gives the name of confused to our *ideas*, is, when any one of them is *uncertain* and *undetermined*. Thus we may observe men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary words of their language, till they have learned their precise signification, change the *idea* they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his *idea* of *church* or *idolatry*, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise combination of *ideas*, that makes it up, is said to have a confused *idea* of *idolatry* or the *church*: though this be still for the same reason that the former, *viz.* because a mutable *idea* (if we will allow it to be one *idea*) cannot belong to one name rather than another; and so loses the distinction that distinct names are designed for.

§ 10. *Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.*

By what has been said, we may observe how much names, as supposed steady signs of things, and by their difference to stand for and keep things distinct that in themselves are different, are the *occasion of denominating ideas distinct or confused*, by a secret and unobserved reference the mind makes of its *ideas* to such names. This perhaps will be fuller understood, after what I say of words, in the third book, has been read and considered. But without taking notice of such a reference of *ideas*, to distinct names, as the signs of distinct things, it will be hard to say what a *confused idea* is. And therefore when a man designs, by any name, a sort of things, or any one particular thing, distinct from all others; the complex

idea he annexes to that name, is the more distinct, the more particular the *ideas* are, and the greater and more determinate the number and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all *ideas* belonging to other names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confusion with them is avoided.

§ 11. *Confusion concerns always two Ideas.*

CONFUSION, making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated, *concerns always two ideas*: and those most, which most approach one another. - Whenever therefore we suspect any *idea* to be *confused*, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from: and that will always be found an *idea* belonging to another name, and so should be a different thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct, being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name, as the other it is ranked under; and so keeps not that difference from that other *idea* which the different names import.

§ 12. *Causes of Confusion.*

THIS, I think, is the *confusion* proper to *ideas*, which still carries with it a secret reference to names. At least, if there be any other confusion of *ideas*, this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses: *Ideas*, as ranked under names, being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves, and always those which they commune about with others. And therefore where there are supposed two different *ideas* marked by two different names, which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be *confusion*: And where any *ideas* are distinct, as the *ideas* of those two sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no *confusion*. The way to prevent it, is, to collect and unite into our complex *idea*, as precisely as is possible, all those ingredients whereby it is differenced from others; and to them so united in a determinate number and order, ap-

ply steadily the same name. But this neither accomodating men's ease or vanity, or serving any design but that of naked truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for. And since the loose application of names to undetermined, variable, and almost no *ideas*, serve both to cover our own ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge, it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Though, I think, no small part of the *confusion* to be found in the notions of men, might by care and ingenuity be avoided, yet I am far from concluding it every where wilful. Some *ideas* are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the memory does not easily retain the very same precise combination of simple *ideas* under one name; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex *idea* such a name stands in another man's use of it. From the first of these, follows *confusion* in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent *confusion* in discoursing and arguing with others. But having more at large treated of words, their defects and abuses, in the following book, I shall here say no more of it.

§ 13. *Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.*

OUR *complex ideas* being made up of collections, and so variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. In a man who speaks of a *chiliadron*, or a body of a thousand sides, the *idea* of the figure may be very confused, though that of the number be very distinct; so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex *idea*, which depends upon the number of a thousand, he is apt to think he has a distinct *idea* of a *chiliadron*; though it be plain he has no precise *idea* of its figure, so as to distinguish it by that, from one that has but 999 sides; the

not observing whereof, causes no small error in men's thoughts, and confusion in their discourses.

§ 14. *This, if not heeded, causes Confusion in our Arguings.* HE that thinks he has a distinct *idea* of the figure of a *chiliadron*, let him for trial-sake take another parcel of the same uniform matter, *viz.* gold or wax, of an equal bulk, and make it into a figure of 999 sides: He will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two *ideas* one from another, by the number of sides; and reason and argue distinctly about them, whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these *ideas*, which is contained in their numbers; as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers, and of the other not, &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not able, I think, to frame in his mind two *ideas*, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold; as he could, if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube, the other a figure of five sides. In which incomplete *ideas*, we are very apt to impose on ourselves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar names. For being satisfied in that part of the *idea*, which we have clear, and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part also which is imperfect and obscure; we are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obscure part of its signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

§ 15. *Instance in Eternity.*

HAVING frequently in our mouths the name *eternity*, we are apt to think we have a positive comprehensive *idea* of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that duration which is not clearly contained in our *idea*. It is true, that he that thinks so may have a clear *idea* of duration; he may also have a very clear *idea* of a very great length of duration; he may also have a clear *idea* of the comparison of that great one with still a greater: But it not being possible for him to include in his *idea* of any duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole

extent together of a duration where he supposes no end, that part of his *idea*, which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity, or any other *infinite*, we are apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.

§ 16. *Divisibility of Matter.*

IN matter we have no clear *ideas* of the smallness or parts much beyond the smallest that occur to any of our senses: and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*, though we have clear *ideas* of division and divisibility, and have also clear *ideas* of parts made out of a whole by division; yet we have but very obscure and confused *ideas* of corpuscles, or minute bodies so to be divided, when by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness much exceeding the perception of any of our senses; and so all that we have clear and distinct *ideas* of, is of what division in general or abstractly is, and the relation of *totum* and *pars*: But of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think we have no clear nor distinct *idea* at all. For I ask any one, whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw, he has any distinct *idea* (bating still the number which concerns not extension) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1000,000 part of it. Or if he thinks he can refine his *ideas* to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed, since a division carried on so far, brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division into two halves does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct *ideas* of the different bulk or extension of these bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of division of bodies *in infinitum*, our *idea* of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in obscurity. For that *idea*, which is to represent only bigness, must be very obscure

and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number; so that we have clear distinct *ideas*, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct *ideas* of two such extensions. It is plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite divisibility of body, or extension, our distinct and clear *ideas* are only of numbers; but the clear distinct *ideas* of extension, after some progress of division, is quite lost: and of such minute parts we have no distinct *ideas* at all; but it returns, as all our *ideas* of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct *idea* of actual infinite parts. We have, it is true, a clear *idea* of division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear *idea* of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear *idea* of an infinite number, by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned number we have: Endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct *idea* of actually infinite parts, than endless addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct *idea* of an actually infinite number: they both being only in a power still increasing the number, be it already as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added (wherein consists the infinity) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused *idea*; from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of which we have no such distinct *idea* as we have of 4 or 100: but only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other, it is still bigger: And we have no more a clear positive *idea* of it when we say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40, or 4; 400,000,000, having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition, or number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000, to 400,000,000. And so likewise in eternity, he that has an *idea* of but four years, has as much a positive complete *idea* of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years: For what remains of eternity beyond either of

these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other; *i. e.* neither of them has any clear positive *idea* of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on; or if he please, doubles the increase as often as he will: The remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions, as it is from the length of a day or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our *ideas*, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is also in our *idea* of *extension*, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by division, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space. After a few doublings of those *ideas* of extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct *idea* of that space: It becomes a confusedly great one, with a surplus of still greater; about which, when we would argue or reason, we shall always find ourselves at a loss; confused *ideas* in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused, always leading us into confusion.

CHAP. XXX.

OF REAL AND FANTASTICAL IDEAS.

§ 1. *Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.*

BESIDES what we have already mentioned concerning *ideas*, other considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent: and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and are,

First, Either real or fantastical.

Secondly, Adequate or inadequate.

Thirdly, True or false.

First, By *real ideas*, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. *Fantastical* or *chimerical*, I call such as have no founda-

tion in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of *ideas* before-mentioned, we shall find that,

§ 2. *Simple Ideas all real.*

FIRST, Our *simple ideas are all real*, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. But though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than the pain is; yet those *ideas* of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real *ideas* in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For these several appearances being designed to be the marks whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our *ideas* do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our *simple ideas* are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in *simple ideas* (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no *simple idea*, more than what it has received.

§ 3. *Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations.*

THOUGH the mind be wholly passive in respect of its *simple ideas*; yet, I think, we may say, it is not so in respect of its *complex ideas*; for those being combinations of *simple ideas* put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty, in forming those *complex ideas*:

How else comes it to pass that one man's *idea* of gold, or justice, is different from another's? but because he has put in or left out of his some simple *idea*, which the other has not. The question then is, which of these are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That,

§ 4. *Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas, are real.*

SECONDLY, *Mixed modes and relations* having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to those kind of *ideas* to make them *real*, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These *ideas* themselves being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and so cannot be *chimerical*, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent *ideas*. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language assigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would signify them to others, so bare possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that *idea*, which common use calls liberality. But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of *ideas*: for a man to be undisturbed in danger, sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex *idea* of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reason or industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an *idea* as the other. Though the first of these having the name *courage* given to it, may, in respect of that name, be a right or wrong *idea*; but the other, whilst it has not a common received name of any known language assigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself.

§ 5. *Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of things.*

THIRDLY, Our complex *ideas of substances* being made all

of them in reference to things existing without us, and intended to be representations of substances, as they really are, are no farther *real*, than as they are such combinations of simple *ideas*, as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, those are *fantastical* which are made up of such collections of simple *ideas* as were never really united, never were found together in any substance; v. g. a rational creature, consisting of a horse's head, joined to a body of human shape, or such as the *Centaurs* are described: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, consisting, as to sense, all of similar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether such substances as these can possibly exist or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these *ideas* of substances being made conformable to no pattern existing that we know, and consisting of such collections of *ideas*, as no substance ever showed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: but much more are those complex *ideas* so, which contain in them any inconsistency or contradiction of their parts.

CHAP. XXI.

OF ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Adequate Ideas are such as perfectly represent their Archetypes.*

OF our real *ideas*, some are adequate, and some are inadequate. Those I call *adequate*, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. *Inadequate ideas* are such, which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

§ 2. *Simple Ideas, all adequate.*

FIRST, That all our *simple ideas* are adequate. Because being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things,

fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers: and we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us the *ideas* which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those *ideas* in our minds, or else they could not have been produced by it. And so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the *idea* so produced is a real *idea* (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any simple *idea*); and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple *ideas* are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple *ideas* are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those *ideas* were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the *idea* of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot; as if light and heat were really something in the fire more than a power to excite these *ideas* in us; and therefore are called *qualities* in, or of the fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such *ideas* in us, I must, in that sense, be understood when I speak of secondary *qualities*, as beings in things; or of their *ideas*, as being in the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood; yet truly signify nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensation or *ideas* in us: since were there no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the *ideas* of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or the sun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount *Ætna* flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the *ideas*, would be really in the world as they

are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no: and therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to show what complex *ideas* are *adequate*, and what not.

§ 5. *Modes are all adequate.*

SECONDLY, Our complex *ideas of modes*, being voluntary collections of simple *ideas* which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes or standing patterns existing any where, *are* and cannot but be *adequate ideas*. Because they not being intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of *ideas*, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should: so that the mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the *idea* of a figure, with three sides meeting in three angles, I have a complete *idea*, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its *idea*, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any understanding hath, or can have a more complete or perfect *idea* of that thing it signifies by the word *triangle*, supposing it to exist, than itself has in that complex *idea* of three sides, and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be essential to it, or necessary to complete it, wherever or however it exists. But in our *ideas of substances* it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy things as they really do exist, and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our *ideas* attain not that perfection we intend; we find they still want something we should be glad were in them; and so are all *inadequate*. But *mixed-modes* and *relations*, being archetypes without patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, cannot but be *adequate*, every thing being so to itself. He that at first put together the *idea* of danger perceived, absence of disorder from

fear, sedate consideration from what was justly to be done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex *idea* made up of that combination; and intending to be nothing else, but what it is, nor to have in it any other simple *ideas*, but what it hath, it could not also but be an *adequate idea*: and laying this up in his memory, with the name *courage* annexed to it, to signify it to others, and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This *idea* thus made, and laid up for a pattern, must necessarily be *adequate*, being referred to nothing else but itself, nor made by any other original, but the good-liking and will of him that first made this combination.

§ 4. *Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.*

INDEED another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word *courage*, may make any *idea*, to which he gives that name *courage*, different from what the first author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs that his *idea* in thinking should be conformable to the other's *idea*, as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his, from whom he learned it, his *idea* may be very wrong and *inadequate*: because in this case, making the other man's *idea* the pattern of his *idea* in thinking, as the other man's word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking, his *idea* is so far defective and *inadequate*, as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it; which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's *idea* (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§ 5.

THEREFORE these complex ideas of *modes*, when they are referred by the mind, and intend to correspond to the

ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being, expressed by the names we apply to them, they *may be* very deficient, wrong and *inadequate*; because they agree not to that, which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which respect only, any *idea* of *modes* can be wrong, imperfect or *inadequate*. And on this account our *ideas* of *mixed modes* are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper speaking, than knowing right.

§ 6. *Ideas of Substances, as referred to real Essences, not adequate.*

THIRDLY, What *ideas* we have of *substances*, I have above shown. Now those *ideas* have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in the mind, of things that do exist by *ideas* of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these copies of those originals and archetypes, are imperfect and *inadequate*.

First, It is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things, as supposed to have certain real essences, whereby they are of this or that species: and names standing for nothing but the *ideas* that are in men's minds, they must consequently refer their *ideas* to such real essences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do suppose certain specific essences of substances, which each individual, in its several kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is so far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under, to things as distinguished by such specific real essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whether he called himself man, with any other meaning, than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand what those real essences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows,

that the *ideas* they have in their minds, being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being *adequate*, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex *ideas* we have of substances, are, as it has been shown, certain collections of simple *ideas* that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex *idea* cannot be the real essence of any substance; for then the properties we discover in that body, would depend on that complex *idea*, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connection with it be known: as all properties of a triangle depend on, and as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex *idea* of three lines, including a space. But it is plain, that in our complex *ideas* of substances, are not contained such *ideas*, on which all the other qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common *idea* men have of *iron*, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardness; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connection with that complex *idea*, or any part of it: and there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that colour, weight and hardness, than that colour, or that weight depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by most men, supposed to have a real essence, whereby it is *gold*; and from whence those qualities flow, which I find in it, *viz.* its peculiar colour, weight, hardness, fusibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a slight touch of mercury, &c. This essence, from which all these properties flow, when I inquire into it, and search after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover; the farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but body, its real essence, or internal constitution, on which these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, size and connection of its solid parts; of neither

of which, having any distinct perception at all, can I have any *idea* of its essence, which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness, a greater weight than any thing I know of the same bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real essence and internal constitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, size and arrangement or connection of its solid parts, but something else, called its particular *form*; I am farther from having any *idea* of its real essence, than I was before: for I have an *idea* of a figure, size and situation of solid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, size, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that something besides the figure, size and posture of the solid parts of that body, is its essence, something called *substantial form*; of that, I confess, I have no *idea* at all, but only of the sound *form*, which is far enough from an *idea* of its real essence, or constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real essence of this particular substance, I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones: of which essences, I confess I have no distinct *ideas* at all; and I am apt to suppose others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§ 7.

Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general name already in use, and denominate it *gold*, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name as belonging to a particular species of bodies, having a real internal essence; by having of which essence, this particular substance comes to be of that species, and to be called by that name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that essence, must be referred primarily to that essence; and consequently the

idea to which that name is given, must be referred also to that essence, and be intended to represent it. Which essence, since they, who so use the names, know not, their *ideas of substances* must be *all adequate* in that respect, as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should.

§ 8. *Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities are all inadequate.*

SECONDLY, Those who neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world, by putting together the *ideas* of those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate *ideas* of those substances they would thus copy into their minds; nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities, and powers of substances, whereof we make their complex *ideas*, are so many and various, that no man's complex *idea* contains them all. That our abstract *ideas* of substances do not contain in them all the simple *ideas* that are united in the things themselves, is evident, in that men do rarely put into their complex *idea* of any substance, all the simple *ideas* they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the signification of their specific names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific *ideas* of the sorts of substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple *ideas* which are to be found in them: But these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific *idea* more than others that are left out, it is plain that both these ways our *ideas of substances* are deficient and *inadequate*. The simple *ideas*, whereof we make our complex ones of substances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers, which being relations to other substances we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes

it is fitted to give to, or receive from other substances, in their several ways of application: Which being impossible to be tried upon any one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate *ideas* of any substance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§ 9.

WHOSOEVER first lit on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word *gold*, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real essence or internal constitution. Therefore those never went into his *idea* of that species of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex *idea* of that species. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after such a manner, and to produce in us that *idea* we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal scales, one against another. Another perhaps added to these the *ideas* of fusibility and fixedness, two other passive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and solubility in *aq. regia*, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure or separation of it into insensible parts. These, or parts of these, put together, usually make the complex *idea* in men's minds, of that sort of body we call *gold*.

§ 10.

BUT no one, who hath considered the properties of bodies in general, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this called *gold* has infinite other properties, not contained in that *complex idea*. Some who have examined this species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many properties in *gold*, all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution, as its colour or weight; And, it is probable, if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal, there would an hundred times as many *ideas* go to the complex *idea* of *gold*, as any one man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes which that one body

is apt to receive, and make in other bodies, upon a due application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one, who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one, no very compound figure, a *triangle*; though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it.

§ 11. *Ideas of Substances as Collections of their Qualities, are all inadequate.*

So that *all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate.* Which would be so also in mathematical figures, if we were to have our complex *ideas* of them, only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our *ideas* be of an *ellipsis*, if we had no other *idea* of it, but some few of its properties? Whereas having in our plain *idea* the whole essence of that figure, we from thence discover those properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

§ 12. *Simple Ideas ἰδέα, and adequate.*

THUS the mind has three sorts of abstract *ideas* or nominal essences:

FIRST, Simple ideas, which are ἰδέα, or *copies*; but yet certainly *adequate*. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation, that sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on, having the power, in the light (I speak according to the common notion of light) to produce in me the sensation which I call white, it cannot but be the effect of such a power, in something without the mind; since the mind has not the power to produce any such *idea* in itself, and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power, that simple *idea* is real and *adequate*: the sensation of white, in my mind, being the effect of that power; which is in the paper to produce it, is perfectly *adequate* to that power; or else, that power would produce a different *idea*.

§ 13. Ideas of Substances are *in vana*, inadequate.

SECONDLY, The complex ideas of substances are *etypes*, copies too; but not perfect ones, not *adequate*: which is very evident to the mind, in that it plainly perceives that whatever collection of simple *ideas* it makes of any substance that exists, it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance: since not having tried all the operations, of all other substances upon it, and found all the alterations it would receive from, or cause in other substances, it cannot have an exact *adequate* collection of all its active and passive capacities; and so *not* have an *adequate* complex *idea* of the powers of any substance existing, and its relations, which is that sort of complex *idea* of substances we have. And after all, if we could have, and actually had in our complex *idea*, an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance, we should not yet thereby have an *idea* of the essence of that thing. For since the powers or qualities that are observable by us, are not the real essence of that substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any collection whatsoever of these qualities, cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our *ideas* of substances are not *adequate*; are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides, a man has no *idea* of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.

§ 14. Ideas of Modes and Relations, are *Archetypes*, and cannot but be adequate.

THIRDLY, Complex ideas of modes and relations, are originals, and archetypes; are not copies, nor made after the pattern of any real existence, to which the mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such collections of simple *ideas*, that the mind itself puts together, and such collections, that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends it should, they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist, and so are designed only for, and belong only to such modes, as when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex *ideas*. The *ideas* therefore of modes and relations cannot but be *adequate*.

CHAP. XXXII.

OF TRUE AND FALSE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Truth and Falsehood properly belong to Propositions.*

THOUGH truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to propositions; yet *ideas* are oftentimes termed *true* or *false* (as what words are there, that are not used with great latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations)? Though, I think, that when the *ideas* themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that denomination: as we shall see, if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation, which is the reason of that denomination. For our *ideas* being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be *true* or *false*, no more than a single name of any thing can be said to be *true* or *false*.

§ 2. *Metaphysical Truth contains a tacit Proposition.*

INDEED both *ideas* and words may be said to be *true* in a *metaphysical sense* of the word truth, as all other things, that any way exist, are said to be true; *i. e.* really to be such as they exist. Though in things called *true*, even in that sense, there is perhaps a secret reference to our *ideas*, looked upon as the standards of that truth, which amounts to a mental proposition, though it be usually not taken notice of.

§ 3. *No Idea, as an Appearance in the mind, true or false.*

BUT it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when we examine whether our *ideas* are capable of being *true* or *false*; but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: And so I say, that the *ideas* in our minds being only so many perceptions, or appearances there, none of them are *false*; the *idea* of a centaur having no more falsehood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name centaur has falsehood

in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation, or negation, mental or verbal, our *ideas* are *not capable*, any of them, *of being false*, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.

§ 4. *Ideas referred to any thing, may be true or false.*

WHENEVER the mind refers any of its *ideas* to any thing extraneous to them, they are then *capable to be called true or false*. Because the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing: which supposition, as it happens to be *true* or *false*, so the *ideas* themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases wherein this happens, are these following:

§ 5. *Other men's Ideas real Existence, and supposed real Essences, are what men usually refer their Ideas to.*

FIRST, When the mind supposes any *idea* it has, *conformable* to that in *other men's* minds, called by the same common name; v. g. when the mind intends or judges its *ideas* of *justice, temperance, religion*, to be the same with what other men give those names to.

SECONDLY, When the mind supposes any *idea* it has in itself, to be *conformable to some real existence*. Thus the two *ideas*, of a man and a centaur, supposed to be the *ideas* of real substances, are the one *true*, and the other *false*; the one having a conformity to what has really existed, the other not.

THIRDLY, When the mind refers any of its *ideas* to the real constitution and *essence* of any thing, whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our *ideas* of substances, are *false*.

§ 6. *The Cause of such References.*

THESE suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own *ideas*. But yet, if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abstract complex *ideas*. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge; and finding that, if it should proceed by and dwell upon any particular things, its progress would be very slow, and its work endless: therefore to shorten its way to knowledge, and make each

perception more comprehensive ; the first thing it does, as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge, either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, or conference with others about them, is to bind them into bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what knowledge it gets of any of them, it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort ; and so advance by larger steps in that, which is its great business, knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere showed, is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive *ideas*, with names annexed to them, into *genera* and *species*, i. e. into kinds and sorts.

§ 7.

If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind, and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge ; we shall, I think, find that the mind having got any *idea*, which it thinks it may have use of, either in contemplation or discourse, the first thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a name to it ; and so lay it up in its storehouse, the memory, as containing the essence of a sort of things, of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is, meaning, by that inquiry, nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species, or the essence of it ; whereof it is indeed used as the mark, and is generally supposed annexed to it.

§ 8.

BUT this abstract *idea* being something in the mind between the thing that exists, and the name that is given it ; it is in our *ideas*, that both the rightness of our knowledge, and the propriety or intelligibleness of our speaking, consists. And hence it is, that men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract *ideas* they have in their minds, are such as agree to the things existing without them, to which they are referred ; and are the same also, to which the names they give them do, by the use and propriety of that language, belong. For without this *double conformity* of their *ideas*, they find

they should both think amiss of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§ 9. *Simple Ideas may be false, in reference to others of the same Name, but are least liable to be so.*

FIRST, then, I say, that when the truth of our ideas is judged of, by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have, and commonly signify by the same name, they may be any of them false. But yet simple ideas are least of all liable to be mistaken; because a man by his senses, and every day's observation, may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are, which their several names that are in common use stand for; they being but few in number, and such as if he doubts or mistakes in, he may easily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes in his names of simple ideas; or applies the name *red*, to the idea *green*; or the name *sweet*, to the idea *bitter*; much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas, belonging to different senses; and call a colour by the name of a taste, &c. whereby it is evident, that the simple ideas they call by any name, are commonly the same that others have and mean when they use the same names.

§ 10. *Ideas of Mixed Modes most liable to be false in this Sense.*

COMPLEX ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and the complex ideas of mixed modes, much more than those of substances: because in substances (especially those which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) some remarkable sensible qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any care in the use of their words, from applying them to sorts of substances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain; it being not so easy to determine of several actions, whether they are to be called *justice* or *cruelty*, *liberality* or *prodigality*. And so in referring our ideas to those of other men, called by the same names, ours may be false; and the idea in our minds, which we express by the word *justice*, may perhaps be that which ought to have another name.

§ 11. *Or at least to be thought false.*

BUT whether or no, our *ideas* of mixed modes are more liable than any sort to be different from those of other men, which are marked by the same names; this at least is certain, *That this sort of falsehood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes, than to any other.* When a man is thought to have a *false idea* of *justice*, or *gratitude*, or *glory*, it is for no other reason, but that his agrees not with the *ideas* which each of those names are the signs of in other men.

§ 12. *And why.*

THE *reason* whereof seems to me to be this, That the abstract *ideas* of mixed modes, being men's voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple *ideas*: and so the essence of each species being made by men alone, whereof we have no other sensible standard existing any where, but the name itself, or the definition of that name: we have nothing else to refer these our *ideas* of mixed modes to, as a standard to which we would conform them, but the *ideas* of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations; and so as our *ideas* conform or differ from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much concerning the *truth* and *falsehood* of our *ideas*, in reference to their names.

§ 13. *As referred to real Existences none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.*

SECONDLY, As to the truth and falsehood of our *ideas*, in reference to the *real existence* of things, when that is made the standard of their truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our complex *ideas* of substances.

§ 14. *First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.* FIRST, Our simple *ideas*, being barely such perceptions as God has fitted us to receive, and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways, suitable to his wisdom and goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those powers he has placed in external objects, or else they could not be produced in us; and

thus answering those powers, they are what they should be, *true ideas*. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of *falsehood*, if the mind (as in most men I believe it does) judges these *ideas* to be in the things themselves. For God, in his wisdom, having set them as marks of distinction in things, whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another, and so choose any of them for our uses, as we have occasion; it alters not the nature of our simple *idea*, whether we think that the *idea* of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object, by a regular and constant operation, producing the same *idea* of blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that distinguishing mark, as it is really in the *violet*, be only a peculiar texture of parts, else that very colour, the *idea* whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *blue*, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that *idea*: since the name *blue* notes properly nothing, but that mark of distinction that is in a *violet*, discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, if we had faculties to discern.

§ 15. *Though one Man's Idea of blue should be different from another's.*

NEITHER would it carry any imputation of *falsehood* to our simple *ideas*, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered, that the same object should produce in several men's minds different *ideas* at the same time; v. g. if the *idea* that a *violet* produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the same that a *marigold* produced in another man's, and *vice versa*. For since this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs; neither the *ideas* hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded,

or any *falsehood* be in either. For all things that had the texture of a *violet*, producing constantly the *idea* which he called *blue*: and those which had the texture of a *marigold*, producing constantly the *idea* which he has constantly called *yellow*: whatever those appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances, and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the name *blue* and *yellow*, as if the appearances, or *ideas* in his mind, received from those two flowers, were exactly the same with the *ideas* in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible *ideas* produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which opinion I think, there might be many reasons offered: but that being besides my present business, I shall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or convenience of life; and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

§ 16. *First, Simple-Ideas in this Sense not false, and why.* FROM what has been said concerning our simple *ideas*, I think it evident, that our *simple ideas* can none of them be *false in respect of things* existing without us. For the truth of these appearances, or perceptions in our minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our senses such appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, such as it is, suitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it represents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to such a pattern, be *false*. *Blue*, or *yellow*, *bitter* or *sweet*, can never be *false ideas*; these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there, answering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied; but that in this respect makes no *falsehood* in the *ideas* as if a man ignorant in the *English* tongue should call *purple* *scarlet*.

§ 17. Secondly, Modes not false.

SECONDLY, Neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the essence of any thing really existing, be false. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern existing, and made by nature: it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to represent any thing but such a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself such meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniencies of life as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply, and his station requires, I have no false ideas; but such an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and so is capable of neither truth or falsehood. But when I give the name *frugality*, or *virtue* to this action, then it may be called a false idea, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of *frugality* doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the standard of virtue and vice.

§ 18. Thirdly, Ideas of Substances when false.

THIRDLY, Our complex ideas of substances, being all referred to patterns in things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition, and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things, of which patterns they are the supposed copies: And in this reference of them, to the existence of things, they are false ideas. 1. When they put together simple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the shape and size that exist together in a horse, is joined, in the same complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a false idea of an horse. 2. Ideas of substances are, in this respect, also false, when from any collection of simple

ideas that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct negation, any other simple *idea* which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if to extension, solidity, fusibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper, he may be said to have a false complex *idea*, as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the *idea* of perfect absolute fixedness. For either way, the complex *idea* of gold being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex *idea*, that of fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separating of it from the rest in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect *idea* rather than a false one; since though it contains not all the simple *ideas* that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exist together.

§ 19. *Truth or Falsehood always supposes Affirmation or Negation.*

THOUGH, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have showed in what sense, and upon what ground our *ideas* may be sometimes called *true* or *false*; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cases where any *idea* is called *true* or *false*, it is from some judgment that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is *true* or *false*. For *truth* or *falsehood*, being never without some affirmation or negation, express or tacit, it is not to be found but when signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use are either *ideas* of words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions. *Truth* lies in so joining or separating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree; and *falsehood* in the contrary, as shall be more fully showed hereafter.

§ 20. *Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.*

ANY *idea* then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any *ideas* in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this

alone be called *false*. For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without, cannot be thought *false*, being exact representations of something: Nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be said to be false representations, or *ideas* of things they do not represent. But the mistake and *falsehood* is,

§ 21. But are false, 1. When judged agreeable to another man's Idea, without being so.

FIRST, When the mind, having any idea, it judges and concludes it the same that is in other men's minds signified by the same name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not: which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes, though other *ideas* also are liable to it.

§ 22. 2. When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.

SECONDLY, When it having a complex *idea* made up of such a collection of simple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing; as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of gold.

§ 23. 3. When judged adequate without being so.

THIRDLY, When in its complex *idea* it has united a certain number of simple *ideas* that do really exist together in some sort of creatures, but has also left out others as much inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete *idea* of a sort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the *ideas* of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy and fusible, it takes that complex *idea* to be the complete *idea* of gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in *aqua regia* are as inseparable from those other *ideas* or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

§ 24. 4. When judged to represent the real Essence.

FOURTHLY, The mistake is yet greater, when I judge that this complex *idea*, contains in it the real essence of any body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow from its real essence and constitu-

tion. I say, only some few of those properties; for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, and of which the complex *idea* of that kind of things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a man, that has several ways tried and examined it, knows of that one sort of things; and all that the most expert man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few *ideas*; three lines including a space make up that essence: But the properties that flow from this essence, are more than can be easily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances, their real essences lie in a little compass; though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless.

§ 25. *Ideas when false.*

To conclude, a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the *idea* he has of it in his mind (which *idea* he has a power to call by what name he pleases), he may indeed make an *idea* neither answering the reality of things, nor agreeing to the *ideas* commonly signified by other people's words; but cannot make a wrong or *false idea* of a thing, which is no otherwise known to him but by the *idea* he has of it: *v. g.* When I frame an *idea* of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a *false idea* of any thing; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a *Man* or *Tartar*, and imagine it either to represent some real being without me, or to be the same *idea* that others call by the same name; in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a *false idea*; though indeed the *falsehood* lies not in the *idea*, but in that tacit mental proposition, wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an *idea* in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name *Man* or *Tartar*,

belongs to it, I will call it *Man* or *Tartar*, I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming, but not erroneous in my judgment; nor the *idea* any way *false*.

§ 26. *More properly to be called Right or Wrong.*

UPON the whole matter, I think, that our *ideas*, as they are considered by the mind, either in reference to the proper signification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may very fitly be called *right* or *wrong* ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them *true* or *false*, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though in propriety of speech, *truth* or *falsehood*, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The *ideas* that are in a man's mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other *ideas* are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge: But when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

§ 1. *Something unreasonable in most Men.*

THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy in another, and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn, though he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced of.

§ 2. *Not wholly from Self-love.*

THIS proceeds not wholly from self-love, though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds, and not given up to the over-weening of self-flattery, are frequently guilty of it; and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings, and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason, though laid before him as clear as day light.

§ 3. *Nor from Education.*

THIS sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice, and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease, nor shows distinctly enough where it rises, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause, and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself: But yet, I think, he ought to look a little farther, who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds, and wherein it consists.

— § 4. *A degree of Madness.*

I SHALL be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as *madness*, when it is considered, that opposition to reason deserves that name, and is really madness; and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always, on all occasions, argue or do as in some cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for *Bedlam* than civil conversation, I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion, but in the steady calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name, and ungrateful imputation, on the greatest part of mankind, is, that inquiring a little by the by into the nature of madness, B. II. C. II.

§ 13. I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself, at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of, suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable; if this be a taint

which so universally infects mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name, thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

§ 5. *From a wrong Connection of Ideas.*

SOME of our *ideas* have a natural correspondence and connection one with another : It is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connection of *ideas* wholly owing to chance or custom : *Ideas* that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to separate them ; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associates appears with it ; and if they are more than two, which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, show themselves together.

§ 6. *This Connection how made.*

THIS strong combination of *ideas*, not allied by nature, the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance ; and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, &c. Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in the body ; all which seems to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set agoing, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which, by often treading, are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus *ideas* seem to be produced in our minds ; or if they are not, this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into that tract, as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune, will find, that let it but once begin in his head, the *ideas* of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding, without any care or attention, as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the tune he has begun, though his unattentive

thoughts be elsewhere a-wandering. Whether the natural cause of these *ideas*, as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers, be the motion of his animal spirits, I will not determine, how probable soever, by this instance, it appears to be so: but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits, and of the tying together of *ideas*.

§ 7. *Some Antipathies an Effect of it.*

THAT there are such affociations of them made by custom in the minds of most men, I think nobody will question, who has well considered himself or others; and to this, perhaps, might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathies observable in men, which work as strongly, and produce as regular effects as if they were natural, and are therefore called so, though they at first had no other original but the accidental connection of two *ideas*, which either the strength of the first impression, or future indulgence so united, that they always afterwards kept company together in that man's mind, as if they were but one *idea*. I say most of the antipathies, I do not say all, for some of them are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us; but a great part of those which are counted natural, would have been known to be from unheeded, though, perhaps, early impressions, or wanton fancies at first, which would have been acknowledged the original of them, if they had been warily observed. A grown person surfeiting with honey, no sooner hears the name of it, but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach, and he cannot bear the very *idea* of it; other *ideas* of dislike, and sickness, and vomiting, presently accompany it, and he is disturbed, but he knows from whence to date this weakness, and can tell how he got this indisposition. Had this happened to him by an over-dose of honey, when a child, all the same effects would have followed, but the cause would have been mistaken, and the antipathy counted natural.

§ 8.

I MENTION this not out of any great necessity there is in this present argument, to distinguish nicely between

natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, (*viz.*) That those who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch, and carefully to prevent the undue connection of *ideas* in the minds of young people. This is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions; and though those relating to the health of the body, are by discreet people minded and fenced against, yet I am apt to doubt, that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind, and terminate in the understanding or passions, have been much less heeded than the thing deserves: nay, those relating purely to the understanding, have, as I suspect, been by most men wholly overlooked.

§ 9. *A great Cause of Errors.*

THIS wrong connection in our minds, of *ideas* in themselves, loose and independent one of another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.

§ 10. *Instances.*

THE *ideas* of goblins and *sprights*, have really no more to do with darkness, than light: yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives: but darkness shall for ever afterwards bring with it those frightful *ideas*, and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than the other.

§ 11.

A MAN receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over; and by ruminating on them strongly, or much in his mind, so cements those two *ideas* together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are

often begotten from slight and almost innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

§ 12.

A MAN has suffered pain or sickness in any place, he saw his friend die in such a room; though these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *idea* of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it; he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

§ 13. *Why Time cures some Disorders in the Mind which Reason cannot.*

WHEN this combination is settled, and whilst it lasts, it is not in the power of reason to help us, and relieve us from the effects of it. *Ideas* in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumstances; and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections, which reason, though in the right, and allowed to be so, has not power over, nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases. The death of a child, that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes, and joy of her soul, rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life, and gives her all the torment imaginable: use the consolations of reason in this case, and you were as good preach ease to one on the rack, and hope to allay, by rational discourses, the pain of his joints tearing asunder. Till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment, and its loss from the *idea* of the child returning to her memory, all representations, though ever so reasonable, are in vain; and therefore some in whom the union between these *ideas* is never dissolved, spend their lives in mourning, and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves.

§ 14. *Farther Instances of the Effect of the Association of Ideas.*

A FRIEND of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness, by a very harsh and offensive operation. The gentleman, who was thus recovered, with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment, owned the cure all his life after, as the greatest obligation he could have received;

but whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him, he could never bear the sight of the operator: that image brought back with it the *idea* of that agony which he suffered from his hands, which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure.

§ 15.

MANY children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for, so join those *ideas* together, that a book becomes their aversion, and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after; and thus reading becomes a torment to them, which otherwise possibly they might have made the greatest pleasure of their lives. There are rooms convenient enough, that some men cannot study in, and fashions of vessels, which though ever so clean and commodious, they cannot drink out of, and that by reason of some accidental *ideas* which are annexed to them, and make them offensive: and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance, or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him, but because having once on some occasion got the ascendant, the *idea* of authority and distance goes along with that of the person, and he that has been thus subjected, is not able to separate them?

§ 16.

INSTANCES of this kind are so plentiful every where, that if I add one more, it is only for the pleasant oddness of it. It is of a young gentleman, who having learned to dance, and that to great perfection, there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learned. The *idea* of this remarkable piece of household-stuff, had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was only whilst that trunk was there; nor could he perform well in any other place, unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room. If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances, a little beyond precise nature, I answer for myself, that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man, upon his own know-

ledge, as I report it: and I dare say, there are very few inquisitive persons, who read this, who have not met with accounts, if not examples of this nature, that may parallel, or at least justify this.

§ 17. *Its Influence on intellectual Habits.*

INTELLECTUAL habits and defects this way contracted, are not less frequent and powerful, though less observed. Let the *ideas* of being and matter be strongly joined, either by education or much thought, whilst these are still combined in the mind, what notions, what reasonings will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the *ideas* of God, and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity?

Let the *idea* of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind; and then one body, in two places at once, shall, unexamined, be swallowed for a certain truth, by an implicit faith, whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands assent without inquiry.

§ 18. *Observable in different Sects.*

SOME such wrong and unnatural combinations of *ideas* will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them, to a man, should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of; some independent *ideas*, of no alliance to one another, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their

minds, that they always appear there together ; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one *idea*, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to *jargon*, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the errors in the world ; or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united ; if the eye sees these things rivetted, which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two *ideas*, that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds, as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves ? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error ; and the confusion of two different *ideas*, which a customary connection of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

§ 19. *Conclusion.*

HAVING thus given an account of the original, sorts and extent of our *ideas*, with several other considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments or materials of our knowledge ; the method I at first proposed to myself, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to show what use the understanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do : but upon a nearer approach, I find that there is so close a connection between *ideas* and words ; and our abstract *ideas*, and general words have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions without considering, first, the nature, use and signification of language ; which therefore must be the business of the next book.

BOOK III.—CHAPTER I.

OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.

§ 1. *Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.*

GOD having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. *Man* therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be *fit to frame articulate sounds*, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language.

§ 2. *To make them Signs of Ideas.*

BESIDES articulate sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be *able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions*; and to make them stand as marks for the *ideas* within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

§ 3. *To make general Signs.*

BUT neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of *ideas*, unless those *signs* can be so made use of, as to *comprehend several particular things*: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences: which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the *ideas* they were made signs of; those names becoming general, which are made to

stand for general *ideas*, and those remaining particular, where the *ideas* they are used for are particular.

§ 4. *To make general Signs.*

BESIDES these names which stand for *ideas*, there be other words which men make use of, not to signify any *idea*, but the want or absence of some *ideas* simple or complex, or all *ideas* together; such as are *nihil* in Latin, and in English, *ignorance* and *barrenness*. All which negative or privative words, cannot be said properly to belong to, or signify no *ideas*: for then they would be perfectly insignificant sounds; but they relate to positive *ideas*, and signify their absence.

§ 5. *Words ultimately derived from such as signify sensible Ideas.*

IT may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our *words* have on common sensible *ideas*; and how those, which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, *have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations*, and made to stand for *ideas* that come not under the cognizance of our senses; v. g. to *imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, &c.* are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. *Spirit*, in its primary signification, is breath; *angel*, a messenger: and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names, which stand for things that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible *ideas*. By which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which fill'd their minds who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge: whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other *ideas* that came not under their senses, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known *ideas* of sensation, by that

means to make others the more easily to conceive those operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances : and then when they had got known and agreed names, to signify those internal operations of their own minds, they were sufficiently furnished to make known by words all their other *ideas* ; since they could consist of nothing, but either of outward sensible perceptions, or of the inward operations of their minds about them : we having, as has been proved, no *ideas* at all, but what originally come either from sensible objects without, or what we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of which we are conscious to ourselves within.

§ 6. *Distribution.*

BUT to understand better the use and force of language, as subservient to instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

First, To what it is that names, in the use of language, are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things, it will be necessary to consider, in the next place, what the sorts and kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin names, *what the species and genera of things* are ; wherein they consist, and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought) well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of words, the natural advantages and defects of language, and the remedies that ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniencies of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words, without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness, or order, concerning knowledge : which being conversant about propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connection with words than perhaps is suspected.

These considerations, therefore, shall be the matter of the following chapters :

CHAP. II.

OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.

§ 1. *Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.*

MAN, though he has great variety of thoughts, and such, from which others, as well as himself, might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible *ideas*, which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which, with so much ease and variety, he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how *words*, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, come to be made use of by men, as the *signs* of their *ideas*; not by any natural connection that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain *ideas*, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an *idea*. The use then of words is to be sensible marks of *ideas*; and the *ideas* they stand for, are their proper and immediate signification.

§ 2. *Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.*

THE use men have of these marks, being either to record their own thoughts for the assistance of their own memory, or as it were to bring out their *ideas*, and lay them before the view of others; *words in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them*, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly those *ideas* are collected from the things, which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his *ideas* to the hearer. That then which

words are the marks of, are the *ideas* of the speaker : nor can any one apply them, as marks, immediately to any thing else, but the *ideas* that he himself hath. For this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other *ideas* ; which would be to make them signs, and not signs of his *ideas* at the same time ; and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some *ideas* of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man ; nor can he use any signs for them : for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men's *ideas* by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own *ideas* ; to *ideas* that he has, and not to *ideas* that he has not.

§ 3. *Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.*

THIS is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the knowing and the ignorant, the learned and unlearned, use the *words* they speak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every man's mouth stand for the *ideas* he has, and which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing in the metal he hears called gold, but the bright shining yellow colour, he applies the word gold only to his own *idea* of that colour, and nothing else : and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock's tail, gold. Another that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow, great weight : and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex *idea* of a shining yellow and very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities fusibility : and then the word gold to him signifies a body, bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy. Another adds malleability : each of

these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the *idea* which they have applied it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own *idea*; nor can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex *idea* as he has not.

§ 4. *Words often secretly referred, First, to the Ideas in other men's minds.*

BUT though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the *ideas* that are in the mind of the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.

First, They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea, where such as by the hearer were applied to another; which is to speak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds, be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose, that the idea they make it a sign of, is precisely the same, to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.

§ 5. *Secondly, to the Reality of things.*

SECONDLY, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to substances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple *ideas* and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and substances in particular: though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for any thing, but those *ideas* we have in our own minds.

§ 6. *Words by use readily excite Ideas.*

CONCERNING words also it is farther to be considered,

First, That they being immediately the signs of men's *ideas*, and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts, *there comes by constant use* to be such a connection between certain sounds, and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain *ideas*, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities; and in all substances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.

§ 7. *Words often used without signification.*

SECONDLY, That though the proper and immediate signification of words are *ideas* in the mind of the speaker, yet because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their significations perfectly; it often happens that *men*, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, *do set their thoughts more on words than things*. Nay, because words are many of them learned, before the *ideas* are known for which they stand; therefore some, not only children, but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connection between the sound and the *idea*, and a designation that the one stand for the other; without which application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant noise.

§ 8. *Their Signification perfectly arbitrary.*

WORDS by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain *ideas* so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural connection between them. But that they signify only men's peculiar *ideas*, and that by a perfectly arbitrary imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same language) the same *ideas* we

take them to be the signs of : and every man has so inviolable a liberty, to make words stand for what *ideas* he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the same *ideas* in their minds, that he has when they use the same words that he does. And therefore the great *Augustus* himself, in the possession of that power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word : which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what *idea* any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his subjects. It is true, common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain *ideas* in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same *idea*, he does not speak properly : and let me add, that unless a man's words excite the same *ideas* in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his *ideas*, and they can be signs of nothing else.

CHAP. III.

OF GENERAL TERMS.

§ 1. *The greatest part of Words general.*

ALL things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too ; I mean, in their signification ; but yet we find the quite contrary. The far *greatest part of words*, that make all languages, are *general terms* ; which has not been the effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity.

§ 2. *For every particular thing to have a Name is impossible.*

FIRST, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For the signification and

use of words, depending on that connection which the mind makes between its *ideas* and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct *ideas*, of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that *idea*. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct *ideas* of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason, why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand that came in their way, by a peculiar name.

§ 3. *And useless.*

SECONDLY, If it were possible, *it would yet be useless*; because it would not serve to the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood: which is then only done, when by use or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech, excites in another man's mind, who hears it, the *idea* I apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the *ideas* in my mind, the names of them could not be significant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my notice.

§ 4.

THIRDLY, But yet granting this also feasible (which I think is not), yet a *distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge*: which though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which, things reduced

into sorts under general names are properly subservient. These, with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use requires: and therefore in these, men have, for the most part stopped; but yet not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things, by appropriated names, where convenience demands it. And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names; and their distinct individuals have distinct denominations.

§ 5. *What things have proper Names.*

BESIDES persons, countries, also cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like distinctions of place, have usually found peculiar names, and that for the same reason; they being such as men have often an occasion to mark particularly, and as it were set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular horses, as often as we have to mention particular men, we should have *proper names* for the one, as familiar as for the other, and *Bucephalus* would be a word as much in use as *Alexander*. And therefore we see that amongst jockeys, horses have their proper names to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants; because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that particular horse, when he is out of sight.

§ 6. *How general Words are made.*

THE next thing to be considered, is, *How general words come to be made.* For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being made the signs or general *ideas*; and *ideas* become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other *ideas*, that may determinethem to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one;

each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract *idea*, is (as we call it) of that sort.

§ 7.

BUT to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our *ideas* from our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the *ideas*, of the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone), are like the persons themselves, only particular. The *ideas* of the nurse, and the mother, are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them, are confined to these individuals; and the names of *nurse* and *mamma*, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other things in the world that in some common agreements of shape, and several other qualities resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an *idea*, which they find those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name *man* for example. And thus they come to have a general name, and a general *idea*. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex *idea* they had of *Peter* and *James*, *Mary* and *Jane*, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8.

By the same way that they come by the general name and *idea* of *man*, they easily advance to more general names and notions. For observing that several things that differ from their *idea* of *man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with *man*, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one *idea*, they have again another and a more general *idea*; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehensive extension: which new *idea* is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape,

and some other properties signified by the name *man*, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name *animal*.

§ 9. *General natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.*

THAT this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a man's self or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing else but such abstract and partial *ideas* of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his *idea* of *man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Paul*, or his *idea* of *horse* from that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex *ideas* of several particular existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex *ideas* signified by the names *man* and *horse*, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex *idea*, and giving the name *animal* to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave out of the *idea* of *animal*, sense and spontaneous motion; and the remaining complex *idea*, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term *vivens*. And not to dwell longer on this particular, so evident in itself, by the same way the mind proceeds to *body*, *substance*, and at last to *being*, *thing*, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our *ideas* whatsoever. To conclude, this whole *mystery* of *genera* and *species*, which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract *ideas*, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, that every more general term stands for such an *idea*, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

§ 10. *Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions.*

THIS may show us the reason, *why, in the defining of words*, which is nothing, but declaring their signification, *we make use of the genus*, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple *ideas*, which the next general word or *genus* stands for: or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by *genus* and *differentia* (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to), I say, though defining by the *genus* be the shortest way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For definition being nothing but making another understand by words, what *idea* the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple *ideas* that are combined in the signification of the term defined: and if instead of such an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term; it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness, but for quickness and despatch sake. For, I think, that to one who desired to know what *ideas* the word *man* stood for, if it should be said, that man was a solid extended substance, having life, sense, spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term *man* would be as well understood, and the *idea* it stands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a *rational animal*: which by the several definitions of *animal*, *vivens*, and *corpus*, resolves itself into those enumerated *ideas*. I have, in explaining the term *man*, followed here the ordinary definition of the schools: which though, perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the rule, that a definition must consist of *genus* and *differentia*: and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is of such a rule, or advantage

in the strict observing of it. For definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one word by several others, so that the meaning or *idea* it stands for may be certainly known; languages are not always so made according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those who have made this rule, have done ill, that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

§ 11. *General and universal are Creatures of the Understanding.*

To return to general words, it is plain by what has been said, that *general* and *universal* belong not to the real existence of things; but *are the inventions and creatures of the understanding*, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or *ideas*. Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of general *ideas*, and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and *ideas* are general, when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things; but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence; even those words and *ideas*, which in their signification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them.

§ 12. *Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.*

THE next thing therefore to be considered, is, *What kind of signification it is, that general words have*. For as it is evident, that they do not signify barely one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper names: so on the other side it is as evident, they do not signify a plurality; for man and men would

then signify the same, and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That then which general words signify, is a sort of things; and each of them does that, by being a sign of an abstract *idea* in the mind, to which *idea*, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name; or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident, that the *essences* of the sorts, or (if the Latin word pleases better) *species* of things, are nothing else but these abstract *ideas*. For the having the essence of any species, being that which makes any thing to be of that species, and the conformity to the *idea* to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity, must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right to the name of that species, is all one. As for example, to be a *man*, or of the species *man*, and to have right to the name *man*, is the same thing. Again, to be a *man*, or of the species *man*, and have the essence of a *man*, is the same thing. Now, since nothing can be a *man*, or have a right to the name *man*, but what has a conformity to the abstract *idea* the name *man* stands for; nor any thing be a *man*, or have a right to the species *man*, but what has the essence of that species, it follows, that the abstract *idea*, for which the name stands, and the essence of the species is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and consequently the sorting of this, is the workmanship of the understanding, that abstracts and makes those general *ideas*.

§ 13. *They are the workmanship of the Understanding, but have their foundation in the Similitude of things.*

I WOULD not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet, I think, we may say the *sorting* of them under names is the *workmanship of the understanding*, taking occasion from the *similitude* it observes amongst

them to make abstract general *ideas*, and set them up in the mind with names annexed to them as patterns or forms (for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification), to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that *classis*. For when we say, this is a *man*, that a *horse*; this *justice*, that *cruelty*; this a *watch*, that a *jack*; what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract *ideas*, of which we have made those names the signs? and what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract *ideas* in the mind; which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connection with particular beings, these abstract *ideas* are the *medium* that unites them: so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but those precise abstract *ideas* we have in our minds. And therefore the supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract *ideas*, cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one as rationally, as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a *horse* or *lead*, without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract *ideas*, this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences, he will, I suppose, be at a loss; and he will never be able to know when any thing precisely ceases to be of the species of a *horse* or *lead*.

§ 14. *Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence.*

NOR will any one wonder, that I say these *essences*, or abstract *ideas* (which are measures of name, and the boundaries of species), are the *workmanship of the understanding*, who considers, that at least the complex ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple *ideas*; and therefore that is *covetousness* to one man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances,

where their abstract *ideas* seem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not constantly the same; no not in that species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether the *foetus* born of a woman were a *man*, even so far as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized: which could not be, if the abstract *idea* of essence, to which the name *man* belonged, were of nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple *ideas*, which the understanding puts together, and then abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth *every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence*: and the names that stand for such distinct *ideas*, are the names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval, as a sheep from a goat: and rain is as essentially different from snow, as water from earth; that abstract *idea* which is the essence of one, being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract *ideas*, that in any part vary one from another, with two distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if you please, *species*, as essentially different as any two the most remote, or opposite in the world.

§ 15. *Real and Nominal Essence.*

BUT since the *essences* of things are thought, by some, (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amiss to consider the *several significations of the word essence*.

First, *Essence* may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in substances unknown, constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their *essence*. This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident from the formation of it; *essentia*, in its primary notation, signifying properly, *being*. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the *essence* of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about *genus* and *species*, the word *essence* has almost lost its primary signification: and instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of *genus* and *species*. It is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past doubt, there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple *ideas* co-existing must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked under names into sorts or *species*, only as they agree to certain abstract *ideas*, to which we have annexed those names; the *essence* of each *genus*, or sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract *idea*, which the general or *sortal* (if I may have leave so to call it from *sort*, as I do *general* from *genus*) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word *essence* imports in its most familiar use. These two sorts of *essences*, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the *real*, the other the *nominal essence*.

§ 16. *Constant connection between the name and nominal Essence.*

BETWEEN the nominal *essence*, and the name, there is so near a connection, that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this *essence*, whereby it answers that abstract *idea*, whereof that name is the sign.

§ 17. *Supposition that Species are distinguished by their real Essences, useless.*

CONCERNING the real *essences* of corporeal substances, (to mention those only) there are, if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those, who, using the word *essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those *essences*, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that *species*. The other, and more rational opinion, is of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one

from another, according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts under common denominations. The former of these opinions, which supposes these *essences*, as a certain number of forms or moulds, wherein all natural things, that exist, are cast, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things. The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of changelings, and other strange issues of human birth, carry with them difficulties, not possible to consist with this *hypothesis*: since it is as impossible, that two things, partaking exactly of the same real *essence*, should have different properties, as that the two figures partaking in the same real essence of a circle should have different properties. But were there no other reason against it, yet the *supposition of essences that cannot be known*, and the making them nevertheless to be that which distinguishes the species of things is so *wholly useless*, and unserviceable to any part of our knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content ourselves with such *essences* of the sorts or species of things as come within the reach of our knowledge: which when seriously considered, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract complex *ideas*, to which we have annexed distinct general names.

§ 18. *Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas and Modes, different in Substances.*

ESSENCES being thus distinguished into *nominal* and *real*, we may farther observe, that in the species of *simple ideas and modes*, they are always the same; but in *substances* always quite different. Thus a figure including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal *essence* of a triangle; it being not only the abstract *idea* to which the general name is annexed, but the very *essentia* or being of the thing itself, that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of matter, which makes the ring on my finger, wherein these two *essences* are apparently different. For it is the real constitution of its insensible parts, on which

depend all those properties of colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c. which makes it to be *gold*, or gives it a right to that name which is therefore its nominal *essence*: Since nothing can be called *gold* but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex *idea*, to which that name is annexed. But this distinction of *essences*, belonging particularly to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an occasion to treat of more fully.

§ 19. *Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.*

THAT such *abstract* ideas, with names to them, as we have been speaking of, are *essences*, may farther appear by what we are told concerning *essences*, viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real constitutions of things which begin and perish with them. All things that exist, besides their author, are all liable to change; especially those things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under distinct names or ensigns. Thus that which was grass to-day, is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep; and within a few days after becomes part of a man: In all which, and the like changes, it is evident their real *essence*, i. e. that constitution, whereon the properties of these several things depended, is destroyed, and perishes with them. But *essences* being taken for *ideas*, established in the mind, with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the same, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* and *Bucephalus*, the *ideas* to which *man* and *horse* are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain in the same: and so the *essences* of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever changes happen to any, or all of the individuals of those species. By this means, the *essence* of a species rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one individual of that kind. For were there now no circle existing any where in the world (as perhaps that figure exists not any where exactly marked out), yet the *idea* annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease to be as a pattern to determine which of the

particular figures we meet with have or have not a right to the name *circle*, and so to show which of them, by having that essence, was of that *species*. And though there neither were nor had been in nature such a beast as an *unicorn*, or such a fish as a *mermaid*; yet supposing those names to stand for complex abstract *ideas* that contained no inconsistency in them, the *essence* of a *mermaid* is as intelligible as that of a *man*; and the *idea* of an *unicorn* as certain, steady, and permanent as that of a horse. From what has been said, it is evident, that the doctrine of the immutability of *essences* proves them to be only abstract *ideas*; and is founded on the relation established between them, and certain sounds as signs of them; and will always be true as long as the same name can have the same signification.

§ 20. *Recapitulation.*

To conclude, this is that which in short I would say, viz. That all the great business of *genera* and *species*, and their *essences*, amounts to no more but this, that men making abstract *ideas*, and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge; which would advance but slowly, were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

CHAP. IV.

OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS.

§ 1. *Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something peculiar.*

THOUGH all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the *ideas* in the mind of the speaker; yet upon a nearer survey we shall find that the *names of simple ideas, mixed modes* (under which I comprise relations too), *and natural substances, and each of them have something peculiar* and different from the other. For example:

§ 2. 1. *Names of simple Ideas and Substances intimate real Existence.*

FIRST, The names of simple ideas and substances, with the abstract ideas in the mind, which they immediately signify, intimate also some real existence, from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any farther, as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

§ 3. 2. *Names of simple Ideas, and Modes signify always both real and nominal Essence.*

SECONDLY, The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural substances signify rarely, if ever, any thing but barely the nominal essences of those species, we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular.

§ 4. 3. *Names of simple Ideas undefinable.*

THIRDLY, The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definitions; the names of all complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet observed by any body, what words are, and what are not capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses, whilst some demand definitions of terms that cannot be defined: and others think they ought to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word, and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art, by a genus and difference), when even after such definition made according to rule, those who hear it, have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that the showing what words are, and what are not capable of definitions, and wherein consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs, and our ideas, as to deserve a more particular consideration.

§ 5. *If all were definable it would be a process in infinitum.* I WILL not here trouble myself, to prove that all terms

are not definable from that progress, *in infinitum*, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I shall, from the nature of our *ideas*, and the signification of our words, show, *why some names can, and others cannot be defined*, and which they are.

§ 6. *What a Definition is.*

I THINK it is agreed, that a *definition* is nothing else, but *the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms*. The meaning of words being only the *ideas* they are made to stand for by him that uses them: the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is defined, when by other words, the *idea* it is made the sign of, and annexed to in the mind of the speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and thus its signification ascertained: this is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only measure of what is, or is not a good definition.

§ 7. *Simple Ideas why undefinable.*

THIS being premised, I say, that *the names of simple ideas, and those only, are incapable of being defined*. The reason whereof is this, that the several terms of a definition, signifying several *ideas* they can all together by no means represent an *idea*, which has no composition at all; and therefore a definition, which is properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the names of simple *idea* have no place.

§ 8. *Instances—Motion.*

THE not observing this difference in our *idea*, and their names, has produced that eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple *ideas*. For as to the greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more exquisite *jargon* could the wit of man invent, than this definition, *the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?* which

would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully asking a *Dutchman* what *beweeginge* was, should have received this explication in his own language, that it was *actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia*; I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have understood what the word *beweeginge* signified, or have guessed what *idea* a *Dutchman* ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another when he used that sound.

§ 9.

NOR have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the *jargon* of the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple *ideas*, whether by explaining their causes, or any otherwise. The *atomists*, who define motion to be a *passage from one place to another*, what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is *passage*, other than *motion*? And if they were asked what *passage* was, how would they better define it than by *motion*? For is it not at least as proper and significant to say, *passage is a motion from one place to another*, as to say, *motion is a passage*, &c. This is to translate and not to define, when we change two words of the same signification one for another; which, when one is better understood than the other, may serve to discover what *idea* the unknown stands for; but is very far from a *definition*, unless we will say every *English* word in the dictionary is the definition of the *Latin* word it answers, and then motion is a definition of *motus*. Nor will the *successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body, to those of another*, which the *Cartesians* give us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.

§ 10. Light.

THE act of *perspicuous*, as far forth as *perspicuous*, is another peripatetic definition of a simple *idea*; which though not more absurd than the former of *motion*, yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly, because experience will easily convince any one, that it cannot

make the meaning of the word *light* (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind man; but the definition of *motion* appears not at first sight so useless, because it escapes this way of trial. For this simple *idea*, entering by the touch as well as sight, it is impossible to show an example of any one, who has no other way to get the *idea* of *motion*, but barely by the definition of that name. Those who tell us, that *light* is a great number of little globules, striking briskly on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than the schools; but yet these words ever so well understood would make the *idea* the word *light* stands for, no more known to a man that understands it not before, than if one should tell him, that *light* was nothing but a company of little tennis balls, which fairies all day long struck with rackets against some men's foreheads, whilst they passed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be true; yet the *idea* of the cause of *light*, if we had it ever so exact, would no more give us the *idea* of *light* itself, as it is such a particular perception in us, than the *idea* of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of steel, would give us the *idea* of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For the cause of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple *ideas* of one sense, are two *ideas*; and two *ideas* so different and distant one from another, that no two can be more so. And therefore should *Descartes's* globules strike ever so long on the *retina* of a man, who was blind by a *gutta serena*, he would thereby never have any *idea* of *light*, or any thing approaching it, though he understood what little globules were, and what striking on another body was, ever so well. And therefore the *Cartesians* very well distinguish between that light which is the cause of that sensation in us, and the *idea* which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.

§ 11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, farther explained. SIMPLE *ideas*, as has been shown, are only to be got by those *impressions*, objects themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made

use of to explain, or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the idea it stands for. For words being sounds, can produce in us no other simple ideas, than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connection, which is known to be between them, and those simple ideas, which common use has made them signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any tastes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to his palate, so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas, by their known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same thing; for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and arbitrary. And no definition of *light* or *redness*, is more fitted, or able to produce either of those ideas in us, than the sound *light* or *red* by itself. For to hope to produce an idea of light, or colour, by a sound, however formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible, and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all one as to say, that we might taste, smell and see by the ears; a sort of philosophy worthy only of *Sancho Pancho*, who had the faculty to see *Dulcinea* by hearsay. And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever put together, according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and friends, to understand those names of light and colours, which often came in

his way, bragged one day, that he now understood what *scarlet* signified. Upon which his friend demanding, what *scarlet* was? the blind man answered, It was like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple *idea* will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or other words made use of to explain it.

§ 12. *The contrary shewed in complex Ideas by Instances of a Statue and Rainbow.*

THE case is quite otherwise in *complex ideas*; which consisting of several simple ones; it is in the power of words, standing for the several *ideas* that make that composition, to imprint *complex ideas* in the mind, which were never there before, and so make their names be understood. In such collections of *ideas*, passing under one name, *definition*, or the teaching the signification of one word by several others; has place, and *may make us understand the names* of things, which never came within the reach of our senses: and frame *ideas* suitable to those in other men's minds, when they use those names: provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple *ideas*, which he to whom the explication is made, has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word *statue* may be explained to a blind man by other words, when *picture* cannot; his senses having given him the *idea* of figure, but not of colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him. This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred, because it reached farther, and even those who had lost their eyes, could yet perceive the excellency of it; the painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other, he was first led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body, and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman. But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told, That now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c. as his

hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any the least distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to them all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive any thing.

§ 13.

HE that should use the word *rainbow* to one who knew all those colours, but yet had never seen that *phenomenon*, would, by enumerating the figure, largeness, position, and order of the colours, so well define that word that it might be perfectly understood. But yet that *definition*, how exact and perfect soever, would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the simple *ideas* that make that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

§ 14. *The names of complex Ideas when to be made intelligible by words.*

SIMPLE *ideas*, as has been showed, can only be got by experience, from those objects, which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When by this means we have our minds stored with them, and know the names for them, then *we are in a condition to define*, and by *definition* to understand the names of complex *ideas*, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple *idea*, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an *idea* a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it, there another name, of the same *idea* which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple *idea*, capable of a *definition*.

§ 15. 4. *Names of Simple Ideas least doubtful.*

FOURTHLY, But though the names of *simple ideas* have not the help of *definition* to determine their signification, yet that hinders not but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed modes and substances: because they standing only for one simple perception,

men for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that word as long as he retains that *idea*; which when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple *ideas* to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown real essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof are also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple *ideas* the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the *idea* may be varied, and so the signification of its name be obscure or uncertain.

§ 16. 5. *Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea predicamentali.*

FIFTHLY, This farther may be observed concerning simple ideas, and their names, that they *have but few ascents in linea predicamentali* (as they call it) *from the lowest species to the summum genus*. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple *idea*, nothing can be left out of it; that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one *idea* common to them both; which having one name, is the *genus* of the other two: *v. g.* There is nothing can be left out of the *idea* of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as *rationality* being left out of the complex *idea* of *man*, makes it agree with brute, in the more general *idea* and name of *animal*: and therefore when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both *white* and *red*, and several other such simple *ideas*, under one general name; they have been fain to do it by a word, which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when *white*, *red* and *yellow* are all comprehended under the *genus* or name *colour*, it

signifies no more but such *ideas* as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both *colours* and *sounds*, and the like simple *ideas*, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense: and so the general term *quality*, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their *ideas* by more senses than one.

§ 17. 6. *Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbitrary.*

SIXTHLY, The names of simple *ideas*, substances, and mixed modes, have also this difference; that those of *mixed modes* stand for *ideas* perfectly arbitrary; those of *substances* are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, though with some latitude; and those of simple *ideas* are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple *ideas*.

CHAP. V.

OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.

§ 1. *They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.*

THE names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shown, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been showed, are nothing but the abstract *ideas* in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes, have nothing but what is common to them with other *ideas*: but if we take a little nearer fur-

vey of them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our attention.

§ 2. 1. *The Ideas they stand for are made by the Understanding*

THE first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstract *ideas*, or, if you please, the essences of the several species of *mixed modes* are made by the *understanding*, wherein they differ from those of simple *ideas*; in which sort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it.

§ 3. 2. *Made arbitrarily and without Patterns.*

IN the next place, these *essences of the species of mixed modes*, are not only made by the mind, but made *very arbitrarily*, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex *ideas* of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific *ideas*, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex *ideas* of substances, examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his *idea* of *adultery* or *incest* be right, will a man seek it any where amongst things existing? Or is it true, because any one has been witness to such an action? No: but it suffices here, that men having put together such a collection into one complex *idea*, that makes the *archetype* and specific *idea*, whether ever any such action were committed in *rerum natura* or no.

§ 4. *How this done.*

To understand this aright, we must consider *wherein this making of these complex ideas consists*: and that is not in the making any new *idea*, but putting together those

which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: First, It chooses a certain number: Secondly, It gives them connection, and makes them into one *idea*: Thirdly, It ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind, and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.

§ 5. *Evidently arbitrary, that the Idea is often before the Existence.*

NOBODY can doubt, but that these *ideas* of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of *ideas*, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this sort of complex *ideas* may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt but the *ideas* of *sacrilege* or *adultery* might be framed in the mind of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed: and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much *the sort of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding*, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence, but in their own minds. And I think nobody can deny, but that the *resurrection* was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.

§ 6. *Instances—Murder, Incest, Stabbing.*

To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will satisfy us, that it

is the mind that combines several scattered independent *ideas* into one complex one, and by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature. For what greater connection in nature has the *idea* of a man, than the *idea* of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word *murder*, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the *idea* of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a son, or neighbour; that those are combined into one complex *idea*, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species *parricide*, whilst the other make no distinct species at all? But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct species from killing his son, and daughter; yet in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex *ideas*, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one *idea*, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connection to a certain number of *ideas*, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out: why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct species called *stabbing*, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that therefore these species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident than that for the most part, in the framing these *ideas*, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the *ideas* it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.

§ 7. *But still subservient to the end of Language.*

BUT though these complex *ideas*, or *essences of mixed modes*, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they *are not made at random*, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex *ideas* be not always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract *ideas* are made: and though they be combinations made of *ideas* that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other to which the mind never gives a connection that combines them into one *idea*; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The use of language is, by short sounds to signify with ease and despatch general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent *ideas* collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex *ideas*, and given names to; whilst others that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract *ideas*, of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices, that men make and name so many complex *ideas* of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the *idea* of killing, the *idea* of father, or mother, and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and therefore they find it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that distinct combination. But though the *ideas* of mother and daughter

are so differently treated, in reference to the *idea* of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a distinct abstract *idea* with a name, and so a distinct species, and the other not; yet in respect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under *incest*: and that still for the same convenience of expressing under one name, and reckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions, and tedious descriptions.

§ 8. *Whereof the intranslatable Words of diverse Languages are a proof.*

A MODERATE skill in *different languages* will easily satisfy one of the truth of this; it being so obvious to observe great store of *words in one language, which have not any that answer them in another.* Which plainly shows, that those of one country, by their customs and manner of life, have found occasion to make several complex *ideas*, and give names to them, which others never collected into specific *ideas*. This could not have happened, if these species were the steady workmanship of nature, and not collections made and abstracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty sounds, will hardly find words that answer them in the *Spanish* or *Italian*, no scanty languages; much less, I think, could any one translate them into the *Caribbee* or *Westoe* tongues: and the *versura* of the *Romans*, or *Corban* of the *Jews*, have no words in other languages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what has been said. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we shall find, that though they have words which in translations and dictionaries are supposed to answer one another, yet there is scarce one of ten amongst the names of complex *ideas*, especially of mixed modes, that stands for the same precise *idea*, which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no *ideas* more common, and less compounded, than the measures of time, extension, and weight, and the *Latin* names, *hora*, *pes*, *libra*, are without difficulty rendered by the

English names *hour*, *foot*, and *pound*: but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the *ideas* a *Roman* annexed to these *Latin* names, were very far different from those which an *Englishman* expresses by those *English* ones. And if either of these should make use of the measures that those of the other language designed by their names, he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted; and we shall find this much more so, in the names of more abstract and compounded *ideas*, such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses: whose names, when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into, in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations.

§ 9. *This shows Species to be made for Communication.* THE reason why I take so particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about *genera* and *species*, and their *essences*, as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature, and had a real existence in things; when they appear, upon a more wary survey, to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier signifying such collections of *ideas*, as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term; under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abstract *idea*, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful signification of the word *species*, may make it sound harsh to some, that I say that the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding; yet, I think, it can by nobody be denied, that it is the mind makes those abstract complex *ideas*, to which specific names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things, I leave it to be considered who makes the boundaries of the sort of *species*; since with me, *species* and *sort* have no other difference, than that of a *Latin* and *English* idiom.

§ 10. *In mixed modes it is the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species.* THE near relation that there is between *species*, *essences*, and

their *general name*, at least in *mixed modes*, will farther appear, when we consider that it is the name that seems to preserve those *essences*, and give them their lasting duration. For the connection between the loose parts of those complex *ideas* being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would cease again, were there not something that did as it were hold it together, and keep the parts from scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them fast together. What a vast variety of different *ideas* does the word *triumphus* hold together, and deliver to us as one *species*! Had this name been never made or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descriptions of what passed in that solemnity: but yet, I think, that which holds those different parts together, in the unity of one complex *idea*, is that very word annexed to it; without which, the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing, than any other shew, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one complex *idea*, under one denomination. How much therefore, in mixed modes, the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annexed to it; I leave to be considered by those, who look upon *essences* and *species* as real established things in nature.

§ 11.

SUITABLE to this, we find, that *men speaking of mixed modes, seldom imagine, or take any other for species of them, but such as are set out by name*: because they being of man's making only, in order to naming, no such *species* are taken notice of, or supposed to be, unless a *name* be joined to it, as the sign of man's having combined into one *idea* several loose ones; and by that *name* giving a lasting union to the parts, which would otherwise cease to have any, as soon as the mind laid by that abstract *idea*, and ceased actually to think on it. But when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex *idea* have a settled and permanent union; then

is the essence as it were established, and the *species* looked on as complete. For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general, unless it were that they might have general *names*, for the convenience of discourse, and communication? Thus we see, that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet, are looked on as no distinct species of action: but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it passes for a distinct *species*, where it has a distinct *name*; as in *England*, in whose language it is called *stabbing*: but in another country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar *name*, it passes not for a distinct *species*. But in the *species* of corporeal substances, though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence; yet since those *ideas* which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or no, therefore those are looked on as distinct *species*, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting or giving a *name* to that complex *idea*.

§ 12. *For the Originals of mixed modes, we look no farther than the mind which also shows them to be the workmanship of the Understanding.*

CONFORMABLY also to what has been said, concerning the *essences* of the *species* of *mixed modes*, that they are the creatures of the understanding, rather than the works of nature: conformable, I say to this, we find that *their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther*. When we speak of *justice* or *gratitude*, we frame to ourselves no imagination of any thing existing, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract *ideas* of those virtues, and look not farther: as they do, when we speak of a *horse* or *iron*, whose specific *ideas* we consider not, as barely in the mind, but as in things themselves, which afford the original patterns of those *ideas*. But in mixed modes, at least the most considerable parts of them, which are moral beings, we consider the original patterns as being in the mind; and to those we refer for the distinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is, that these *essences* of the *species*

of mixed modes, are by a more particular name called *notions*; as by a peculiar right, appertaining to the understanding.

§ 13. *Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, shows the reason why they are so compounded.* HENCE likewise we may learn, *Why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded, than those of natural substances.* Because they being the workmanship of the understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expressing in short those *ideas*, it would make known to another, does with great liberty unite often into one abstract *idea* things that in their nature have no coherence; and so, under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded *ideas*. Thus the name of *profession*, what a great mixture of independent *ideas* of persons, habits, talents, orders, motions, sounds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to express by that one name? Whereas the complex *ideas* of the sorts of substances are usually made up of only a small number of simple ones; and in the species of animals, these two, *viz.* shape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal essence.

§ 14. *Names of mixed modes stand always for their real Essences.*

ANOTHER thing we may observe from what has been said, is, that *the names of mixed modes always signify* (when they have any determined signification) *the real essences of their species.* For these abstract *ideas*, being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real existence of things, there is no supposition of any thing more signified by that name, but barely that complex *idea* the mind itself has formed, which is all it would have expressed by it; and is that, on which all the properties of the *species* depend, and from which alone they all flow: and so in these the *real* and *nominal* essence is the same; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth we shall see hereafter.

§ 15. *Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.*

THIS also may show us the reason, *Why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got, before the ideas they stand for are perfectly known.* Because there being no *species* of these ordinarily taken notice of, but what have names, and those *species*, or rather their essences, being abstract complex *ideas* made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not necessary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame these complex *ideas*: unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex *ideas*, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confess, that in the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the *idea*, before one gave it the name: and so it is still, where making a new complex *idea*, one also, by giving it a new name, makes a new word. But this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for *ideas*, which men have frequent occasion to have and communicate: and in such, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes, before they have their *ideas*? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract *idea* of *glory* and *ambition*, before he has heard the name of them? In simple *ideas* and substances, I grant it is otherwise; which being such *ideas* as have a real existence and union in nature, the *ideas* or names are got one before the other, as it happens.

§ 16. *Reason of my being so large on this Subject.*

WHAT has been said here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable also to relations; which, since every man himself may observe, I may spare myself the pains to enlarge on: especially, since what I have here said concerning words in this third book, will possibly be thought by some to be much more than what so slight a subject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compass: but I was willing to stay my reader on an argument that appears to me new, and a little out of the way (I am sure it is one I thought not of when I began to write), That by searching it to the bottom, and

turning it on every side, some part or other might meet with every one's thoughts, and give occasion to the most averse or negligent to reflect on a general miscarriage; which, though of great consequence, is little taken notice of. When it is considered what a pudder is made about *essences*, and how much all sorts of knowledge, discourse, and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless and confused use and application of words, it will perhaps be thought worth while thoroughly to lay it open. And I shall be pardoned if I have dwelt long on an argument which I think, therefore, needs to be inculcated; because the faults, men are usually guilty of this kind, are not only the greatest hinderances of true knowledge, but are so well thought of, as to pass for it. Men would often see what a small pittance of reason and truth, or possibly none at all, is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with; if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds, and observe what *ideas* are, or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points, and with which they so confidently lay about them. I shall imagine I have done some service to truth, peace and learning, if by any enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use of language; and give them reason to suspect, that since it is frequent for others, it may also be possible for them to have sometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings, with very uncertain, little, or no signification. And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves, and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others. With this design, therefore, I shall go on with what I have farther to say concerning this matter.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES.

§ 1. *The common Names of Substances stand for Sorts.*

THE common names of *substances*, as well as other general terms, *stand for sorts*; which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex *ideas*,

wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, and signified by one name. I say, do or might agree : for though there be but one sun existing in the world, yet the *idea* of it being abstracted, so that more substances (if there were several) might each agree in it ; it is as much a sort, as if there were as many suns as there are stars. They want not their reasons who think there are, and that each fixed star would answer the *idea* the name sun stands for, to one who were, placed in a due distance ; which, by the way, may show us how much the sorts, or, if you please, *genera* and *species* of things (for those *Latin* terms signify to me no more than the *English* word *sort*) depend on such collections of *ideas* as men have made, and not on the real nature of things ; since it is not impossible, but that in propriety of speech, that might be a sun to one, which is a star to another.

§ 2. *The Essence of each sort is the abstract Ideas.*

THE measure and boundary of each sort, or *species*, whereby it is constituted that particular sort, and distinguished from others, is that we call its *essence*, which is nothing but that *abstract* idea to which the name is annexed : so that every thing contained in that *idea* is essential to that sort. This, though it be all the *essence* of natural substances that we know, or by which we distinguish them into sorts ; yet I call it by a peculiar name, the *nominal essence*, to distinguish it from that real constitution of substances, upon which depends this *nominal essence*, and all the properties of that sort : which therefore, as has been said, may be called the *real essence* : v. g. the *nominal essence* of gold is that complex *idea* the word *gold* stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the *real essence* is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body, on which those qualities, and all the other properties of gold depend. How far these two are different, though they are both called *essence*, is obvious at first sight to discover.

§ 3. *The nominal and real Essence different.*

FOR though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the complex *idea* to which I, and others, annex the name *man*, and so be the *nominal essence* of the *species* so called; yet nobody will say that that complex *idea* is the *real essence* and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort. The foundation of all those qualities, which are the ingredients of our complex *idea*, is something quite different: and had we such a knowledge of that constitution of *man*, from which his faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow: and on which his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his Maker has: we should have a quite other *idea* of his *essence* than what now is contained in our definition of that *species*, be it what it will: and our *idea* of any individual *man* would be as far different from what it now is, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels, and other contrivances within, of the famous clock at *Straßburg*, from that which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward appearances.

§ 4. *Nothing essential to Individuals.*

THAT *essence*, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to *sorts*; and that it is considered in particular beings no farther than as they are ranked into *sorts*, appears from hence: that take but away the abstract *ideas*, by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then the thought of anything *essential* to any of them, instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without the other; which plainly show their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; GOD and nature has made me so: but there is nothing, I have is essential to me. An accident, or disease, may very much alter my colour, or shape; a fever, or fall, may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor understanding, no nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with more, and bet-

ter, or fewer, or worse faculties than I have : and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one, or the other, or to any individual whatsoever, till the mind refers it to some sort or *species* of things ; and then presently according to the abstract *idea* of that sort, something is found *essential*. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks of *essential*, the consideration of some *species*, or the complex *idea*, signified by some general name, comes into his mind : and it is in reference to that, that this or that quality is said to be *essential*. So that if he be asked, whether it be *essential* to me or any other particular corporeal being to have reason ? I say no : no more than it is *essential* to this white thing I write on, to have words in it. • But if that particular being be to be counted of the sort *man*, and to have the name *man* given it, then reason is *essential* to it, supposing reason to be a part of the complex *idea* the name *man* stands for : as it is *essential* to this thing I write on to contain words, if I will give it the name *treatise*, and rank it under that *species*. So that *essential* and not *essential*, relate only to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them ; which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular thing has not in it those qualities, which are contained in the abstract *idea*, which any general term stands for, cannot be ranked under that *species*, nor be called by that name, since that abstract *idea* is the very *essence* of that *species*.

§ 5.

THUS if the *idea* of *body*, with some people, be bare extension or space, then solidity is not *essential* to body : if others make the *idea*, to which they give the name *body*, to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential to *body*. That, therefore, and that alone is considered as *essential*, which makes a part of the complex *idea* the name of a sort stands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to that name. Should there be found a parcel of matter that had all the other qualities that are in *iron*, but wanted obedience to

the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it, nor receive direction from it, would any one question, whether it wanted any thing *essential*? It would be absurd to ask, whether a thing really existing wanted any thing *essential* to it. Or could it be demanded, whether this made an *essential* or *specific* difference or no; since we have no other measure of *essential* or *specific*, but our abstract *ideas*? And to talk of specific differences in nature, without reference to general *ideas* and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, what is sufficient to make an *essential* difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract *idea*, which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a *species*? All such patterns and standards, being quite laid aside, particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally *essential*; and every thing, in each individual, will be *essential* to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to ask, whether obeying the magnet be *essential* to *iron*? yet, I think, it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be *essential* to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without considering it under the name *iron*, or as being of a certain *species*? And if, as has been said, our abstract *ideas*, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of *species*, nothing can be *essential* but what is contained in those *ideas*.

§ 6.

It is true I have often mentioned a *real essence*, distinct in substances from those abstract *ideas* of them, which I call their *nominal essence*. By this *real essence* I mean that real constitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the *nominal essence*; that particular constitution which every thing has within itself, without any relation to any thing without it. But *essence*, even in this sense, *relates to a sort*, and supposes a *species*: for being that real constitution, on which the properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things, properties belonging only to *species*, and not to individuals:

v. g. Supposing the nominal essence of *gold* to be body of such a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter, on which these qualities, and their union, depend; and is also the foundation of its solubility in *aq. regia*, and other properties accompanying that complex *idea*. Here are *essences* and *properties*, but all upon supposition of a sort, or general abstract *idea*, which is considered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of these qualities are so annexed, as to be *essential* to it, or inseparable from it. That which is *essential* belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that sort: but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract *idea*, and then there is nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. Indeed, as to the *real essences* of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely knowing what they are: But that which annexes them still to the *species*, is the nominal essence, of which they are the supposed foundation and cause.

§ 7. *The nominal Essence bounds the Species.*

THE next thing to be considered, is, by which of those essences it is that *substances are determined into* sorts, or *species*; and that, it is evident, is *by the nominal essence*. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the sort, signifies. It is impossible, therefore, that any thing should determine the sorts of things, which we rank under general names, but that *idea* which that name is designed as a mark for; which is that, as has been shown, which we call the *nominal essence*. Why do we say, this is a *horse*, and that a *mule*; this is an *animal*, that an *herb*? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that *sort*, but because it has that nominal essence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract *idea* that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts when he hears or speaks any of those or other names of substances, to know what sort of *essences* they stand for.

§ 8.

AND that the *species of things to us are nothing but the ranking under them distinct names, according to the com-*

plex ideas in us, and not according to precise, distinct, real *essences* in them, is plain from hence, That we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort, called by one common name, and so received as being of one *species*, have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ *specifically*. This as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies, so chemists especially are often, by sad experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are bodies of the same *species*, having the same nominal *essence*, under the same name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists. But if things were distinguished into *species*, according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same *species*, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the *essence* to us, which determines every particular to this or that *class*; or, which is the same thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be else, but that abstract *idea* to which that name is annexed? and so has, in truth, a reference, not so much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

§ 9. *Not the real Essence which we know not.*

NOR indeed *can we* rank, and *sort things*, and consequently (which is the end of *sorting*) denominate them *by their real essences*, because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible *ideas* which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal constitution, from which those qualities flow, than, as I said a countryman's *idea* is from the inward contrivance

of that famous clock at *Strasburg*, whereof he only sees the outward figure and motions. There is not so contemptible a plant or animal that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar use of things about us, take off our wonder, yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we presently find we know not their make, and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal constitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the grossest and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, What is that texture of parts, that real *essence*, that makes lead and antimony fusible; wood and stones not? What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances, and unconceivable *real essences* of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wise and powerful God, in the great fabric of the universe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into sorts, and dispose them into certain classes, under names, by their *real essences*, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension. A blind man may as soon sort things by their colours, and he that has lost his smell, as well distinguish a lily and a rose by their odours, as by those internal constitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can distinguish sheep and goats by their real essences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in those *species*, called *cassowary* and *querechinchio*; and by their internal real essences determine the boundaries of those *species*, without knowing the complex *idea* of sensible qualities, that each of those stand for, in the countries where those animals are to be found.

§ 10. *Not substantial Forms which we know less.*

THOSE therefore who have been taught, that the several

Species of substances had their distinct internal *substantial forms*; and that it was those *forms* which made the distinction of substances into their true *species* and *genera*, were led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after *substantial forms*, wholly unintelligible, and whereof we have scarce so much as any obscure, or confused conception in general,

§ 11. *That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species farther evident from Spirits.*

THAT our ranking and distinguishing natural *substances* into *species*, consists in the *nominal essences* the mind makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the things themselves, is farther evident from our *ideas* of *spirits*. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, those simple *ideas* which it attributes to *spirits*, it hath, or can have no other notion of *spirit*, but by attributing all those operations, it finds in itself, to a sort of beings, without consideration of matter. And even the most advanced notion we have of God, is but attributing the same simple *ideas* which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their absence; attributing, I say, those simple *ideas* to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourselves, the *idea* of existence, knowledge, power, and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better; joining all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex *idea* of an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely wise and happy Being. And though we are told, that there are different *species* of *angels*: yet we know not how to frame distinct *specific ideas* of them: not out of any conceit that the existence of more *species* than one of *spirits* is impossible, but because having no more simple *ideas* (nor being able to frame more), applicable to such beings, but only those few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of our own minds in thinking, and being delighted, and moving several parts of our bodies, we can no otherwise distinguish in our conceptions the several *species* of

Spirits, one from another, but by attributing these operations and powers, we find in ourselves, to them in a higher or lower degree; and so have no very distinct specific ideas of *spirits*, except only of GOD, to whom we attribute both duration, and all those other ideas with infinity; to the other *spirits*, with limitation. Nor as I humbly conceive do we, between GOD and them in our ideas, put any difference by any number of simple ideas, which we have of one, and not of the other, but only that of infinity. All the particular ideas of existence, knowledge, will, power, and motion, &c. being ideas derived from the operations of our minds, we attribute all of them to all sorts of *spirits*, with the difference only of degrees, to the utmost we can imagine, even infinity, when we would frame, as well as we can, an idea of the first Being; who yet, it is certain, is infinitely more remote in the real excellency of his nature, from the highest and perfectest of all created beings, than the greatest man, nay purest seraphim, is from the most contemptible part of matter; and consequently must infinitely exceed what our narrow understandings can conceive of him.

§ 12. *Whereof there are probably numberless Species.*

IT is not impossible to conceive, nor repugnant to reason, that there may be many species of *spirits*, as much separated and diversified one from another, by distinct properties, whereof we have no ideas, as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities, which we know and observe in them. That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us, is probable to me from hence, That in all the visible corporeal world, we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us, the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. There are fishes that have wings, that are not strangers to the airy region; and there are some birds, that are inhabitants of the water, whose blood is cold as fishes, and their flesh is so like in taste, that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish days.

There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts, that they are in the middle between both: Amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together; seals live at land and at sea, and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog, not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids or sea-men. There are some brutes, that seem to have as much knowledge and reason, as some that are called men; and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined, that if you will take the lowest of one, and the highest of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them; and so on, till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter, we shall find every where, that the several *species* are linked together, and differ but in almost insensible degrees. And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think, that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe, and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect, that the *species* of creatures should also, by gentle degrees, ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection, as we see they gradually descend from us downwards: Which if it be probable, we have reason then to be persuaded, that there are far more *species* of creatures above us, than there are beneath; we being, in degrees of perfection, much more remote from the infinite being of GOD, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing. And yet of all those distinct *species*, for the reasons above said, we have no clear distinct *ideas*.

§ 13. *The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.*

BUT to return to the *species* of corporeal substances. If I should ask any one, whether *ice* and *water* were two distinct *species* of things, I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative: And it cannot be denied, but he that says they are two distinct *species*, is in the right. But if an *Englishman*, bred in *Jamaica*, who perhaps had never seen nor heard of *ice*, coming into *England* in the winter, find the water he puts in his basin at night, in

a great part frozen in the morning, and not knowing any peculiar name it had, should call it hardened water; I ask, whether this would be a new *species* to him different from water? And I think, it would be answered here, It would not be to him a new *species*, no more than congealed gelly, when it is cold, is a distinct *species* from the same gelly fluid and warm; or than liquid gold, in the furnace, is a distinct *species* from hard gold in the hands of a workman. And if this be so, it is plain, that our *distinct species are nothing but distinct complex ideas, with distinct names annexed to them*. It is true, every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution, whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it; but the ranking of things into *species*, which is nothing but sorting them under several titles, is done by us according to the *ideas* that we have of them: Which though sufficient to distinguish them by names, so that we may be able to discourse of them, when we have them not present before us; yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions, and that things existing are distinguished by nature into *species*, by real essences, according as we distinguish them into *species* by names, we shall be liable to great mistakes.

§ 14. *Difficulties against a certain number of real Essences.*

To distinguish substantial beings into *species*, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise *essences* or *forms* of things, whereby all the individuals existing, are by nature distinguished into *species*, these things are necessary:

§ 15.

FIRST, To be assured that nature, in the production of things, always designs them to partake of certain regulated established *essences*, which are to be the models of all things to be produced. This, in that crude sense it is usually proposed, would need some better explication before it can fully be assented to.

§ 16.

SECONDLY, It would be necessary to know whether na-

ture always attains that *essence* it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births, that in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.

§ 17.

THIRDLY, It ought to be determined whether those we call *monsters* be really a distinct *species*, according to the scholastic notion of the word *species*; since it is certain, that every thing that exists has its particular constitution: And yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have few or none of those qualities, which are supposed to result from, and accompany the *essence* of that *species*, from whence they derive their originals, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong.

§ 11. *Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect Collections of properties.*

FOURTHLY, The *real essences* of those things, which we distinguish into *species*, and as so distinguished we name, ought to be known; *i. e.* we ought to have *ideas* of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, *the supposed real essences of things stand us not instead for the distinguishing substances into species.*

§. 19.

FIFTHLY, The only imaginable help in this case would be, that having framed perfect complex *ideas* of the *properties* of things, flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into *species*. But neither can this be done; for being ignorant of the real essence itself, it is impossible to know all these properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that essence is not there, and so the thing is not of that *species*. We can never know what are the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of *gold*, any one of which failing, the real essence of *gold*, and consequently *gold*, would not be there, unless we knew the real essence of *gold* itself, and by that determined that *species*. By the word *gold* here, I must be understood to design a particular piece of matter; *v. g.* the last guinea that was coined. For if it should stand here in

its ordinary signification for that complex *idea*, which I or any one else calls *gold*; *i. e.* for the nominal essence of gold, it would be *jargon*: so hard is it to show the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing else but words to do it by.

§ 20.

By all which it is clear, that our *distinguishing substances into species* by names, is not at all founded on their real essences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into species, according to the internal essential differences.

§ 21. But such a Collection as our Name stands for.

BUT since, as has been remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not the real essences of things; all we can do is to collect such a number of simple *ideas*, as by examination we find to be united together in things existing, and thereof to make one complex *idea*. Which though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet, *the specific essence*, to which our name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences. For example, there be that say, that the essence of *body* is extension: if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the essence of any thing for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put *extension* for *body*; and when we would say that *body* moves, let us say that *extension* moves, and see how it will look. He that should say that one extension by impulse moves another extension, would by the bare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The *essence* of any thing, in respect of us, is the whole complex *idea*, comprehended and marked by that name; and in substances, besides the several distinct simple *ideas* that make them up, the confused one of substance, or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always a part: and therefore the essence of *body* is not bare extension, but an extended solid thing: and so to say an extended solid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to say, *body* moves or impels. Likewise to say, that a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one as

to say a *man*. But no one will say, that rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole essence to which we give the name *man*.

§ 22. *Our abstract Ideas are to us the Measures of species—Instance in that of Man.*

THERE are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape, but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is said (*sic fides penes authorem*, but there appears no contradiction that there should be such) that with language, and reason, and a shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy tails; others where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If it be asked, whether these be all *men* or no, all of human *species*; it is plain, the question refers only to the nominal essence: for those of them to whom the definition of the word *man*, or the complex *idea* signified by that name, agrees, are *men*, and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence, and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different, it is wholly impossible for us to answer, no part of that going into our specific *idea*; only we have reason to think, that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs, the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the internal real constitution makes a specific difference, it is in vain to inquire; whilst *our measures of species* be, as they are, only *our abstract ideas*, which we know; and not that internal constitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin, be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill, when they agree in shape, and want of reason and speech? and shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and *species* between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest, if we pretend that the distinction of *species* or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.

§ 23. *Species not distinguished by Generation.*

NOR let any one say, that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female, and in plants by seeds, keeps the supposed real *species* distinct and entire. For granting this to be true, it would help us in the distinction of the *species* of things no farther than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest? but in those two it is not sufficient: for if history lie not, women have conceived by drills; and what real *species*, by that measure, such a production will be in nature, will be a new question: and we have reason to think this is not impossible, since mules and jumarts, the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare, the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it; wherein nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature, will find it hard, even in the race of animals, to determine by the pedigree of what *species* every animal's issue is; and be at a loss about the real essence, which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation, and has alone a right to the specific name. But farther, if the *species* of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation, must I go to the *Indies* to see the sire and dam of the one, and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other, to know whether this be a tyger or that tea?

§ 24. *Not by substantial forms.*

UPON the whole matter, it is evident, that it is their own collections of sensible qualities, that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances; and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men, in the sorting them. Much less were any *substantial forms* ever thought on by any, but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools: and yet those ignorant men, who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor

trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities, are often better acquainted with their differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their uses, and better know what they may expect from each, than these learned quick-sighted men, who look so deep into them, and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

§ 25. *The specific Effences are made by the Mind.*

BUT supposing that the *real effences* of substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry, yet we could not reasonably think that the *ranking of things under general names was regulated* by those internal real constitutions, or any thing else but *their obvious appearances*: since languages in all countries, have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers, or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about *forms and essences*, that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensive terms have for the most part, in all languages, received their birth and signification from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them; thereby to signify them, when absent, to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.

§ 26. *Therefore very various and uncertain.*

SINCE then it is evident, that we sort and name substances by their *nominal*, and not by their *real essences*; the next thing to be considered is, how and by whom these *essences* come to be made. As to the latter, it is evident they *are made by the mind*, and not by nature: for were they nature's workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one *species* of substances in all men the same; no not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be, that the abstract *idea* to which the name

man is given, should be different in several men, if it were of nature's making; and that to one it should be *animal rationale*, and to another *animal implume bipes latis unguibus*. He that annexes the name *man*, to a complex idea made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to a body of such a shape, as thereby one essence of the *species man*; and he that, upon farther examination, adds rationality, has another essence of the *species* he calls *man*: by which means, the same individual will be a true *man* to the one, which is not so to the other. I think, there is scarce any one will allow this upright figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the *species man*; and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent, is very visible: since it has been more than once debated, whether several human *fœtus's* should be preserved or received to baptism or no, only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of reason, as infants cast in another mould: some whereof though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant; and never give any signs of being acted by a rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting, and not the faculty of reason, which nobody could know would be wanting in its due season, was made essential to the human *species*: the learned divine and lawyer, must, on such occasions, renounce his sacred definition of *animal rationale*, and substitute some other essence of the human *species*. Monsieur Menage furnishes us with an example worth the taking notice of on this occasion. When the Abbot of St. Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of the figure of a man, that it bespoke him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation, whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was baptized and declared a man provisionally [till time should show what he would prove.] Nature had moulded him so untowardly, that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotrué, i. e. Ill-shaped. He was of Caen. Menagi-

ana, 278-430. This child, we see, was very near being excluded out of the *species* of *man* barely by his shape. He escaped very narrowly as he was, and it is certain a figure a little more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allowed to pass for a man. And yet there can be no reason given, why if the lineaments of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have been lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer, or a nose flatter, or a wider mouth, could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his ill figure, with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

§ 27.

WHEREIN, then, would I gladly know, consists the precise and *unmoveable boundaries* of that *species*? It is plain, if we examine, there is *no* such thing *made by nature*, established by her amongst men. The real essence of that, or any other sort of substances, it is evident we know not; and therefore are so undetermined in our nominal essences, which we make ourselves, that if several men were to be asked concerning some oddly-shaped *fœtus*, as soon as born, whether it were *man* or no, it is past doubt, one should meet with different answers, which could not happen, if the nominal essences, whereby we limit and distinguish the *species* of substances, were not made by man, with some liberty; but were exactly copied from precise boundaries set by nature, whereby it distinguished all substances into certain species. Who would undertake to resolve, what species that monster was of, which is mentioned by Licetus, *lib. 1. c. 3.* with a man's head and hog's body? Or those other, which to the bodies of men had the heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, &c. If any of these creatures had lived, and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human shape; and all below swine; had it been murder to destroy it? Or must the bishop have been consulted, whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? as, I have been told, it happened in France, some years since, in somewhat a like case. So

uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures than the complex *ideas* of our own collecting: and so far are we from certainly knowing what a *man* is; though, perhaps, it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet, I think, I may say, that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined, and the precise number of simple *ideas*, which make the nominal essence, so far from being settled and perfectly known, that very material doubts may still arise about it. And I imagine, none of the definitions of the word *man*, which we yet have, nor descriptions of that sort of animal, are so perfect and exact, as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person, much less to obtain a general consent, and to be that which men would every where stick by, in the decision of cases, and determining of life and death, baptism or no baptism, in productions that might happen.

§ 28. *But not so arbitrary as Mixed Modes.*

BUT though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal essence, it is necessary, *First*, That the *ideas* whereof it consists, have such an union as to make but one *idea*, how compounded soever. *Secondly*, That the particular *ideas* so united be exactly the same, neither more nor less; for if two abstract complex *ideas*, differ either in number or sorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the same essence. In the first of these, the mind in making its complex *ideas* of substances, only follows nature; and puts none together, which are not supposed to have an union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep, with the shape of a horse; nor the colour of lead, with the weight and fixedness of gold, to be the complex *ideas* of any real substances: unless he has a mind to fill his head with *chimeras*, and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together, therein copied nature; and of *ideas* so united, made their complex ones of substances.

For though men may make what complex *ideas* they please, and give what names to them they will; yet if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must in some degree conform their *ideas* to the things they would speak of: or else men's language will be like that of *Babel*; and every man's words being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life, if the *ideas* they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances, as they really exist.

§ 29. *Though very imperfect.*

SECONDLY, Though the mind of man, in making its complex *ideas of substances*, never puts any together that do not really or are not supposed to co-exist; and so it truly borrows that union from nature; yet *the number* it combines, *depends upon the various care, industry or fancy of him that makes it.* Men generally content themselves with some few sensible obvious qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of sensible substances, there are two sorts; one of organized bodies which are propagated by seed; and in these, the shape is that, which to us is the leading quality and most characteristic part that determines the species. And therefore in vegetables and animals, an extended solid substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however some men seem to prize their definition of *animal rationale*, yet should there a creature be found, that had language and reason, but partook not of the usual shape of a man, I believe it would hardly pass for a *man*, how much soever it were *animal rationale*. And if *Balaam's* ass had, all his life, discoursed as rational as he did once with his master, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name *man*, or allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables and animals it is the shape, so in most other bodies, not propagated by seed, it is the colour we must fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold, we are apt to imagine all the other qua-

lities, comprehended in our complex *idea*, to be there also : and we commonly take these two obvious qualities, *viz.* Shape and colour, for so presumptive *ideas* of several *species*, that in a good picture we readily say this is a lion, and that a rose ; this is a gold, and that a silver goblet, only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil.

§ 30. *Which yet serve for common converse.*

BUT though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions, and unaccurate ways of talking and thinking ; yet *men are far enough from having agreed on the precise number of simple ideas, or qualities, belonging to any sort of things, signified by its name.* Nor is it a wonder, since it requires much time, pains, and skill, strict inquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many those simple *ideas* are, which are constantly and inseparably united in nature, and are always to be found together in the same subject. Most men wanting either time, inclination, or industry enough for this, even to some tolerable degree, content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things, thereby readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life : and so, without farther examination, give them names, or take up the names already in use. Which, though in common conversation they pass well enough for the signs of some few obvious qualities co-existing, are yet far enough from comprehending, in a settled signification, a precise number of simple *ideas* ; much less all those, which are united in nature. He that shall consider, after so much stir about *genus* and *species*, and such a deal of talk of specific differences, how few words we have yet settled definitions of, may with reason imagine that those *forms*, which there hath been so much noise made about, are only *chimeras*, which give us no light into the specific natures of things. And he that shall consider, how far the names of substances are from having significations, wherein all who use them do agree, will have reason to conclude, that though the nominal essences of substances are all supposed to be copied from nature, yet they are all, or most

of them, very imperfect. Since the composition of those complex *ideas* are, in several men, very different : and therefore that these boundaries of *species* are as men, and not as nature makes them, if at least there are in nature any such prefixed bounds. It is true, that many particular substances are so made by nature, that they have agreement and likeness one with another, and so afford a foundation of being ranked into sorts. But the sorting of things by us, or the making of determinate *species*, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can be properly said, that nature sets the boundaries of the *species* of things : or if it be so, our boundaries of *species* are not exactly conformable to those in nature. For we having need of general names for present use, stay not for a perfect discovery of all those qualities which would best show us their most material differences and agreements ; but we ourselves divide them, by certain obvious appearances, into *species*, that we may the easier under general names communicate our thoughts about them. For having no other knowledge of any substance, but of the simple *ideas* that are united in it ; and observing several particular things to agree with others in several of those simple *ideas*, we make that collection our specific *idea*, and give it a general name ; that in recording our own thoughts, and in our discourse with others, we may in one short word design all the individuals that agree in that complex *idea*, without enumerating the simple *idea* that make it up ; and so not waste our time and breath in tedious descriptions : which we see they are fain to do, who would discourse of any new sort of things they have not yet a name for.

§ 31. *Essences of Species under the same name very different.*

BUT however these species of substances pass well enough in ordinary conversation, it is plain that this complex *idea*, wherein they observe several individuals to agree, is by different men made very differently ; by some more, and others less accurately. In some, this complex *idea* contains a greater, and in others a smaller num-

ber of qualities; and so is apparently such as the mind makes it. The yellow shining colour makes *gold* to children; others add weight, malleableness, and fusibility; and others yet other qualities, which they find joined with that yellow colour, as constantly as its weight and fusibility; for in all these and the like qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex *idea* of that substance wherein they are all joined, as another. And therefore *different men* leaving out or putting in several simple *ideas*, which others do not, according to their various examination, skill, or observation of that subject, *have different essences of gold*; which must therefore be of their own, and not of nature's making.

§ 32. *The more general our Ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.*

If the number of simple *ideas*, that make the nominal essence of the lowest species, or first sorting of individuals, depends on the mind of man variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do so, in the more comprehensive *classis*, which by the masters of logic are called *genera*. These are complex *ideas* designedly imperfect: And it is visible at first sight, that several of those qualities, that are to be found in the things themselves, are purposely left out of *generical ideas*. For as the mind, to make general *ideas* comprehending several particulars, leaves out those of time, and place, and such other, that make them incommunicable to more than one individual; so to make other yet more general *ideas*, that may comprehend different sorts, it leaves out those qualities that distinguish them, and puts into its new collection only such *ideas* as are common to several sorts. The same convenience that made men express several parcels of yellow matter coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, sets them also upon making of one name that may comprehend both gold and silver, and some other bodies of different sorts. This is done by leaving out those qualities which are peculiar to each sort; and retaining a complex *idea* made up of those that are common to them all. To which the name *metal* being annexed, there is a *genus* consti-

tuted; the essence whereof being that abstract *idea*, containing only malleableness and fusibility, with certain degrees of weight and fixedness, wherein some bodies of several kinds agree, leaves out the colour, and other qualities peculiar to gold and silver, and the other sorts comprehended under the name *metal*, whereby it is plain, that men follow not exactly the patterns set them by nature, when they make their general *ideas* of substances; since there is no body to be found, which has barely malleableness and fusibility in it, without other qualities as inseparable as those. But men, in making their general *ideas*, seeing more the convenience of language and quick despatch, by short and comprehensive signs, than the true and precise nature of things as they exist, have, in the framing their abstract *ideas*, chiefly pursued that end which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names. So that in this whole business of *genera* and *species* the *genus*, or more comprehensive, is but a partial conception of what is in the *species*, and the *species* but a partial *idea* of what is to be found in each individual. If therefore any one will think, that a *man*, and a *horse*, and an animal, and a plant, &c. are distinguished by real essences, made by nature, he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences, making one for body, another for an animal, and another for a horse; and all these essences liberally bestowed upon *Bucephalus*. But if we would rightly consider what is done, in all these *genera* and *species*, or sorts, we should find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or less comprehensive signs whereby we may be enabled to express, in a few syllables, great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or less general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpose. In all which we may observe, that the more general term is always the name of a less complex *idea*; and that each *genus* is but a partial conception of the *species* comprehended under it. So that if these abstract general *ideas* be thought to be complete, it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them and certain names, which are made

use of to signify them; and not in respect of any thing existing, as made by nature.

§ 33. *This all accommodated to the end of Speech.*

THIS is adjusted to the true end of speech, which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions. For thus he, that would discourse of things as they agreed in the complex *idea* of extension and solidity, needed but use the word *body* to denote all such. He that to these would join others signified by the words life, sense, and spontaneous motion, needed but use the word *animal*, to signify all which partook of those *ideas*: and he that had made a complex *idea* of a body, with life, sense, and motion, with the faculty of reasoning, and a certain shape joined to it, needed but use the short monosyllable *man*, to express all particulars that correspond to that complex *idea*. This is the proper business of *genus* and *species*: and this men do, without any consideration of *real essences*, or *substantial forms*, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of those things; nor within the signification of our words, when we discourse with others.

§ 34. *Instance in Contraries.*

WERE I to talk with any one of a sort of birds I lately saw in St. James's Park, about three or four foot high, with a covering of something between feathers and hair, of a dark brown colour without wings, but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom, long great legs, with feet only of three claws, and without a tail; I must make this description of it, and so may make others understand me: But when I am told that the name of it is *Cassowary*, I may then use that word to stand in discourse for all my complex *idea* mentioned in that description; though by that word, which is now become a specific name, I know no more of the real essence or constitution of that sort of animals, than I did before; and knew probably as much of the nature of that *species* of birds, before I learned the name, as many *Englishmen* do of swans, or herons, which are specific names, very well known, of sorts of birds common in *England*.

§ 35. *Men determine the Sorts.*

FROM what has been said, it is evident, that *men make sorts of things*. For it being different essences alone that make different *species*, it is plain that they who make those abstract *ideas*, which are the nominal essences, do thereby make the *species*, or sort. Should there be a body found, having all the other qualities of gold, except malleableness, it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or no, *i. e.* whether it were of that *species*. This could be determined only by that abstract *idea* to which every one annexed the name *gold*: so that it would be true gold to him, and belong to that *species*, who included not malleableness in his nominal essence, signified by the sound *gold*; and on the other side it would not be true gold, or of that *species* to him who included malleableness in his specific *idea*. And who, I pray, is it that makes these diverse *species* even under one and the same name, but men that make two different abstract *ideas* consisting not exactly of the same collection of qualities? Nor is it a mere supposition to imagine that a body may exist, wherein the other obvious qualities of gold may be without malleableness; since it is certain, that gold itself, will be sometimes so eager (as artists call it), that it will as little endure the hammer as glass itself. What we have said, of the putting in or leaving malleableness out of the complex *idea*, the name *gold* is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fixedness, and several other the like qualities: For whatsoever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex *idea*, to which that name is annexed, that makes the *species*; and as any particular parcel of matter answers that *idea*, so the name of the sort belongs truly to it; and it is of that *species*. And thus any thing is true *gold*, perfect *metal*. All which determination of the *species*, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making this or that complex *idea*.

§ 36. *Nature makes the Similitude.*

THIS then, in short, is the case: *Nature makes many particular things which do agree one with another, in many sensible qualities and probably too in their inter-*

nal frame and constitution : but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into *species* ; it is *men*, who taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe often several individuals to agree, *range them into sorts, in order to their naming*, for the convenience of comprehensive signs : under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract *idea*, come to be ranked as under ensigns ; so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment ; this is a man, that a drill : And in this, I think, consists the whole business of *genus* and *species*.

§ 37.

I do not deny but nature, in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another : But I think it nevertheless true, that *the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men* ; since the essences of the *species*, distinguished by different names, are, as has been proved, of man's making, and seldom adequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say, such a manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.

§ 38. *Each abstract Idea is an Essence.*

ONE thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine ; which is, that from what has been said it will follow, that *each abstract idea, with a name to it, makes a distinct species*. But who can help it if truth will have it so ? For so it must remain till somebody can show us the *species* of things limited and distinguished by something else ; and let us see, that general terms signify not our abstract *ideas*, but something different from them. I would fain know why a flock and a hound are not as distinct *species* as a spaniel and an elephant. We have no other *idea* of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel, than we have of the different essence of a flock and a hound ; all the essential difference, whereby we know and distinguish them one from another, consisting only in the different collection of simple *ideas*, to which we have given those different names.

§ 39. *Genera and Species are in order to naming.*
How much *the making of species and genera is in order to general names*, and how much general names are necessary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a *species*, and making it pass for such, will appear, besides what has been said above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A silent and a striking *watch* are but one *species* to those who have but one name for them: but he that has the name *watch* for one, and *clock* for the other, and distinct complex *ideas* to which those names belong, to him they are different *species*. It will be said, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and constitution is different between these two, which the watchmaker has a clear *idea* of. And yet, it is plain, they are but one *species* to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new *species*? There are some *watches* that are made with four wheels, others with five: Is this a specific difference to the workman? Some have strings and physies, and others none; some have the balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral spring, and others by hogs bristles: Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman, that knows each of these, and several other different contrivances, in the internal constitutions of *watches*? It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the rest: But whether it be an essential, a specific difference or no, relates only to the complex *idea* to which the name *watch* is given: as long as they all agree in the *idea* which that name stands for, and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different *species* under it, they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such precise complex *ideas*, gives names that shall prevail; they will then be new *species* to them, who have those *ideas* with names to them; and can, by those differences, distinguish watches into these several sorts, and then *watch* will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct *species* to men ignorant of clock-

work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other *idea* but the outward shape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same *idea*, and signify no more, nor no other thing but a *watch*. Just thus, I think, it is in natural things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say) within, are different in a *rational man* and a *changeling*, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a *drill* and a *changeling*. But whether one or both these differences be essential or specific, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or disagreement with the complex *idea* that the name *man* stands for: For by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man or no.

§ 40. *Species of artificial things less confused than natural.*
 FROM what has been before said, we may see the reason *why, in the species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and uncertainty, than in natural.* Because an *artificial* thing being a production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well knows the *idea* of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other *idea*, nor to import any other essence than what is certainly to be known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the *idea* or essence of the several sorts of *artificial* things consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts; and sometimes motion depending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, such as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain *idea* thereof, and so settle the signification of the names, whereby the species of *artificial* things are distinguished with less doubt, obscurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural, whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries.

§ 41. *Artificial things of distinct Species.*

I MUST be excused here if I think *artificial things* are of *distinct species*, as well as natural: since I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into sorts, by different abstract *ideas*, with general names annexed to them, as distinct

one from another as those of natural substances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol, as distinct species one from another, as a horse and a dog, they being expressed in our minds by distinct *ideas*, and to others by distinct appellations?

§ 42. *Substances alone have proper Names.*

THIS is farther to be observed concerning *substances*, that they alone of all our several sorts of *ideas* have particular or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is signified. Because in simple *ideas*, modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often this or that particular when it is absent. Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable of a lasting duration as substances, which are the actors; and wherein the simple *ideas* that make up the complex *ideas* designed by the name, have a lasting union.

§ 43. *Difficulty to treat of Words.*

I MUST beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt so long upon this subject, and perhaps with some obscurity. But I desire it may be considered how *difficult* it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those specific differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some sort or other, and suggest to the mind the usual abstract *idea* of that *species*, and so cross my purpose. For to talk of a *man*, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary signification of the name *man*, which is our complex *idea* usually annexed to it; and bid the reader consider *man* as he is in himself, and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution, or real essence, that is, by something he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and *species* of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no such thing signified by the general names, which substances are called by, but because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind

has of specific names and *ideas* a little more clear; and to show how the complex *ideas* of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the same, to the signification annexed by others to their received names; and sometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its *ideas* of substances, either to the substances themselves, or to the signification of their names as to the *archetypes*; and also to make plain the nature of *species*, or sorting of things, as apprehended, and made use of by us; and of the essences belonging to those *species*, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine.

§ 44. *Instance of Mixed Modes in Kinneah and Niouph.*

LET us suppose *Adam* in the state of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other faculties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He observes *Lamech* more melancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a suspicion he has of his wife *Adah* (whom he most ardently loved), that she had too much kindness for another man. *Adam* discourses these his thoughts to *Eve*, and desires her to take care that *Adah* commit not folly: and in these discourses with *Eve* he makes use of these two new words, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. In time *Adam's* mistake appears, for he finds *Lamech's* trouble proceeded from having killed a man: but yet the two names, *Kinneah* and *Niouph*; the one standing for suspicion, in a husband, of his wife's disloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing disloyalty, lost not their distinct significations. It is plain then that here were two distinct complex *ideas* of mixed modes, with names to them, two distinct species of actions essentially different; I ask wherein consisted the essences of these two distinct species of action? And it is plain it consisted in a precise combination of simple *ideas*, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex *idea* in *Adam's* mind,

which he called *Kinneah*, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a combination of simple *ideas*, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abstracted and gave the name *Kinneah* to, to express in short to others, by that one sound, all the simple *ideas* contained and united in that complex one; it must necessarily follow, that it was an edequate *idea*. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.

§ 45.

THESE words, *Kinneah* and *Nioupb*, by degrees grew into common use; and then the case was somewhat altered. *Adam's* children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had to make what complex *ideas* of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds; to abstract them, and make what sounds they pleased the signs of them: but the use of names being to make our *ideas* within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same *idea* in two who would communicate their thoughts, and discourse together. Those therefore of *Adam's* children, that found these two words, *Kinneah* and *Nioupb*, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds; but must needs conclude, they stood for something, for certain *ideas*, abstract *ideas*, they being general names, which abstract *ideas* were the essences of the species distinguished by those names. If, therefore, they would use these words, as names of species already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the *ideas*, in their minds signified by these names, to the *ideas*, that they stood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and *archetypes*; and then indeed their *ideas* of these complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple *ideas*) not to be exactly conformable to the *ideas*, in other men's minds, using the same names; though for this there be usually a remedy at hand, which is to ask

the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that uses it: it being as impossible to know certainly what the words jealousy and adultery (which I think answer קנאה and נאיוֹפִי) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them; as it was impossible, in the beginning of language, to know what *Kinneah* and *Niouph* stood for in another man's mind, without explication, they being voluntary signs in every one.

§ 46. *Instance of Substances in Zahab.*

LET us now also consider, after the same manner, the names of substances in their first application. One of *Adam's* children, roving in the mountains, lights on a glittering substance which pleases his eye; home he carries it to *Adam*, who, upon consideration of it finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow colour, and an exceeding great weight. These, perhaps at first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it: and abstracting this complex *idea*, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and a weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name *Zahab*, to denote and mark all substances that have these sensible qualities in them. It is evident now that, in this case, *Adam* acts quite differently from what he did before in forming those *ideas* of mixed modes, to which he gave the name *Kinneah* and *Niouph*. For there he puts *ideas* together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of any thing; and to them he gave names to denominate all things that should happen to agree to those his abstract *ideas*, without considering whether any such thing did exist or no: the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his *idea* of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course; here he has a standard made by nature; and therefore being to represent that to himself, by the *idea* he has of it, even when it is absent, he puts in no simple *idea* into his complex one, but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He takes care that his *idea* be conformable to this *archetype*, and intends the name should stand for an *idea* so conformable.

§ 47.

THIS piece of matter, thus denominated *Zahab* by *Adam*, being quite different from any he had seen before, nobody, I think, will deny to be a distinct species, and to have its peculiar essence; and that the name *Zahab* is the mark of the species, and a name belonging to all things partaking in that essence. But here it is plain, the essence, *Adam* made the name *Zahab* stand for, was nothing but a body hard, shining, yellow, and very heavy. But in the inquisitive mind of man, not content with the knowledge of these, as I may say superficial qualities, puts *Adam* on farther examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints, to see what was discoverable in the inside: he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces: he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former *idea*, and made part of the essence of the species that name *Zahab* stands for? Farther trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they also, by the same reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex *idea* signified by the name *Zahab*? If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? If these must, then all the other properties, which any farther trials shall discover in this matter, ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex *idea*, which the name *Zahab* stands for, and so be the essences of the species marked by that name. Which properties, because they are endless, it is plain, that the *idea* made after this fashion by this *archetype*, will be always inadequate.

§ 48. *Their Ideas imperfect, and therefore various.*

BUT this is not all, it would also follow, that the names of substances would not only have (as in truth they have), but would also be supposed to have different significations, as used by different men, which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality, that were discovered in any matter by any one, were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex *idea*, signified by the common name given it, it must follow, that men must suppose the same word to signify different things

in different men; since they cannot doubt but different men may have discovered several qualities in substances of the same denomination, which others know nothing of.

§ 49. *Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed.*

To avoid this, therefore, they have *supposed a real essence belonging to every species*, from which these properties all flow, and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they not having any *idea* of that real essence in substances, and their words signifying nothing but the *ideas* they have, that which is done by this attempt, is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence, without knowing what the real essence is; and this is that which men do, when they speak of species of things, as supposing them made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.

§ 50. *Which Supposition is of no use.*

For let us consider, when we affirm, that all gold is fixed, either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, part of the nominal essence the word *gold* stands for; and so this affirmation, *all gold is fixed*, contains nothing but the signification of the term *gold*. Or else it means, that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the word *gold*, is a property of that substance itself; in which case, it is plain, that the word *gold* stands in the place of a substance, having the real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification, that though this proposition, *gold is fixed*, be in that sense an affirmation of something real, yet it is a truth will always fail us in its particular application, and so is of no real use nor certainty. For let it be never so true, that all *gold*, i. e. all that has the real essence of *gold*, is fixed, what serves this for? whilst we know not in this sense what is or is not *gold*? For if we know not the real essence of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence, and so whether it be true *gold* or no.

§ 51. *Conclusion.*

To conclude: what liberty *Adam* had at first to make

any complex *ideas* of mixed modes, by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his *ideas* of substances to things without him, as to *archetypes* made by nature, that *Adam* was under, if he would not wilfully impose upon himself, the same are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that *Adam* had of affixing any new name to any *idea*, the same has any one still (especially the beginners of languages, if we can imagine any such), but only with this difference, that in places where men in society have already established a language amongst them, the signification of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered: because men being furnished already with names for their *ideas*, and common use having appropriated known names to certain *ideas*, an affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. He that hath new notions, will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new terms to express them: but men think it a boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current. But in communication with others, it is necessary, that we conform the *ideas* we make the vulgar words of any language stand for, to their known proper significations (which I have explained at large already), or else to make known that new signification we apply them to.

CHAP. VII.

OF PARTICLES.

§ 1. *Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.*

BESIDES words, which are names of *ideas* in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of, to signify the *connection* that the mind gives to *ideas*, or *propositions*, one with another. The mind, in communicating its thought to others, does not only need signs of the *ideas* it has then before it, but others also, to show or intimate some particular action of its own, at that time, relating to those *ideas*. This it does several ways; as *is*, and *is not*, are the general marks of the

mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

§ 2. *In them consists the Art of Well speaking.*

THE words, whereby it signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued reasoning or narration, are generally called *particles*; and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style. To think well, it is not enough that a man has *ideas* clear and distinct in his thoughts, nor that he observes the agreement or disagreement of some of them; but he must think in train, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings one upon another. And to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to *show* what *connection*, *restriction*, *distinction*, *opposition*, *emphasis*, &c. he gives to each respective *part of his discourse*. To mistake in any of these, is to puzzle, instead of informing his hearer; and therefore it is that those words, which are not truly by themselves the names of any *ideas*, are of such constant and indispensable use in language, and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.

§ 3. *They show what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.*

THIS part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected, as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write, one after another, of *cases* and *genders*, *moods* and *tenses*, *gerunds* and *supines*. In these, and the like, there has been great diligence used; and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked into their several orders. But though *prepositions* and *conjunctions*, &c. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions; yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a

little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

§ 4. *They show what Relation the Mind gives to its own thoughts.*

NEITHER is it enough, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as it is usually in dictionaries, by words of another tongue which came nearest to their signification: for what is meant by them, is commonly as hard to be understood in one, as another language. They are all *marks of some action, or intimation of the mind*; and therefore to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind, for which we have either none, or very deficient names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of particles, that most languages have to express them by; and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have divers, and sometimes almost opposite significations. In the Hebrew tongue there is a particle consisting but of one single letter, of which there are reckoned up, as I remember, seventy, I am sure above fifty several significations.

§ 5. *Instance in But.*

BUT is a particle, none more familiar in our language; and he that says it is a discretive conjunction, and that it answers *sed* in *Latin*, or *mais* in *French*, thinks he has sufficiently explained it. But it seems to me to intimate several relations, the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them, which it joins by this monosyllable.

First, *BUT to say no more*: here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came to the end of it.

Secondly, *I saw BUT two plants*: here it shows, that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other.

Thirdly, *You pray; BUT it is not that GOD would bring you to the true religion.*

Fourthly, *BUT that he would confirm you in your own,*

The first of these *BUTS* intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be; the latter shows, that the mind makes a direct opposition between that, and what goes before it.

Fifthly, *All animals have sense; BUT a dog is an animal*: here it signifies little more, but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the *minor* of a syllogism.

§ 6.

To these, I doubt not, might be added a great many other significations of this particle, if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude, and consider it in all the places it is to be found, which if one should do, I doubt, whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of *discretive*, which grammarians give to it. But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs. The instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect upon their use and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles; some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS.

§ 1. *Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.*

THE ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our *ideas*, if they had been but considered with attention. The mind, as has been shown, has a power to abstract its *ideas*, and so they become *essences*, general essences, whereby the sorts of things are distinguished. Now each abstract *idea* being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions, no two whole *ideas* can ever be af-

firmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language, which permits *not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another.* For how near of kin soever they may seem to be, and how certain soever it is, that man is an animal, or rational, or white, yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions: *humanity is animality, or rationality, or whiteness*: and this is as evident, as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only inconcrete, which is the affirming, not one abstract *idea* to be another, but one abstract *idea* to be joined to another; which abstract *ideas*, in substances, may be of any sort: in all the rest, are little else but of relations; and in substances the most frequent are of powers: *v. g. a man is white*, signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man, has also in it the essence of whiteness, which is nothing but a power to produce the *idea* of whiteness in one, whose eyes can discover ordinary objects; or *a man is rational*, signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man, hath also in it the essence of rationality, *i. e.* a power of reasoning.

§ 2. *They show the difference of our Ideas.*

THIS distinction of names shows us also the difference of our *ideas*: for if we observe them we shall find that our *simple ideas have all abstract, as well as concrete names*: the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive, the other an adjective: as whiteness, white; sweetness, sweet. The like also holds in our *ideas* of modes and relations; as justice, just; equality, equal; only with this difference: That some of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly, are substantives; as *paternitas, pater*; whereof it were easy to render a reason. But as to our *ideas* of *substances*, we have very few or *no abstract names* at all. For though the schools have introduced *animalitas, humanitas, corporietas*, and some others; yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances, to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones: and those few that the schools forged, and put into the mouths of their scholars, could

never yet get admittance into common use, or obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind, that they have no *ideas* of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such *ideas*: which no doubt they would have had, had not their consciousness to themselves of their ignorance of them, kept them from so idle an attempt. And therefore though they had *ideas* enough to distinguish gold from stone, and metal from wood; yet they but timorously ventured on such terms, as *aurietas* and *saxietas*, *metallietas* and *lignietas*, or the like names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of those substances, whereof they knew they had no *ideas*. And indeed it was only the doctrine of *substantial forms*, and the confidence of mistaken pretenders to a knowledge that they had not, which first coined, and then introduced *animalitas*, and *humanitas*, and the like; which yet went very little farther than their own schools, and could never get to be current amongst understanding men. Indeed, *humanitas* was a word familiar amongst the *Romans*, but in a far different sense, and stood not for the abstract essence of any substance; but was the abstract name of a mode, and its concrete *humanus*, not *homo*.

CHAP. IX.

OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS.

§ 1. *Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.*

FROM what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfection or imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end: for as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so are they more or less perfect. We have in the former part of this *discourse*, often upon occasion mentioned a *double use of words*.

First, One for the recording of our own thoughts.

Secondly, The other for the communicating of our thoughts to others.

§ 2. *Any Words will serve for recording.*

As to the first of these, *for the recording our own thoughts* for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any *ideas*, a man may use what words he pleases, to signify his own *ideas* to himself: and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the same *idea*; for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists the right use and perfection of language.

§ 3. *Communication by words, Civil or Philosophical.*

SECONDLY, As to *Communication of Words*, that too has a double Use.

I. *Civil.*

II. *Philosophical.*

First, By their *civil use*, I mean such a communication of thoughts and *ideas* by words, as may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce, about the ordinary affairs and conveniencies of civil life, in the societies of men one amongst another.

Secondly, By the *philosophical use* of words, I mean such an use of them, as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express, in general propositions, certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with, in its search after true knowledge. These two uses are very distinct; and a great deal less exactness will serve in the one than in the other, as we shall see in what follows.

§ 4. *The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.*

THE chief end of language in communication being to be understood, words serve not for that end, neither in civil nor philosophical discourse, when any word does not excite in the hearer the same *idea* which it stands for in the mind of the speaker. Now since sounds have no

natural connection with our *ideas*, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men, the *doubtfulness* and uncertainty of *their signification*, which is the *imperfection* we here are speaking of, has its cause more in the *ideas* they stand for, than in any incapacity there is in one sound more than in another, to signify any *idea* : for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than other words, is the difference of *ideas* they stand for.

§ 5. *Causes of their Imperfection.*

WORDS having naturally no signification, the *idea* which each stands for must be learned and retained by those, who would exchange thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others in any language. But this is hardest to be done, where,

First, The *ideas* they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of *ideas* put together.

Secondly, Where the *ideas* they stand for have no certain connection in nature ; and so no settled standard. any where in nature existing, to rectify and adjust them by.

Thirdly, Where the signification of the word is referred to a standard, which standard is not so easy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the signification of the word, and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same.

These are difficulties that attend the signification of several words that are intelligible. Those which are not intelligible at all, such as names standing for any simple *ideas*, which another has not organs or faculties to attain ; as the names of colours to a blind man, or sounds to a deaf man ; need not here be mentioned.

In all these cases we shall find an imperfection in words, which I shall more at large explain, in their particular application to our several sorts of *ideas* : For if we examine them, we shall find that the *names of mixed modes* are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection, for the two

first of these reasons; and the names of substances chiefly for the two latter.

§ 6. *The Names of mixed Modes doubtful.*

FIRST, The names of *mixed modes* are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification.

First, Because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.

I. Because of that *great composition* these complex *ideas* are often made up of. To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary (as has been said), that they excite in the hearer exactly the same *idea* they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their *ideas*, which is the end of discourse and language. But when a word stands for a very complex *idea* that is compounded and decomposed, it is not easy for men to form and retain that *idea* so exactly, as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise *idea* without any the least variation. Hence it comes to pass, that men's names of very compound *ideas*, such as for the most part are moral words, have seldom, in two different men, the same precise signification; since one man's complex *idea* seldom agrees with another's, and often differs from his own, from that which he had yesterday, or will have to-morrow.

§ 7. *Secondly, Because they have no Standards.*

II. *BECAUSE* the names of *mixed modes*, for the most part, *want standards* in nature, whereby men may rectify and adjust their significations; therefore they are very various and doubtful. They are assemblages of *ideas* put together at the pleasure of the mind, pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suited to its own notions; whereby it designs not to copy any thing really existing, but to denominate and rank things, as they come to agree, with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word *sham*, *wheelde*, or *banter* in use, put together, as he thought fit, those *ideas* he made it stand for: And as it is with any new names of modes,

that are now brought into any language; so was it with the old ones, when they were first made use of. Names therefore that stand for collections of *ideas* which the mind makes at pleasure, must needs be of doubtful signification, when such collections are no where to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown whereby men may adjust them. What the word *murder*, or *sacrilege*, &c. signifies, can never be known from things themselves: There be many of the parts of those complex *ideas*, which are not visible in the action itself; the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of *murder* or *sacrilege*, have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either: and the pulling the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed, and is all the action that perhaps is visible, has no natural connection with those other *ideas* that make up the complex one, named *murder*. They have their union and combination only from the understanding: which unites them under one name: but uniting them without any rule or pattern, it cannot be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary collections, should be often various in the minds of different men, who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by, in such arbitrary *ideas*.

§ 8. *Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.*

It is true, *common use*, that is the rule of propriety, may be supposed here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of language; and it cannot be denied, but that in some measure it does. *Common use regulates the meaning of words* pretty well for common conversation; but nobody having an authority to establish the precise signification of words, nor determine to what *ideas* any one shall annex them, common use is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses; there being scarce any name of any very complex *idea* (to say nothing of others), which in common use has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of propriety, may not be made the sign of far different *ideas*. Besides, the

rule and measure of propriety itself being no where established, it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a word, be propriety of speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex *ideas* are naturally liable to this imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain signification; and even in men that have a mind to understand one another, do not always stand for the same *idea* in speaker and hearer. Though the names *glory* and *gratitude* be the same in every man's mouth through a whole country, yet the complex collective *idea*, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in men using the same language.

§ 9. *The way of learning these Names contributes also to their Doubtfulness.*

THE way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned, does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that to make them understand what the names of simple *ideas*, or substances, stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the *idea*; and then repeat to them the name that stands for it, as *white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog.* But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, moral words, the sounds are usually learned first; and then to know what complex *ideas* they stand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own observation and industry; which being little laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds; or when they have any, it is for the most part but a very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused, signification. And even those themselves, who have with more attention settled their notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them stand for complex *ideas*, different from those which other, even intelligent and studious men, make them the signs of. Where shall one find any, either *controversial debate*, or

familiar discourse, concerning *honour, faith, grace, religion, church, &c.* wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words, nor have in their minds the same complex *ideas* which they make them stand for: and so all the contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a sound. And hence we see, that in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end; comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications: And of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification of these moral words, there is no end. These *ideas* of men's making, are, by men still having the same power, multiplied *in infinitum*. Many a man, who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of a text, of scripture, or clause in the code at first reading, has by consulting commentators quite lost the sense of it, and by those elucidations given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this, that I think commentaries needless; but to show how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts.

§ 10. *Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.*
 WHAT obscurity this has unavoidably brought upon the writings of men, who have lived in remote ages and different countries, it will be needless to take notice; since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to show what attention, study, sagacity, and reasoning are required, to find out the true meaning of *ancient authors*. But their being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors; who writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater neces-

sity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them, resolve thus with ourselves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

§ 11.

IF the signification of the names of mixed modes are uncertain, because there be no real standards existing in nature, to which those *ideas* are referred, and by which they may be adjusted, the *names of substances are of a doubtful signification*, for a contrary reason, *viz.* Because the *ideas* they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to standards made by nature. In our *ideas* of substances we have not the liberty, as in mixed modes; to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, suit our complex *ideas* to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be the signs of them, and stand for them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow; but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain: For names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the *ideas* they stand for be referred to standards without us, *that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.*

§ 12. *Names of Substances referred, 1. To real essences that cannot be known.*

THE *names of substances* have, as has been showed, a double reference in their ordinary use.

First, Sometimes they are made to stand for, and so their signification is supposed to agree to, *the real constitution of things*, from which all their properties flow, and in which they all centre. But this real constitution; or (as it is apt to be called) essence, being utterly unknown to us, any sound that is put to stand for it, must be very uncertain in its application; and it will be impos-

fible to know what things are, or ought to be called an *horse*, or *antimony*, when those words are put for real essences, that we have no *ideas* of at all. And therefore in this supposition, the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known, their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards.

§ 13. 2. *To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.*

SECONDLY, The *simple ideas* that are found to *co-exist* in *substances* being that which their names immediately signify, these, as united in the several sorts of things, are the proper *standards* to which their names are referred, and by which their significations may best be rectified. But neither will these *archetypes* so well serve this purpose, as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations. Because these *simple ideas* that co-exist, and are united in the same subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal right to go into the complex *specific idea*, which the specific name is to stand for, men, though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider, yet frame very different *ideas* about it; and so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have, in several men, very different significations. The *simple qualities* which make up the complex *ideas* being most of them powers, in relation to changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other bodies, are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive from the different application only of fire; and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chemist, by the application of other bodies, will not think it strange that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of inquiry, which our faculties are capable of. They being therefore at least so many, that no man can know the precise and definite number, they are differently discovered by different men, according to their various skill, attention, and ways of handling; who there-

fore cannot choose but have different *ideas* of the same substance, and therefore make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain. For the complex *ideas* of substances being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature, every one has a right to put into his complex *idea* those qualities he has found to be united together. For though in the substance *gold*, one satisfies himself with colour and weight, yet another thinks solubility in *aqua regia* as necessary to be joined with that colour in his *idea* of gold, as any one does its fusibility; solubility in *aqua regia* being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight, as fusibility, or any other: others put in its ductility or fixedness, &c. as they have been taught by tradition or experience. Who of all these has established the right signification of the word *gold*? or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex *idea* signified by the word *gold*, those qualities which upon trial he has found united: as another, who has not so well examined, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the union in nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex *idea*, who can say, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex *ideas* of substances, in men using the name for them, will be very various; and so the significations of those names very uncertain.

§ 14. *To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.*

BESIDES, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple *ideas*, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less number of particular beings: who shall determine in this case which are those that are to make up the precise collection that is to be signified by the specific name; or can with any just authority prescribe, which obvious or common qualities are to be left out; or which more secret, or more

particular, are to be put into the signification of the name of any substance? All *which* together seldom or never fail to *produce* that various and *doubtful* signification in the names of substances, which causes such uncertainty, disputes, or mistakes, when we come to a philosophical use of them.

§ 15. *With this Imperfection they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical Use.*

IT is true, as to civil and common conversation, the general names of substances, regulated in their ordinary signification by some obvious qualities (as by the shape and figure in things of known seminal propagation, and in other substances, for the most part by colour, joined with some other sensible qualities), *do well enough* to design the words men would be understood to speak of: and so they usually conceive well enough the substances meant by the word *gold*, or *apple*, to distinguish the one from the other. But in philosophical inquiries and debates, where general truths are to be established, and consequences drawn from positions laid down; there the precise signification of the names of substances will be found, not only *not* to be *well established*, but also very hard to be so. For example, he that shall make malleableness, or a certain degree of fixedness, a part of his complex *idea* of *gold*, may make propositions concerning gold, and draw consequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from *gold* taken in such a signification: but yet such as another man can never be forced to admit, nor be convinced of their truth, who makes not malleableness, or the same degree of fixedness, part of that complex *idea*, that the name *gold*, in his use of it, stands for.

§ 16. *Instance—Liquor.*

THIS is a natural, and almost unavoidable imperfection in almost all the names of substances, in all languages whatsoever, which men will easily find, when once passing from confused or loose notions, they come to more strict and close inquiries. For then they will be convinced how doubtful and obscure those words are in their signification, which in ordinary use appeared very clear and determined. I was once in a meeting of very

learned and ingenious physicians, where by chance there arose a question, whether any liquor passed through the filaments of the nerves. The debate having been managed a good while by variety of arguments on both sides, I (who had been used to suspect, that the greatest part of disputes were more about the signification of words, than a real difference in the conception of things) desired, that before they went any farther on in this dispute, they would first examine, and establish among them, what the word *liquor* signified. They at first were a little surpris'd at the proposal; and had they been persons less ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: since there was no one there that thought not himself to understand very perfectly what the word *liquor* stood for; which I think too none of the most perplexed names of substances. However, they were pleas'd to comply with my motion, and upon examination, found, that the signification of that word was not so settled and certain as they had all imagin'd; but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex *idea*. This made them perceive that the main of their dispute was about the signification of that term; and that they differ'd very little in their opinions, concerning some fluid and subtile matter, passing through the conduits of the nerves; though it was not so easy to agree whether it was to be called *liquor* or no, a thing which, when consider'd, they thought it not worth the contending about.

§ 17. *Instance—Gold.*

How much this is the case, in the greatest part of disputes that men are engag'd so hotly in, I shall perhaps have an occasion in another place to take notice. Let us only here consider a little more exactly the foremention'd instance of the word *gold*, and we shall see how hard it is precisely to determine its signification. I think all agree to make it stand for a body of a certain yellow shining colour; which being the *idea* to which children have annexed that name, the shining yellow part of a peacock's tail is properly to them gold. Others, finding fusibility join'd with that yellow colour in cer-

tain parcels of matter, make of that combination a complex *idea*, to which they give the name *gold* to denote a sort of substances; and so exclude from being *gold* all such yellow shining bodies, as by fire will be reduced to ashes; and admit to be of that species, or to be comprehended under that name *gold*, only such substances as having that shining yellow colour will by fire be reduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another, by the same reason, adds the weight, which, being a quality as straitly joined with that colour as its fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in its *idea*, and to be signified by its name: and therefore the other made up of body, of such a colour and fusibility, to be imperfect; and so on of all the rest: wherein no one can show a reason why some of the inseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put into the nominal essence, and others left out: or why the word *gold*, signifying that sort of body the ring on his finger is made of, should determine that sort rather by its colour, weight, and fusibility, than by its colour, weight, and solubility in *aqua regia*: since the dissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation which that substance has to two other bodies, which have a power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility comes to be a part of the essence signified by the word *gold*, and solubility but a property of it? or why is its colour part of the essence, and its malleableness but a property? That which I mean is this, that these being all but properties depending on its real constitution, and nothing but powers, either active or passive, in reference to other bodies: no one has authority to determine the signification of the word *gold* (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of *ideas* to be found in that body than to another: whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain; since, as has been said, several people observe several properties in the same substance; and, I think, I may say nobody all. And therefore have but very imper-

fect descriptions of things, and words have very uncertain significations.

§ 18. *The Names of simple Ideas the least Doubtful.*

FROM what has been said, it is easy to observe what has been before remarked, *viz.* That the *names of simple ideas are*, of all others, the *least liable to mistakes*, and that for these reasons: *First*, Because the *ideas* they stand for, being each but one single perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of *substances and mixed modes*, in which the precise number of simple *ideas*, that make them up, are not easily agreed, and so readily kept in the mind. And *Secondly*, Because they are never referred to any other essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify: which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed, and gives occasion to so many disputes. Men, that do not perversely use these words, or on purpose set themselves to cavil, seldom mistake in any language which they are acquainted with, the use and signification of the names of simple *ideas*; *white* and *sweet*, *yellow* and *bitter*, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precisely comprehends, or easily perceives he is ignorant of, and seeks to be informed. But what precise collection of simple *ideas*, *modesty* or *frugality* stand for in another's use, is not so certainly known. And however, we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by *gold* or *iron*, yet the precise complex *idea*, others make them the signs of, is not so certain: and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection. Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes, when they are made use of in discourses, wherein men have to do with universal propositions, and would settle in their minds universal truths, and consider the consequences that follow from them.

§ 19. *And next to them Simple Modes.*

By the same rule, the *names of simple modes are*, next to those of simple *ideas*, *least liable to doubt and uncertainty*, e-

specially those of figure and number, of which men have so clear and distinct *ideas*. Who ever, that had a mind to understand them, mistook the ordinary meaning of *seven* or a *triangle*? And in general the least compounded *ideas* in every kind have the least dubious names.

§ 20. *The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded Mixed Modes and Substances.*

MIXED modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious simple *ideas*, have usually names of no very uncertain signification. But the names of mixed modes, which comprehend a great number of simple *ideas*, are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning, as has been shown. The names of substances, being annexed to *ideas* that are neither the real essences nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to, are liable yet to greater imperfection and uncertainty, especially when we come to a philosophical use of them.

§ 21. *Why this imperfection charged upon Words.*

THE great disorder that happens in our names of substances, proceeding for the most part from our want of knowledge, and inability to penetrate into their real constitutions, it may probably be wondered, *why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than understandings*. This exception has so much appearance of justice, that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method. I must confess then, that when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words were at all necessary to it. But when having passed over the original and composition of our *ideas*, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connection with words, that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our gene-

ral knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and truth, which it would contemplate and apprehend, that like the *medium* through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes, and impose upon our understandings. If we consider, in the fallacies men put upon themselves as well as others, and the mistakes in men's disputes and notions, how great a part is owing to words, and their uncertain or mistaken significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way to knowledge; which, I conclude, we are the more carefully to be warned of, because it has been so far from being taken notice of as an inconvenience, that the arts of improving it have been made the business of men's study; and obtained the reputation of learning and subtilty, as we shall see in the following chapter. But I am apt to imagine, that were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of knowledge, more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world, would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal opener than it does.

§ 22. *This should teach us Moderation, in imposing our own sense of old Authors.*

SURE I am; that the signification of words in all languages, depending very much on the thoughts, notions, and *ideas* of him that uses them, must unavoidably be of great uncertainty to men of the same language and country. This is so evident in the *Greek* authors, that he that shall peruse their writings will find in almost every one of them a distinct language, though the same words. But when to this natural difficulty in every country, there shall be added different countries and remote ages, wherein the speakers and writers had very different notions, tempers, customs, ornaments, and figures of speech, &c. every one of which influenced the signification of their words then, though to us now they are lost and unknown; it would become us to be charitable one to another in our interpretations or misunderstanding of those ancient writings: which though of great

concernment to be understood, are liable to the unavoidable difficulties of speech, which (if we except the name of simple *ideas*, and some very obvious things) is not capable, without a constant defining the terms of conveying the sense and intention of the speaker, without any manner of doubt and uncertainty, to the hearer. And in discourses of religion, law, and morality, as they are matters of the highest concernment, so there will be the greatest difficulty.

§ 23.

THE volumes of interpreters and commentators on the Old and New Testament, are but too manifest proofs of this. Though every thing said in the text be infallibly true, yet the reader may be, nay, cannot choose but be very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it to be wondered, that the will of GOD, when clothed in words, should be liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance; when even his Son, whilst clothed in flesh, was subject to all the frailties and inconveniences of human nature, sin excepted. And we ought to magnify his goodness, that he hath spread before all the world such legible characters of his works and Providence, and given all mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they to whom this written word never came, could not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the obedience due to him. Since, then, the precepts of natural religion are plain, and very intelligible to all mankind, and seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed truths, which are conveyed to us by books and languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words; methinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter.

CHAP. X.

OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.

§ 1. *Abuse of Words.*

BESIDES the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several *wilful faults and neglects* which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification, than naturally they need to be.

§ 2. 1. *Words without any, or without clear Ideas.*

FIRST, In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct *ideas*: or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified. Of these there are two sorts:

I. One may observe, in all languages, certain words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first original and their appropriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct *ideas*. These, for the most part, the several *sects* of philosophy and religion have introduced. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting something singular and out of the way of common apprehensions, or to support some strange opinions, or cover some weakness of their hypothesis, seldom fail to *coin* new words, and such as when they come to be examined may justly be called *insignificant terms*. For having either had no determinate collection of *ideas* annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least such as, if well examined will be found inconsistent; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar use of the same party, they remain empty sounds, with little or no signification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the distinguishing characters of their church, or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise *ideas* they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances: every one's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him: or if he wants to be better stored, the great mint-mas-

ters of these kind of terms, I mean the schoolmen and metaphysicians (under which, I think, the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended), have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

§ 3.

II. OTHERS there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take so little care to lay by words, which in their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct *ideas* which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly *use words*, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important *ideas*, *without any distinct meaning* at all. *Wisdom, glory, grace, &c.* are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them, should be asked what they mean by them, they would be at a stand, and not know what to answer: a plain proof, that though they have learned those sounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determined *ideas* laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.

§ 4. *Occasioned by learning Names before the Ideas they belong to.*

MEN having been *accustomed* from their cradles to learn *words*, which are easily got and retained, *before they knew*, or had framed the *complex ideas* to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to *stand for*, they *usually continue to do so* all their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined *ideas*, they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have, contenting themselves with the same words other people use: as if their very sound necessarily carried with it constantly the same meaning. This, though men make a shift with, in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it necessary to be understood, and therefore they make signs till they are so; yet this insignificance in their words, when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest, manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible

noise and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of *ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in nature, their bare sounds are often only thought on, or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours, and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning: whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled abode. This I guess to be so; and every one may observe in himself and others, whether it be or no.

§ 5. 2. *Unsteady Application of them.*

SECONDLY, Another great abuse of words, is, *inconstancy* in the use of them. It is hard to find a discourse written of any subject, especially of controversy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the same words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse, and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple *ideas*, and sometimes for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for signs of my *ideas*, to make them known to others, not by any natural signification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat and abuse, when I make them stand sometimes for one thing, and sometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater dishonesty. And a man, in his accounts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of units (*v. g.* this character 3 stand sometimes for three, sometimes for four, and sometimes for eight) as in his discourse, or reasoning, make the same words stand for different collections of simple *ideas*. If men

should do so in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus, in the affairs and business of the world, and call eight sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him one of the two names men constantly are disgusted with. And yet in arguings and learned contests, the same sort of proceeding passes commonly for wit and learning: but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the misplacing of counters in the casting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

§ 6. 3. *Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.*

THIRDLY, Another abuse of language is, an *affected obscurity*, by either applying old words to new and unusual significations, or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or else putting them so together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the peripatetic philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it. There is scarce any of them that are not cumbered with some difficulties (such is the imperfection of human knowledge), which they have been fain to cover with obscurity of terms, and to confound the signification of words, which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being discovered. That *body* and *extension*, in common use, stand for two distinct ideas, is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their signification precisely the same, it would be proper, and as intelligible to say, the *body of an extension*, as *the extension of a body*; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their signification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the signification of words, logic and the liberal sciences, as they have been handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired art of disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that sort of learned writings,

will find the words there much more obscure, uncertain and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary conversation.

§ 7. *Logic and Dispute has much contributed to this.*

THIS is unavoidably to be so, where men's parts and learning are estimated by their skill in *disputing*. And if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly on the fineness and niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of men so employed, should perplex, involve and subtilize the signification of sounds, so as never to want something to say, in opposing or defending any question; the victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but the last word in the dispute.

§ 8. *Calling it Subtility.*

THIS, though a very useless skill, and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of *subtility* and *acuteness*; and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, since the philosophers of old (the disputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian wittily and with reason taxes), and the schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem for their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of others by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could not be understood: whilst it appears in all history, that these profound doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their neighbours; and brought but small advantage to human life, or the societies wherein they lived: unless the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obscuring the signification of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.

§ 9. *This Learning very little benefits Society.*

FOR notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing doctors, it was to the unscholastic statesman, that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and condemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and *learned gibberish*, prevailed mightily in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those, who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men of business and ignorant with hard words, or employing the ingenious and idle intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth: besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful and undefined words: which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns, and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity, but obscurity.

§ 10. *But destroys the Instruments of Knowledge and Communication.*

THUS learned ignorance, and this art of keeping, even inquisitive men, from true knowledge, hath been propagated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform the understanding. For we see that other well-meaning and wise men, whose education and parts had not acquired that *acuteness*, could intelligibly express themselves to one another; and in its plain use make a benefit of language. But though unlearned men well enough understood the words *white* and *black*, &c. and had constant notions of the *ideas* signified by those words; yet there were philosophers found, who had learning and *subtlety* enough to prove, that *snow was black*; i. e. to prove, that *white was black*.

Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse, conversation, instruction and society; whilst with great art and *subtily* they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words, and thereby render language less useful, than the real defects of it had made it; a gift, which the illiterate had not attained to.

§ 11. *As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters.* THESE learned men did equally instruct men's understandings, and profit their lives, as he who should alter the signification of known characters, and, by a subtle device of learning, far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate, dull, and vulgar, should, in his writing, show that he could put *A* for *B*, and *D* for *E*, &c. to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader. It being as senseless to put *black*, which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible *idea*, to put it, I say, for another, or the contrary *idea*, i. e. to call *snow black*, as to put this mark *A*, which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound, made by a certain motion of the organs of speech, for *B*; which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound, made by another certain motion of the organs of speech.

§ 12. *This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice.* NOR hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious empty speculations, it hath invaded the great concerns of human life and society, obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity, brought confusion, disorder and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in great measure rendered useless, those two great rules, religion and justice. What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of GOD and man served for, but to make the meaning more doubtful, and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions and acute niceties, but obscurity and uncertainty, leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes, speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands, are easily understood; speaking to

their people, in their laws, are not so? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text or a law that he reads, till he consults an expositor, or goes to council; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the words signify either nothing at all, or what he pleases.

§ 13. *And ought not to pass for Learning.*

WHETHER any by-interests of these professions have occasioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be considered, whether it would not be well for mankind, whose concernment it is to know things as they are, and to do what they ought, and not to spend their lives in talking about them, or tossing words to and fro; whether it would not be well, I say, that the use of words were made plain and direct, and that language, which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of society, should not be employed to darken truth, and unsettle people's rights; to raise mists, and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at least, if this will happen, it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so?

§ 14. 4. *Taking them for Things.*

FOURTHLY, Another great abuse of words is, the taking them for things. This though it in some degree concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men are most subject, who confine their thoughts to any one system, and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis; whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the peripatetic philosophy, who does not think the ten names, under which are ranked the ten predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that school, that is not persuaded, that *substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, intentional species, &c.* are something real? These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and

have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them; and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The *Platonists* have their *soul of the world*, and the *Epicureans* their *endeavour towards motion* in their atoms, when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms, that others understand not; but yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes by familiar use among those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant. And should *aereal* and *etherial vehicles* come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received any where, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as *peripatetic forms* and *intentional species* have heretofore done.

§ 15. *Instance in Matter*

How much *names taken for things* are apt to mislead the understanding, the attentive reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover; and that, perhaps, in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that a very familiar one: how many intricate disputes have there been about *matter*, as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from *body*; as it is evident the word *matter* stands for an *idea* distinct from the *idea* of body? For if the *ideas* these two terms stood for, were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put one for another. But we see, that though it be proper to say, there is *one matter of all bodies*, one cannot say, there is *one body of all matters*: we familiarly say, one *body* is bigger than another; but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say, one *matter* is bigger than another. Whence comes this then? viz. from hence, that though *matter* and *body* be not really distinct, but wherever there is the one, there is the other; yet *matter* and *body* stands for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part

of the other. For *body* stands for a solid extended figured substance, whereof *matter* is but a partial and more confused conception, it seeming to me to be used for the substance and solidity of body, without taking in its extension and figure; and therefore it is that speaking of *matter*, we speak of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the *idea* of a solid substance, which is every where the same, every where uniform. This being our *idea* of *matter*, we no more conceive or speak of different *matters* in the world, than we do of different solidities; though we both conceive and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking *matter* to be the name of something really existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning *materia prima*; which imperfection or abuse, how far it may concern a great many other general terms, I leave to be considered. This, I think, I may at least say, that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our *ideas* only, and not for things themselves. For when we argue about *matter*, or any the like term, we truly argue only about the *idea* we express by that sound, whether that precise *idea* agree to any thing really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell what *ideas* they make their words stand for, there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling, in the search or support of truth, that there is.

§ 16. *This makes Errors lasting.*

BUT whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any one, that the words which his father or schoolmaster, the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in nature: which, perhaps, is *none of the least causes, that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes*, even in opinions purely phi-

losophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.

§ 17. 5. *Setting them for what they cannot signify.*

FIFTHLY, Another abuse of words, is the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe, that in the general names of substances, whereof the nominal essences are only known to us, when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly suppose, or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For when a man says *gold is malleable*, he means and would insinuate something more than this, that *what I call gold is malleable* (though truly it amounts to no more), but would have this understood, viz. that *gold*, i. e. *what has the real essence of gold, is malleable*; which amounts to thus much, that *malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold*. But a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connection in his mind of malleableness, is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus when we say, that *animal rationale* is, and *animal implume bipes latis unguibus* is not, a good definition of a man; it is plain, we suppose the name *man* in this case to stand for the real essence of a species, and would signify, that a *rational animal* better described that real essence, than a *two legged animal with broad nails and without feathers*. For else, why might not *Plato* as properly make the word *άνθρωπος* or *man* stand for his complex idea, made up of the ideas of a body, distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as *Aristotle*, make the complex idea, to which he gave the name *άνθρωπος* or *man*, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together; unless the name *άνθρωπος* or *man* were supposed to stand for something else than what it signifies; and to be put in the place of some other thing than the idea a man professes he would express by it?

§ 18. v. g. Putting them for the real Effences of Substances.

IT is true, the names of substances would be much more useful, and propositions made in them much more certain, were the real effences of substances the *ideas* in our minds which those words signified. And it is for want of those real effences that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them: And therefore the mind, to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a secret supposition, to stand for a thing having that real effence, as if thereby it made some nearer approaches to it. For though the word *man* or *gold* signify nothing truly but a complex *idea* of properties united together in one sort of substances; yet there is scarce any body in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real effence on which those properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it when we would make them stand for something which not being in our complex *idea*, the name we use can no ways be the sign of.

§ 19. Hence we think every change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Species.

THIS shows us the reason why in *mixed modes* any of the *ideas* that make the composition of the complex one, being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, *i. e.* to be of another species, as is plain in *chance-medley, manslaughter, murder, parricide, &c.* The reason whereof is, because the complex *idea* signified by that name is the real as well as nominal effence; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other effence but that. But in *substances* it is not so. For though in that called *gold* one puts into his complex *idea* what another leaves out, and *vice versa*; yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is changed: because they secretly in their minds refer that name, and suppose it annexed to a real immutable effence of a thing existing, on which those properties depend. He that adds to his complex *idea* of *gold* that of fixedness or sol-

lubility in *aq. regia*, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species; but only to have a more perfect *idea*, by adding another simple *idea*, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex *idea* consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the *idea*, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies, the word *gold* (which by standing for a more or less perfect collection of simple *ideas*, serves to design that sort of body well enough in civil discourse), comes to have no signification at all, being put for somewhat whereof we have no *idea* at all, and so can signify nothing at all, when the body itself is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet, if well considered, it will be found a quite different thing to argue about *gold* in name, and about a parcel of the body itself, *v. g.* a piece of *leaf-gold* laid before us; though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the thing.

§ 20. *The Cause of the Abuse, a Supposition of Nature's working always regularly.*

THAT which I think very much disposes men to substitute their names for the real essences of *species*, is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those *species*, by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who observes their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the same name, are, in their internal constitution, as different one from another as several of those which are ranked under different specific names. *This supposition, however, that the same precise internal constitution goes always with the same specific name, makes men forward to take those names for the representatives of those real essences, though indeed they signify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may so say, signifying one thing, and being supposed for, or put in*

the place of another, they cannot but in such a kind of use cause a great deal of uncertainty in men's discourses; especially in those who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of *substantial forms*, whereby they firmly imagine the several species of things to be determined and distinguished.

§ 21. *This abuse contains two false suppositions.*

BUT however preposterous and absurd it be to make our names stand for *ideas* we have not, or (which is all one) essences that we know not, it being in effect to make our words the signs of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever so little reflects on the use men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or that thing he sees, let it be a drill, or a monstrous *fœtus*, be a *man* or no; it is evident, the question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex *idea* expressed by the name *man*: but whether it has in it the real essence of a species of things, which he supposes his name *man* to stand for. In which way of using the names of substances, there are these false suppositions contained.

First, That there are certain precise essences, according to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into *species*. That every thing has a real constitution, whereby it is what it is, and on which its sensible qualities depend, is past doubt: But I think it has been proved that this makes not the distinction of *species*, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of their names.

Secondly, This tacitly also insinuates, as if we had *ideas* of these proposed essences. For to what purpose else is it to inquire whether this or that thing have the real essence of the species *man*, if we did not suppose that there were such a specific essence known? which yet is utterly false: And therefore such application of names, as would make them stand for *ideas* which we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourses and reasonings about them, and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words.

§ 22. 6. *A Supposition that Words have a certain and evident Signification.*

SIXTHLY, There remains yet another more general, though perhaps less observed *abuse of words*; and that is, that men having by a long and familiar use annexed to them certain *ideas*, they are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connection between the names and the signification they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiesce in the words delivered, as if it were past doubt, that in the use of those common received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise *ideas*: Whence presuming, that when they have in discourse used any term, they have thereby, as it were, set before others, the very thing they talk of. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally standing for just what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand clearly others meaning. From whence commonly proceeds noise and wrangling, without improvement or information; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own *ideas*. And yet men think it strange, if, in discourse, or (where it is often absolutely necessary) in dispute, one sometimes asks the meaning of their terms: though the arguings one may every day observe in conversation, make it evident, that there are few names of complex *ideas* which any two men use for the same just precise collection. It is hard to name a word which will not be a clear instance of this. *Life* is a term none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affront to be asked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, whether a plant, that lies ready formed in the seed, have life; whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a swoon without sense or motion, be alive or no; it is easy to perceive that a clear distinct settled *idea* does not always accompany the use of so known a word as that of *life* is. Some gross and

confused conceptions men indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language; and such a loose use of their words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourses or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical inquiries. Knowledge and reasoning require precise determinate *ideas*. And though men will not be so importunately dull, as not to understand what others say, without demanding an explication of their terms; nor so troublesomely critical, as to correct others in the use of the words they receive from them: yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words, whose sense seems dubious; or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance, in what sense another man uses his words, since he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This abuse of taking words upon trust, has no where spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which has so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more, than to this ill use of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same; though perhaps what they would have been different.

§ 23. *The Ends of Language*: 1. *To convey our Ideas*. To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language; the *ends of language in our discourse with others*, being chiefly these three: *First, To make known* one man's thoughts or *ideas* to another: *Secondly, To do it with* as much ease and *quickness* as is possible: and, *Thirdly, Thereby to convey the knowledge* of things: Language is either abused or deficient, when it fails of any of these three.

First, Words fail in the first of these ends, and lay not open one man's *ideas* to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determin'd *ideas* in their minds, whereof they are the signs: or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to *ideas*, to which the common use of that language does not apply them: or, 3. When they apply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another *idea*.

§ 24. 2. *To do it with quickness.*

SECONDLY, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex *ideas* without having distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that *idea* he would show another.

§ 25. 3. *Therewith to convey the Knowledge of things.*
THIRDLY, There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their *ideas* agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect, that has its original in our *ideas*, which are not so conformable to the nature of things, as attention, study, and application might make them; yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality of existence.

§ 26. *How Men's Words fail in all these.*

FIRST, He that hath words of any language, without distinct *ideas* in his mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else.

§ 27.

SECONDLY, He that has complex *ideas*, without particular names for them, would be in no better a case than a bookseller, who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by showing the loose sheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse, for want of words to communicate his complex *ideas*, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express what another man signifies in one.

§ 28.

THIRDLY, He that puts not constantly the same sign for the same *idea*, but uses the same words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another signification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several things under the same name.

§ 29.

FOURTHLY, He that applies the words of any language to *ideas* different from those to which the common use of that country applies them, however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enters the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other *ideas* than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses them.

§ 30.

FIFTHLY, He that hath imagined to himself substances such as never have been, and filled his head with *ideas* which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with the fantastical imaginations of his own

brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

§ 31.

HE that hath names without *ideas*, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds. He that hath complex *ideas*, without names for them, wants liberty and despatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to use periphrases. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily, will either be not minded, or not understood. He that applies his names to *ideas* different from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he that hath *ideas* of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath instead thereof *chimeras*.

§ 32. *How in Substances.*

IN our notions concerning substances, we are liable to all the former inconveniencies; *v. g.* He that uses the word *tarantula*, without having any imagination or *idea* of what it stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a new-discovered country shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true *ideas* of them, as of a horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himself. 3. He that uses the word *body* sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very fallaciouly. 4. He that gives the name *horse* to that *idea* which common usage calls *mule*, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the name *centaur* stands for some real being, imposes on himself, and mistakes words for things.

§ 33. *How in Modes and Relations.*

IN modes and relations generally we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniencies; *viz.* 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes, as *gratitude*, or *charity*, and yet not have any precise *ideas* annexed in my thoughts to those names. 2. I may have *ideas*, and not know

the names that belong to them; *v. g.* I may have the *idea* of a man's drinking, till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know, that it is to be called *drunkenness*. 3. I may have the *ideas* of virtues or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss; *v. g.* when I apply the name *frugality* to that *idea* which others call and signify by this sound, *covetousness*. 4. I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5. But in modes and relations, I cannot have *ideas* disagreeing to the existence of things: for modes being complex *ideas*, made by the mind at pleasure; and relation being but my way of considering or comparing two things together, and so also an *idea* of my own making; these *ideas* can scarce be found to disagree with any thing existing, since they are not in the mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties inseparably flowing from the internal constitution or essence of any substance; but as it were patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exist. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and so using words in a different sense from other people, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong *ideas* of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my *ideas* of mixed modes or relations, any inconsistent *ideas* together, I fill my head also with *chimeras*; since such *ideas*, if well examined, cannot so much as exist in the mind, much less any real being be ever denominated from them.

§ 34. 7. *Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.* SINCE wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, *figurative speeches* and allusion in language will hardly be admitted, as an imperfection or *abuse* of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the

artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong *ideas*, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheat; and, therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. What and how various they are, will be superfluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to be informed; only I cannot but observe, how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge, is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation: and, I doubt not, but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. *Eloquence*, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.

CHAP. XI.

OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTIONS
AND ABUSES.§ 1. *They are worth seeking.*

THE natural and improved imperfections of languages, we have seen above at large; and speech being the great bond that holds society together, and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man, and one generation to another, it would well deserve our most serious thoughts, to consider what *remedies* are to be found for these *inconveniencies* above mentioned

§ 2. *Are not easy.*

I AM not so vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the perfect *reforming* the *languages* of the world, no not so much as of his own country, without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense, and for none but determined and uniform *ideas*, would be to think that all men should have the same notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct *ideas* of: which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world, who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding; or that men's talking much or little, shall hold proportion only to their knowledge.

§ 3. *But yet necessary to Philosophy.*

BUT though the market and exchange must be left to their own ways of talking, and gossipings not to be robbed of their ancient privilege; though the schools and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have any thing offered to abate the length, or lessen the number of their disputes: yet methinks those who pretend *seriously* to *search after* or *maintain truth*, should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or equivocation, to which men's words are naturally liable, if care be not taken.

§ 4. *Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.*

FOR he that shall well consider the *errors* and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are *spread in the world by an ill use of words*, will find some reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hinderance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their thoughts only on words, especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder, if the result of such contemplations, and reasonings about little more than sounds, whilst the *ideas* they annexed to them

are very confused or very unsteady, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake, without any clear judgment or knowledge?

§ 5. *Obstinacy.*

THIS inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill use of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes, whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder, that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted, very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox; since subtilty, in those who make profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which consisting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of *obscure* or *deceitful terms*, is only fit to *make men more conceited* in their ignorance, and *obstinate* in their errors.

§ 6. *And Wrangling.*

LET us look into the books of controversy of any kind; there we shall see, that the effect of obscure, unsteady or equivocal terms, is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding. For if the *idea* be not agreed on betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument not about things, but names. As often as such a word, whose signification is not ascertained be-

twixt them, comes in use, their understandings have no other object wherein they agree, but barely the sound; the things that they think on at that time, as expressed by that word, being quite different.

§ 7. *Instance—Bat and Bird.*

WHETHER a *bat* be a *bird* or no, is not a question; whether a *bat* be another thing than indeed it is, or have other qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely absurd to doubt of: but the question is, 1. Either between those that acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect *ideas*, of one or both of those sorts of things, for which these names are supposed to stand; and then it is a real inquiry concerning the nature of a *bird* or a *bat*, to make their yet imperfect *ideas* of it more complete, by examining, whether all the simple *ideas*, to which, combined together, they both give the name *bird*, be all to be found in a *bat*: but this is a question only of inquiries (not disputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a question between disputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a *bat* is a *bird*. And then the question is barely about the signification of one or both of these words; in that they not having both the same complex *ideas*, to which they give these two names, one holds, and the other denies that these two names may be affirmed one of another. Were they agreed in the signification of these two names, it were impossible they should dispute about them: for they would presently and clearly see (were that adjusted between them) whether all the simple *ideas*, of the more general name *bird*, were found in the complex *idea* of a *bat*, or no: and so there could be no doubt, whether a *bat* were a *bird* or no. And here I desire it may be considered and carefully examined, whether the greatest part of the disputes in the world are not merely verbal, and about the signification of words; and whether, if the terms they are made in were defined, and reduced in their signification (as they must be where they signify any thing) to determined collections of the simple *ideas* they do or should stand for, those disputes would not end of themselves, and immediately va-

nish. I leave it then to be considered, what the learning of disputation is, and how well they are employed for the advantage of themselves or others, whose business is only the vain ostentation of sounds; *i. e.* those who spend their lives in disputes and controversies. When I shall see any of those combatants strip all his terms of ambiguity and obscurity (which every one may do in the words he uses himself); I shall think him a champion for knowledge, truth, and peace, and not the slave of vain glory, ambition or a party.

§ 8. 1. *Remedy, to use no Word without an Idea.*

To remedy the defects of speech before-mentioned to some degree, and to prevent the inconveniencies that follow from them, I imagine the observation of these following rules may be of use, till somebody better able shall judge it worth his while, to think more maturely on this matter, and oblige the world with his thoughts on it.

First, A man should take care *to use no word without a signification*, no name without an *idea* for which he makes it stand. This rule will not seem altogether needless to any one who shall take the pains to recollect how often he has met with such words, as *instinct*, *sympathy*, and *antipathy*, &c. in the discourse of others, so made use of, as he might easily conclude, that those that used them had no *ideas* in their minds to which they applied them; but spoke them only as sounds, which usually served instead of reasons on the like occasions. Not but that these words, and the like, have very proper significations in which they may be used; but there being no natural connection between any words and any *ideas*, these, and any other, may be learned by rote, and pronounced or writ by men, who have no *ideas* in their minds, to which they have annexed them, and for which they make them stand; which is necessary they should, if men would speak intelligibly even to themselves alone.

§ 9. 2. *To have distinct Ideas annexed to them in Modes.*

SECONDLY, It is not enough a man uses his words as signs of some *ideas*; those *ideas* he annexes them to, if they be *simple*, must be clear and distinct; if *complex* must be de-

terminate, i. e. the precise collection of simple *ideas* settled in the mind, with that sound annexed to it, as the sign of that precise determined collection, and no other. This is very necessary in names of modes, and especially moral words, which having no settled objects in nature, from whence their *ideas* are taken, as from their original, are apt to be very confused. *Justice* is a word in every man's mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined loose signification: which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that a complex *idea* consists of; and if it be decomposed, must be able to resolve it still on, till he at last comes to the simple *ideas* that make it up: and unless this be done, a man makes an ill use of the word, let it be *justice*, for example, or any other: I do not say, a man needs stand to recollect and make this analysis at large, every time the word *justice* comes in his way: but this at least is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the *idea* of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases. If one, who makes his complex *idea* of *justice*, to be such a treatment of the person or goods of another, as is according to law, hath not a clear and distinct *idea* what *law* is, which makes a part of his complex *idea* of justice, it is plain his *idea* of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will perhaps, be judged very troublesome; and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex *ideas* of mixed modes so precisely in their minds. But yet I must say, till this be done, it must not be wondered that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their discourses with others.

§ 10. *And conformable in Substances.*

In the names of *substances*, for a right use of them, something more is required than barely determined *ideas*. In these the names must also be conformable to things, as they exist; but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by. This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge, and in con-

troverfies about truth. And though it would be well too, if it extended itfelf to common converfation, and the ordinary affairs of life ; yet I think that is fcarce to be expected. Vulgar notions fuit vulgar difcourfes ; and both, though confufed enough, yet ferve pretty well the market and the wake. Merchants and lovers, cooks and tailors, have words wherewithal to defpatch their ordinary affairs ; and fo, I think, might philofophers and difputants too, if they had a mind to underftand, and to be clearly underftood.

§ II. 3. *Propriety.*

THIRDLY, It is not enough that men have *ideas*, determined *ideas*, for which they make thefe figns ftand ; but they *muft* alfo take care to *apply their words*, as near as may be, to *ſuch ideas as common ufe has annexed them to*. For words, eſpecially of languages already framed, being no man's private poſſeſſion, but the common meafure of commerce and communication, it is not for any one, at pleaſure, to change the ſtamp they are current in, nor alter the *ideas* they are affixed to ; or at leaſt, when there is a neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give notice of it. Men's intentions in ſpeaking are, or at leaſt ſhould be, to be underſtood ; which cannot be without frequent explanations, demands, and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common ufe. Propriety of ſpeech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greateſt eaſe and advantage ; and therefore deſerves ſome part of our care and ſtudy, eſpecially in the names of moral words. The proper ſignification and uſe of terms is beſt to be learned from thoſe, who in their writings and difcourſes appear to have had the cleareſt notions, and applied to them their terms with the exacteſt choice and fitness. This way of uſing a man's words according to the propriety of the language, though it have not always the good fortune to be underſtood, yet moſt commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is ſo unſkilful in the language he ſpeaks, as not to underſtand it, when made uſe of as it ought to be.

§ 12. 4. *To make known their meaning.*

FOURTHLY, But because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words, as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for: And because men, in the improvement of their knowledge, come to have *ideas* different from the ordinary and received ones, for which they must either make new words (which men seldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty), or else must use old ones in a new signification: Therefore, after the observation of the foregoing rules, it is sometimes necessary, for the ascertaining the signification of words, to *declare their meaning*, where either common use has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most names of very complex *ideas*); or where the term being very material in the discourse, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake.

§ 13. *And that three ways.*

As the *ideas*, men's words stand for, are of different sorts; so the way of making known the *ideas*, they stand for, when there is occasion, is also different. For though defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words; yet there are some words that will not be defined, as there are others, whose precise meaning cannot be made known but by definition; and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other, as we shall see in the names of simple *ideas*, modes and substances.

§ 14. 1. *In simple Ideas, by synonymous terms, or showing.*

FIRST, When a man makes use of the name of any simple idea, which he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged by the laws of ingenuity, and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. This, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition; and therefore, when a synonymous word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. *First*, Sometimes the naming the subject, wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name be understood by those who are

acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So, to make a country man understand what *feuille morte* colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling in *autumn*. Secondly, But the only sure way of making known the signification of the name of any simple *idea*, is by *presenting to his senses that subject which may produce it in his mind*, and make him actually have the *idea* that word stands for.

§ 15. 2. *In mixed Modes, by definition.*

SECONDLY, *Mixed modes*, especially those belonging to morality, being most of them such combinations of *ideas*, as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are not always standing patterns to be found existing; the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple *ideas*, by any showing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly *defined*. For they being combinations of several *ideas*, that the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any archetypes, men may, if they please, exactly know the *ideas* that go to each composition, and so both use these words in a certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when there is occasion, what they stand for. This, if well considered, would lay great blame on those, who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes, or, which is all one, the real essence of each species is to be known, they being not of nature's but man's making, it is a great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by.

§ 16. *Morality capable of Demonstration.*

UPON this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that *morality is capable of demonstration*, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor

let any one object, that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their divers natures are not so much inquired into, as supposed; *v. g.* when we say, that *man is subject to law*, we mean nothing by *man*, but a corporeal rational creature: what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are, in this case, is no way considered. And therefore, whether a child or changeling be a *man* in a physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as it will, it concerns not at all the *moral man*, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable *idea*, a *corporeal rational being*. For were there a monkey, or any other creature to be found, that had the use of reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general *ideas*, he would no doubt be subject to law, and in that sense be a *man*, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical discourses: where, if the mathematician speaks of a *cube* or *globe* of *gold*, or any other body, he has his clear settled *idea* which varies not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not.

§ 17. *Definition can make moral Discourses clear.*

THIS I have here mentioned by the by, to show of what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion: since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuity (to say no worse of it) to refuse to do it: since a *definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known*; and yet a way whereby their meaning may be known *certainly*, and without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not much more clear than those

in natural philosophy: since they are about *ideas*, in the mind, which are none of them false or disproportionate; they having no external beings for the *archetypes* which they are referred to, and much correspond with. It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an *idea* which shall be the standard to which they will give the name *justice*, with which pattern so made all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination, than, having seen *Aristides*, to frame an *idea* that shall in all things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what *idea* they please of him. For the one, they need but know the combination of *ideas* that are put together within in their own minds; for the other they must inquire into the whole nature, and abstruse hidden constitution, and various qualities of a thing existing without them.

§ 18. *And is the only way.*

ANOTHER reason that makes the *defining of mixed modes* so necessary, *especially of moral words*, is what I mentioned a little before, *viz.* That it is *the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty.* For the *ideas* they stand for, being for the most part such whose component parts no where exist together, but scattered and mingled with others, it is the mind alone that collects them, and gives them the union of one *idea*: and it is only by words, enumerating the several simple *ideas* which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names stand for; the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us, by the proposal of sensible objects, to show the *ideas* which our names of this kind stand for, as it does often in the names of sensible simple *ideas*, and also to some degree in those of substances.

§ 19. 3. *In Substances, by showing and defining.*

THIRDLY, For the explaining the signification of the names of substances, as they stand for the *ideas* we have of their distinct species, both the fore-mentioned ways *viz.* of *showing and defining*, are requisite in many cases to be made use of. For there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other *ideas*, which make up our complex *idea* of that spe-

cies, annexed; we forwardly give the specific name to that thing, wherein that characteristical mark is found, which we take to be the most distinguishing *idea* of that species. These leading our characteristical (as I may so call them *ideas*, in the sorts of animals and vegetables, is (as has been before remarked, Ch. VI. § 29. and Ch. IX. § 15.) mostly figure, and in inanimate bodies colour, and in some both together. Now,

§ 20. *Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances are best got by showing.*

THESE *leading sensible qualities* are those which make the *chief ingredients of our specific ideas*, and consequently the most observable and unvariable part in the definitions of our specific names, as attributed to sorts of *substances* coming under our knowledge. For though the sound *man*, in its own nature, be as apt to signify a complex *idea* made up of animality and rationality, united in the same subject, as to signify any other combination; yet used as a mark to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind, perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex *idea*, signified by the word *man*, as any other we find in it: and therefore why *Plato's animal implume bipes latis unguibus* should not be as good a definition of the name *man*, standing for that sort of creatures, will not be easy to show: for it is the shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that species, than a faculty of reasoning, which appears not at first, and in some never. And if this be not allowed to be so, I do not know how they can be excused from murder, who kill monstrous births (as we call them), because of an unordinary shape, without knowing whether they have a rational soul or no; which can be no more discerned in a well-formed, than ill-shaped infant, as soon as born. And who is it has informed us, that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement, unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece, or can join itself to and inform no sort of body but one that is just of such an outward structure?

§ 21. *Ideas of the leading Qualities of substances are best got by showing.*

Now *these leading qualities are best made known by showing*, and can hardly be made known otherwise. For the shape of an *horse*, or *castowary*, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the sight of the animals doth it a thousand times better: and the *idea* of the particular colour of *gold* is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this metal, who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the sight; where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by use have not got the precise nice *idea* of that peculiar yellow) shall not perceive any difference. The like may be said of those other simple *ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any substance; for which precise *ideas* there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing sound there is in *gold*, distinct from the sound of other bodies, has no particular name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal.

§ 22. *The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.*

BUT because many of the simple *ideas* that make up our specific *ideas* of substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the signification of our *names of substances*, some part of the signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple *ideas*, than in showing the substance itself. For he that, to the yellow shining colour of *gold* got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the *ideas* of great ductility, fusibility, fixedness, and solubility in *aq. regia*, will have a perfecter *idea* of *gold* than he can have by seeing a piece of *gold*, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal constitution of this shining, heavy, ductile thing (from whence all these its properties flow) lay open to our senses, as the formal constitution, or essence of a triangle does, the signification of the word *gold* might as easily be ascertained as that of *triangle*.

§ 23. *A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits.*

HENCE we may take notice how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses. For how spirits, separate from bodies (whose knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all. The whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted that spirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh, may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances, as we have of a triangle, and so perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence: but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions.

§ 24. *Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to things.*

BUT though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And therefore in substances we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea, commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little farther, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct species; or else learn them from such as are used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For since it is intended their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex idea in other men's minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they stand for: therefore to define their names right, natural history is to be inquired into; and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniencies in discourses and arguings about

natural bodies and substantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common but confused or very imperfect *idea* to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that *idea* in our use of them: but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex *idea* belonging to each specific name; and in discourse with others (if we find them mistake us), we ought to tell what the complex *idea* is, that we make such a name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical verity, in that children being taught words whilst they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and seldom frame determined *ideas* to be signified by them. Which custom (it being easy, and serving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and conversation) they are apt to continue when they are men: and so begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the proper language of their country, *i. e.* according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themselves; and by their arguing one with another, makes but small progress in the discoveries of useful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called.

§ 25. *Not easy to be made so.*

It were therefore to be wished, that men versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would set down those simple *ideas*, wherein they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confusion which comes from several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, or accurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things which

come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this sort, containing, as it were, a natural history, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, cost, pains, and sagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances, as explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well, where there is occasion, if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done; but men talk to one another, and dispute in words, whose meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake, that the signification of common words are certainly established, and the precise *ideas* they stand for perfectly known; and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false; no names of complex *ideas* having so settled determined significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise *ideas*. Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no discredit not to know what precise *idea* any sound stands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words, within some tolerable latitude, that may serve for ordinary conversation: and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the *ideas* which are annexed to words by common use, in a language familiar to him. But common use, being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itself at last to the *ideas* of particular men, proves often but a very variable standard. But though such a dictionary, as I have above mentioned, will require too much time, cost, and pains to be hoped for in this age; yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that words standing for things, which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease, and in less time, teach the true signification

of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries or ages, and settle truer *ideas* in men's minds of several things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way: And he that has had occasion to consult them, will have reason to confess, that he has a clearer *idea* of *apium*, or *ibex*, from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of *strigil* and *fistrum*, if instead of a *curry-comb* and *cymbal*, which are the *English* names dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the margin, small pictures of these instruments, as they were in use amongst the ancients. *Toga*, *tunica*, *pallium*, are words easily translated by *gown*, *coat*, and *cloak*; but we have thereby no more true *ideas* of the fashion of those habits amongst the *Romans*, than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as these, which the eye distinguishes by their shapes, would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the signification of such words, than any other words set for them, or made use of to define them. But this only by the by.

§ 26. By Constancy in their Signification.

FIFTHLY, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should *use the same word constantly in the same sense*: If this were done (which nobody can refuse without great dissingenuity), many of the books extant might be spared; many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end; several of those great volumes, swoln with ambiguous words, now used in one sense, and by and by in another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many of the philosophers (to mention no other), as well as poets works, might be contained in a nut shell.

§ 27. *When the Variation is to be explained.*

BUT after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect of that infinite variety of thoughts, that men, wanting terms to suit their precise notions, will, notwithstanding their utmost caution, be forced often to use the same word in somewhat different senses. And though in the continuation of a discourse, or the pursuit of an argument, there be hardly room to digress into a particular definition, as often as a man varies the signification of any term; yet the import of the discourse will, for the most part, if there be no designed fallacy, sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it: but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader, there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he there uses that term.

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